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Preface 
The cognitive zeitgeist within the psychotherapy literature of the 
last decades has tended to obscure the role of emotion, 
emphasising instead the role of cognition and behaviour in 
psychotherapeutic change. It seems anomalous that clinically 
oriented psychologists should have neglected emotion to such a 
degree, as emotional distress of one type or another is the 
currency of psychotherapy. Concurrent with the neglect of emotion 
in the psychotherapy literature, within general psychology there 
has been a resurgence of interest in emotion as a fundamental 
aspect of human experience. Following the course set by Jeremy 
Safran & Leslie Greenberg, the individuals who have alerted the 
psychotherapeutic community to the need for cognisance of the 
general psychology work on emotion, an attempt has been made 
to form an amalgam which acknowledges both the therapeutic and 
academic knowledge about emotion. That is the first element of 
the discussion presented below. 
The second major element is Adventure Therapy. Adventure 
Therapy, as a means of addressing difficulties of various sorts, 
has been a part of the therapeutic landscape for almost one 
hundred years. There has been a recent resurgence of interest in 
Adventure Therapy, particularly as the need for alternatives to 
traditional Italking' therapies for some populations has been 
recognised. The view taken here is that Adventure Therapy is 
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indeed a form of psychotherapy and not merely a specialised form 
of recreation undertaken with particular populations. 
In much the same way as many other forms of therapy, Adventure 
Therapy is partially defined by the environment, procedures and 
techniques which constitute the practical aspect of the approach. 
Behind this is the theory that provides the rationale for the more 
tangible aspects. For instance, classical psychoanalysis has the 
unconscious, free association, and the ubiquitous couch, while 
Adventure Therapy has the outdoors and activities such as 
climbing, abseiling, kayaking, and tramping. As will become 
apparent, for Adventure Therapy, it isthe activities and the 
environment within which they take place that is crucial to the 
therapeutic effect. 
Most psychotherapeutic schools, to greater or lesser degrees, 
have attempted, in the course of their theorising, to say something 
about the role of emotion. This does not appear to be the case for 
Adventure Therapy. By way of redressing this notable deficiency, 
the discussion below draws on the implications that stem from a 
synthesis emerging from both the therapeutic and academic 
literatures. 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to Adventure Therapy with particular 
emphasis on the existing theoretical models which have been 
applied to Adventure Therapy. Also discussed are the types of 
programs which exist and the populations to which they are 
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directed. Similarly, Chapter 2 delineates a number of features of 
emotion drawing on the general academic research and theory. 
Chapter 3 outlines the ways in which various psychotherapeutic 
schools have conceptualised emotion. The emotional change 
processes which contribute to the purported psychotherapeutic 
effect are also examined. Chapter 4 describes the general 
therapeutic implications that emerge from the synthesis of the 
therapeutic and academic literatures. 
Chapter 5 is an examination of two particular bodies of research 
that relate to both emotion and adventure; coping and risk-taking. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the academic 
research provides some useful signposts as to the role of emotion 
in Adventure Therapy particularly with regard to the complexity of 
the factors which may need to be considered when examining 
adventure specifically. However, what also becomes apparent are 
the limitations of scope and methodology that will need to be 
addressed for research within the Adventure Therapy context. 
Chapter 6 presents a model of the role of emotion in Adventure 
Therapy. The model, essentially an ecological constructivist 
analysis, draws on the preceding chapters and is designed to 
provide a starting point from which a research program can be 
undertaken. It suggests that the activities and processes which are 
inherent parts of Adventure Therapy provide an adaptive context 
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within which emotion plays a central therapeutic role by way of its 
ability to penetrate multiple aspects of being. 
It is a common conceit that writing is a solitary task, but 
considering, even for a moment, the people who have assisted in 
the production of this thesis quickly bursts the bubble of self-
importance. My supervisor, Professor Ken Strongman, listened 
patiently to my more outlandish ideas, supplied useful feedback on 
the text and provided an exemplary model of eruditeness. John 
Raynor, Margaret Grant-Caplan and Katie Hamilton, my 
colleagues at Richmond Fellowship's Adventure Based Learning 
Program, were always enthusiastic about the project and gave me 
chocolate fish at just the right times. My sister Rachel, and her 
husband Stephen, made the task of preparing the manuscript 
substantially easier with their intelligent proofing. My parents, Eric 
and Robyn, have been unfailingly encouraging and supportive 
throughout the course of my academic endeavours. My last thesis, 
in Sociology and Anthropology, was dedicated to them, so is this 
one - the subject has changed but their love has remained the 
same. 
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ADVENTURE THERAPY 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the area of Adventure 
Therapy. The first and most obvious difficulty when approaching 
the literature in this area is the plethora of terms which different 
authors and practitioners have used to describe their field - terms 
such as adventure therapy (Gass, 1991; Stein & Senior, 1984), 
adventure based counselling (Maizell, 1988: Shoel, Prouty and 
Radcliffe, 1988), experiential-challenge (Roland et ai, 1987), 
outdoor-adventure pursuits (Ewert, 1989), therapeutic adventure 
programs (Wichmann, 1991), and wilderness therapy (Bacon & 
Kimball, 1989; Berman and Anton, 1988). At this point and for 
reasons of convenience rather than any particular ideological 
preference the term Adventure Therapy will be used. 
Adventure education and therapy programs are becoming 
increasingly popular interventions to address a wide variety of 
client difficulties. Ewert (1989:6) suggested that such programs 
involve "a variety of self initiated activities ... that contain elements 
of real or apparent danger, in which the outcome, while uncertain, 
can be influenced by the participant and circumstance". Programs 
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generally involve participants in physically and mentally 
demanding activities such as rock-climbing, abseiling, canoeing, 
rafting, tramping, and caving. 
There is a plethora of evaluation and outcome studies of various 
individual programs around the world as we" as meta-analyses 
sU~1gestive of positive outcomes (see for example; Berman, 1995; 
Cason & Gillis, 1994; Davis-Berman & Berman, 1989). However, 
Wichmann (1991) maintains that while it is generally accepted that 
such programs generally have at least some positive outcomes, 
what is still unclear is why these positive outcomes occur. 
Described below are the main theoretical approaches used within 
the Adventure Therapy domain. While these approaches are 
generally grounded within psychological theory, philosophical, 
historical and cultural aspects are also outlined. This approach of 
only describing theoretical approaches reported within the 
Adventure Therapy literature has resulted in some notable 
omissions such as psychoanalytic and cognitive behavioural 
therapies. This is not to suggest that Adventure Therapy programs 
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do not utilise aspects of such therapeutic techniques but indicates 
instead a lack of literature explicitly linking Adventure Therapy with 
such approaches. The theoretical review is followed by a brief 
description of the types, target populations, and components of 
various Adventure Therapy programs. 
Theoretical Approaches 
The Wilderness Ethic 
A fundamental aspect of most therapeutic undertakings is the 
'healing setting' (Frank, 1979). This is generally taken to refer to 
the layout of the therapist's office, the assurance of confidentiality 
and safety, and the general context within which the encounter 
occurs e.g. a hospital, an outpatient unit, a prison, or professional 
rooms. Adventure Therapy, however, typically occurs outdoors 
and the therapeutic environment is generally separate from both 
the clients' and the therapists' everyday experience. The utilisation 
of the outdoor environment is one of the defining features of 
Adventure Therapy and is seen, to varying degrees and in various 
ways, as a key therapeutic element. The environmental aspect of 
Adventure Therapy is generally approached from two 
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perspectives; a 'romantic' view of the wilderness, where the 
experience of just being in a wild place is thought to have 
therapeutic import, and a view of the experience as being an 
'escape', 'haven', or 'time out' that is used to facilitate therapy. 
The romantic approach essentially suggests that it is the place, 
that is, the wilderness, that acts as the therapist while the other 
'escape' perspective sees the wilderness or outdoors as a useful 
therapeutic medium. 
It is a recurring theme in Western culture that poets, philosophers, 
and prophets find vision and inspiration in the wilderness. It is 
important to note, however, that cultural interpretations of the 
wilderness vary markedly, and that societal attitudes towards the 
wilderness and adventure change substantially over time. 
Kluckhohn (1953) pointed out that cultures almost invariably speak 
of the meaning of nature and of their relationship to that meaning 
as central human concerns. Wilderness is a particular category of 
nature and prompts various questions. Does it provide a sanctuary 
or does it signify danger. Is it a representation of perfect order or 
4 
does it need to be subdued and organised (Altman & Chemers, 
1980)? 
For instance, for Jews in the time of the Roman Empire, 
wilderness was a sanctuary from oppressors. In the Judeo-
Christian tradition, some individuals, such as Moses, John the 
Baptist, and Jesus sought out isolation in order to face God and 
learn spiritual truth. However, as time passed, Christian ideology 
came to see the wilderness as a place of spiritual confusion, 
physical danger, and earthly temptation. The wilderness became a 
place to be subdued and cultivated. Spiritual meaning came to be 
associated with human endeavour in the form of organisation and 
production, reaching its zenith in the 19th century Evangelical 
movement. In contrast to this view is the Eastern perspective 
which sees nature and wilderness experiences as fundamentally 
instructive, presenting the individual with a perspective on their 
place in both the cosmos and their own society (Needham, 1969). 
The Romantic movement, which began in Europe in the eighteenth 
century, and infused the world of philosophy, art, and literature 
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with a new enthusiasm for nature. It is within American literature 
that the Romantic attitude towards the wilderness, and humanity's 
place within it, is most clearly espoused. 1 Longfellow, Whitman, 
and Emerson all popularised the appeal of the wilderness. It is, 
however, in the work of Thoreau that the romantic wilderness ethic 
is most clearly described (Burll, 1995). In Walden Pond, perhaps 
his best known work, Thoreau wrote: 
I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to 
front only the essential facts of life, and to see if I could not 
learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, 
discover that I had not lived. (1997: 75) 
Krutch (1982) suggests that Walden Pond contains four main 
themes, all of which still, to a greater or lesser degree, have 
resonance in the Adventure Therapy literature: (1) most people 
lead desperate lives that are maintained in silence; (2) this 
condition is brought about by a fallacy that has to do with 
materialism; (3) happiness comes from leading a simple life close 
to nature; and (4) leading this kind of life results in an 
understanding of 'higher principles'. Kaplan and Talbot (1983), 
referring specifically to Adventure Therapy wrote: 
1 The other major influence that could be discussed here is Jean-Jacques Rousseau who 
produced a compelling critique of urban sophistication. In an unflattering analysis of the 
decidedly ramshackle life of Rousseau, Johnson (1988) writes, "he is the father of the cold 
bath, systematic exercise, sport as character-forming, the weekend cottage". 
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The wilderness matches some sort of intention of the way 
things ought to be, the way things really are beneath the 
surface layers of culture and civilisation (p.190). 
A rather more pragmatic approach, is described by Chase (cited 
in Handley, 1990:177): 
A natural or wilderness environment is predictable. As a 
result, outcomes of dysfunctional behaviour are clear and 
easily understood. There are few rules other than those 
imposed by the environment ... there are no walls, little lUxury 
and much freedom. There is freedom to accept and deny 
responsibility for ones self and others, to be clean and dirty, to 
hungry or well fed, to be miserable or to have fun. The 
consequences of burned oatmeal, of a sleeping bag left out in 
the rain or an improper belay are immediate and direct. 
While the negative consequences are powerful motivators for 
adapting behaviour, Handly (ibid) suggests that the positive 
consequences of appropriate behaviour within this environment 
are equally powerful. The individual is rewarded with spectacular 
views after persevering with a hard climb, a canoeist progresses 
toward a goal after successfully negotiating a difficult rapid, and so 
on. Aside from a rather behaviourist flavour to such a viewpoint, 
which may seem incongruous, the most obvious difficulties with 
this approach are its lack of specificity with regard to add ressing 
identified problematic behaviours and its culturally determined, but 
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generally applied, assumptions about the rewards of being in the 
outdoors. There is also a hint of some sort of 'magic' occuring as a 
result of being in the wilderness, that because of its untestable 
nature, tends to make empirically oriented scientists rather 
suspicious.2 
Withdrawal and Escape 
The second perspective of the environment in the Adventure 
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Therapy literature relates to the notion of withdrawal or escape. 
There is an intuitive appeal to such an approach reflected in such 
common sayings as 'getting away from it all'. The term 'escape' is 
generally employed to refer to an absence of some aspect of life 
that is ordinarily present. This could be at the level of getting away 
from the work one ordinarily does, finding a place free from usually 
present distractions (such as noise or crowds), or being away from 
a deleterious environment or situation such as an abusive 
releationship. While this aspect has been addressed in some early 
2 The ecopsychology movement, an amalgam of environmentalism, psycotherapy, and 
religion, is the most recent incarnation of such ideas,see Roszak et al (1995) for an overview 
of ecopsychology perspectives. 
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recreational .Iiterature (Hollender, 1977; Stringer, 1975), and is 
taken up below with regard to program types, it would appear to 
have been largely unaddressed within the psychological literature. 
Outward Bound 
Although Outward Bound is strictly a program type rather than a 
theoretical approach, the Outward Bound 'philosophy' has had a 
profound influence on the Adventure Therapy field. The origins of 
many contemporary Adventure Therapy programs can be traced 
to the Outward Bound programs originally developed by 
educationalist Kurt Hahn and shipping magnate Lawrence Holt in 
the 1940's (Wilson, 1981). Holt observed that younger sailors, 
trained on modern ships with sophisticated equipment, were less 
likely to survive shipwrecks than were their older co.unterparts who 
had trained on sailing vessels, where manual dexterity and 
teamwork were regarded as essential skills. Holt believed that the 
new generation of sailors lacked the physical resilience, 
resourcefulness, and emotional control that he maintained older 
sailors used to overcome the hazards of the sea. A curriculum was 
formulated by Hahn and Holt which included obstacle courses and 
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other 'challenges' ostensibly designed to address the perceived 
deficits in the young sailors. 
The style adopted by the Outward Bound movement in the United 
Kingdom mirrored Hahn's approach to general education, most 
notably his austere and harsh public schools, such as 
Gordonstoun in Scotland. The rationale underlying the early 
Outward Bound programs was that individuals needed to develop 
confidence in their physical and psychological 'toughness' in the 
face of life-threatening conditions and that difficult experiences 
precipitate prosocial values. This is reflected in a commitment to 
what would now be described as 'traditional' values. Hahn wrote: 
"The foremost task of education is to ensure the survival of these 
qualities: an indefatigable spirit, tenacity in pursuit, readiness for 
sensible self denial, and, above all, compassion" (Richards, 
1981 :34). These values are still a key part of modern Outward 
Bound programs and are represented in Outward Bound's current 
learning objectives: 
1. The learning of skills. 
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2. Personal development - self confidence, self concept, new 
directions, enhancement of personal philosophy and 
values. 
3. Interpersonal effectiveness - develop relationships, learn to 
live with a variety of people from different backgrounds, 
learn group dynamic skills. 
4. Environmental awareness - develop responsibility for 
preservation, conservation. 
5. The transfer of learning back to reality (Martin, 1997). 
The experiences that Hahn maintained were particularly conducive 
to the formation of such values were wilderness experiences and 
rescue training. Within these activities there was considerable 
pressure to develop the desired attributes, and failure to do so was 
explicitly linked to danger to the group, injuries, negative morale, 
and possible cessation of the activity for either the group or the 
individual (Salerno, 1994). 
What is notable here is Hahn's notion of learning by doing, and 
that what participants were learning was oriented towards the 
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development of maturity and what Hahn called character. Hahn, 
while being deeply concerned about intellectual freedom (he 
himself had been imprisoned and subsequently deported from 
Germany by the Nazi regime) nevertheless felt that some form of 
compulsion was required. He wrote: IIWe believe it is the sin of the 
soul to force the young into opinions, but we consider it culpable 
neglect not to impel every youngster into health-giving 
experiences - regardless of their inclinations" (Richards, 1981 :43). 
The first Outward Bound to open in the United States was in 
Colorado in 1962. Outward Bound soon became involved in the 
'treatment' of juvenile delinquents. Extending (or perhaps making 
more palatable) Hahn's original approach, Outward Bound 
programs were' predicated on the purported relationship between 
self-esteem and delinquency, The essence of the approach was 
that individuals suffer from negative self-esteem and that if this 
was raised then the probability of delinquency or other 
maladaptive behaviour was reduced. The assumption is 
questionable and research results have been equivocal, with some 
research suggesting that an excess rather than lack of self-esteem 
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is associated with delinquency (Farrington, 1990). It has become 
increasingly apparent that the construct of self-esteem is rather 
broad, with self-esteem being a multifaceted rather than unitary 
construct and that the particular facets are situationally determined 
(Muran & Safran, 1993). It is notable however, that the majority of 
Adventure Therapy programs include enhancing self-esteem as a 
primary goal. 
Outward Bound is, in many ways, the Alcoholics Anonymous of 
the Adventure Therapy world. Since 1945, Outward Bound has 
spread to five continents and includes 46 programs. Many 
thousands of other programs in schools, vocational programs, 
colleges, and social service agencies are modeled on Outward 
Bound. While Outward Bound's theoretical underpinnings are 
often questioned, as is its general approach, (most notably the use 
of relatively high levels of objective as opposed to perceived risk), 
it continues to be almost synonymous with Adventure Therapy. 
General Systems Theory and Cybernetics 
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Beginning in the 1940s, Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968) and others 
began to develop an ambitious but comprehensive theoretical 
model embracing all living systems. General Systems Theory was 
a direct challenge to the reductionist view prevalent in the 
sciences. The reductionist view was that complex phenomena 
could be best understood by carefully breaking them down into. 
component parts. Within General Systems Th~ory, the focus is on 
the inter-relationships between parts. 'A' may cause 'B', but 'B' 
affects 'A', which in turn affects 'B', and so on, in a circular 
causality. 
Gregory Bateson (1991) developed Cybernetics in the areas of 
anthropology, biology, and psychology, stating that changes in 
attitudes and behaviour occur as part of the process of responding 
to new information. Rather than looking back on the problem and 
seeking to define it in terms of past experiences or present 
complications, Cybernetics is solution focused. By changing 
present perceptions of the problem, solutions can be initiated. It is 
within the Family Therapy movement, particularly with the work of 
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Bowen (1978) and Minuchin (1974), that Cybernetics has been 
most powerfully articulated as a therapeutic paradigm. 
Handley (1992) has posited that a Cybernetic approach can be 
usefully applied to the Adventure Therapy domain: 
The wilderness is a powerful system. Relatively free from 
external forces, it provides the opportunity to explore new 
responses and develop new patterns of thought and 
behaviour. It provides a short but significant cybernetic model 
that develops a change in attitude for each participant, and 
the time to test and reinforce this change in a difficult 
environment. Feedback is often instantaneous, feelings of 
success and failure refining the process. (1992:345) 
While, as has been described above, the 'power' of the wilderness 
is often espoused, it is seldom conceptualised in these terms. The 
interactional nature of the wilderness experience means that 
intervention from therapists must be carefully applied because 
inappropriate intervention will diminish the interactional freedom of 
the experience. Such an approach is more compatible with a 
model of a therapist as a facilitator, rather than as didactic 
instructor. 
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Those in the Adventure Therapy area who use a Cybernetic model 
generally conceive of wilderness experiences as a different 
system for the participants' behaviour. For instance, because of 
the interdependence of family members and the tendency for 
systems to maintain stability (of whatever form), it is often difficult 
to change an individual's behaviour - without the assistance of the 
family system. An Adventure Therapy setting provides a different 
system for the individual's behaviour. Many commonly observed 
problem behaviours of adolescents (such as being withdrawn, 
uncooperative or verbally aggressive) are incompatible with a 
wilderness setting where participants need to cooperate and 
communicate. Furthermore, such positive behaviours are quickly 
integrated into the wilderness system whereas in the adolescents 
usual family system such behaviours may be not be as directly 
reinforced as they are 'outside the loop' of the system which is 
seeking to maintain stability. 
The primary strength of the Cybernetic model in relation to 
Adventure Therapy is that it provides a possible explanation as to 
the 'why' of how Adventure Therapy may be effective. The 
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cybernetic nature of the experience is clearly evident to the 
participants because feedback is generally direct and tangible. 
The systems model does not, however, suggest the motive power 
or the 'how' of Adventure Therapy. If the experiences are to have 
direct relevance to the problematic aspects of the participant's life, 
it is necessary to have an explanation of what it is about the 
experiences that does the therapeutic work. 
Tension Theory 
Festinger (1957), following the work of Lewins (1951) who 
proposed that the stronger the tension before a decision is made 
the greater the tendency to carry through on that decision 
afterward, formulated a theory of cognitive dissonance. Briefly 
explained, cognitive dissonance is an inconsistency between 
present perceptions and reality that results in a change of 
perception to reduce the frustration or disequilibrium existing with 
the present reality. 
The Adventure Therapy experience can be seen as a catalyst for 
dissonance, where the program is structured to maximise tension 
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in order to create a preposition for effective decision making. With 
regard to Adventure Therapy, it is important to recognise that this 
perspective, while encouraging conflict, does not promote 
confrontation. Confrontation occurs when two opposing views, for 
instance between two participants on a program, become 
polarised and entrenched. Rather, this approach seeks to' use 
tension and conflict to promote problem solving and equilibrium 
(Kraft & Sakofs, 1985). This approach, while providing a possible 
explanation for the motivation to adopt new viewpoints or goals, 
does not provide an adequate explanation of how changes in 
cognitive equilibrium that occur within an Adventure Therapy 
setting might be maintained in the 'real world'. It would appear that 
to expect lasting change to occur, the adventure experience would 
need to have precedence over other experiences which may have 
occurred. 
Social Learning Theory: Modelling, Self-efficacy, and Locus of 
Control 
Modelling 
18 
Miller and Dollard, in their 1941 work Social Learning and 
Imitation, described two types of learning. The first is copying, 
where a learner matches the responses of the model. To use an 
Adventure Therapy example, an instructor may teach participants 
how to light a stove by modelling that behaviour and having them 
copy the essential steps of lighting the stove. The second type of 
learning, matched-dependent learning, involves a more 
experienced, skilled or older model who engages in behaviour to 
gain reinforcement, and a younger, less skilled, or less 
experienced learner who follows the leader because following has 
led to reinforcement for the novice. Miller and Dollard use a drive 
reduction model with the core constructs being drive, cue, 
response, and reinforcement. For example, consider a group 
leader who has a need for comfort (drive) and who then searches 
for a flat campsite on soft ground (cue), the leader then sets up 
camp (response), and relaxes (reward). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Bandura and his colleagues 
debated the drive reduction model and argued that behaviour 
could be acquired through observation without it being deliberately 
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demonstrated (Bandura, 1971). Bandura (1986) maintains that 
there are four critical factors which will predict the likelihood that 
behaviour will be acquired through observation. 
Firstly, attentional processes govern who and what is observed. 
The event will be evaluated with regard to things such as salience, 
complexity and value to the individual. The relative attractiveness 
of the model is also an important factor in the attentional process. 
Secondly, retention processes essentially involve the coding and 
cognitive organisation of the event. Cognitive and enactive 
rehearsals promote retention. Rehearsals of increasing complexity 
are a common part of the preparation for many Adventure Therapy 
activities. The third process contributing to observational learning 
concerns the actual production of the activity. Key parts of this 
process are the individual's physical abilities, ability to self 
observe, and feedback. Videotaping of activities is commonly 
employed to enhance feedback to the individual who can then see 
that they are sitting in the wrong place in a canoe, for instance. 
Lastly, motivational processes relate to the extent to which the 
modelled behaviour is rewarded. Reinforcements can be internal 
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("I feel great having done that"), external ("You did a great job on 
that rapid") or vicarious, with reinforcement occuring as the result 
of watching others being rewarded (or punished) for the same 
behaviour. 
Self-efficacy 
Any reference to Bandura with regard to Adventure Therapy leads 
almost inevitably to discussion of self-efficacy. Bandura (1997:3) 
states that perceived self-efficacy "refers to beliefs in one's 
capabilities to organise and execute the courses of action required 
to produce given attainments". Bandura goes on to point out that 
these beliefs influence the courses of action people choose to 
pursue, how much effort they will apply, how long they will 
persevere in the face of obstacles, their resilience to adversity, 
whether their thought patterns are self-hindering or self-aiding, 
how much stress and depression they experience, and lastly, the 
level of accomplishment they realise. 
Perceptions of self-efficacy are supposed by Bandura (1986) to 
depend on four primary sources of information: performance 
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attainment, vicarious experiences of observing the performance of 
others, verbal persuasion, and allied types of social influences that 
an individual posses competence, and lastly physiological states 
that individuals use to judge their capability, strength, and 
vulnerability. All these sources have obvious relevance to the 
Adventure Therapy context. Of particular interest to therapists 
working in the Adventure Therapy realm has been the limited 
effectiveness of verbal persuasion, which is the basis of most 
psychotherapies, and the powerful impact of performance 
attainments on perceived self-efficacy (Sachs & Miller, 1992). 
Performance attainments are most powerful because they involve 
actual attempts to master the environment. Adventure Therapy 
programs typically involve participants in achieving mastery over 
aspects of their behaviour in the outdoor environment. The primary 
difficulty that researchers have had is linking increased self-
efficacy for the activities that are part of Adventure Therapy 
programs with more general improvements.3 There is a marked 
tendency with the Adventure Therapy literature to associate and 
3 see Maddux (1995) for a general review. 
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essentially confound improvements in self-efficacy with changes in 
self-esteem or self-concept. 
locus of Control 
One of the most often referred to changes for participants on 
Adventure Therapy programs is an increased feeling of 
responsibility for the events in their lives (Cason & Gillis, 1994; 
Latess, 1992). This type of change has most commonly been 
associated with Rotters (1954) notions of internal versus external 
locus of control. An external locus of control suggests that 
individuals feel that they are not responsible for the outcomes of 
their actions, that is, whether or not they get rewards is a function 
of luck, fate, or others - external factors. Alternatively, an internal 
locus indicates a belief that outcomes are a function of effort, skill, 
personality or other internal factors. An internal locus of control is 
generally considered to be a desirable factor and is associated 
with more active engagement with the environment, as opposed to 
the more fatalistic outlook of those with an external locus of control 
(Rotter, 1982). 
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Self-Esteem: 
Conceptions of self-esteem have a central role in modern 
personality psychology that can be traced back to William James 
(Hattie,1992). One of the most commonly claimed benefits of 
Adventure Therapy programs is an improvement in participants' 
self-esteem.4 However there is no one theory of self-esteem and 
it would appear that improvement in self-esteem is the goal of a 
number of therapeutic perspectives rather than a theoretical 
approach per se. Various Adventure Therapy approaches seek to 
facilitate improvements in self-esteem from within a number of 
theoretical approaches. It is notable that the expectation that 
almost automatic improvements in self-esteem will occur as the 
result of participation is increasingly being called into question 
(Kemp, 1997). 
Reality therapy: 
4 See Ewert (1983) for a review of the use and measurement of self-esteem in Adventure 
Therapy programs. 
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Clagett (1992) describes the application of William Glasser's 
(1975) Reality Therapy to Adventure Therapy. Reality therapy 
proposes that it can help people change because it is based on 
how people live from moment to moment. Glasser maintained that 
people have more control over their actions, thinking, and feelings 
than they have been led to believe through popular culture and 
some of the more deterministic psychological theories (Glasser 
himself was a psychoanalytically trained psychiatrist). Following 
the theoretical work of Powers (1973), Glasser maintained that all 
humans, regardless of cultural background, are motivated by five 
'forces': the desire to survive, the psychological need of belonging, 
power (in the form of achievement, competence and 
accomplishment), enjoyment, and freedom (the opportunity to 
make choices and act autonomously). With these principles in 
mind, Glasser formulated seven principles that guide therapeutic 
interventions, all of which have direct application within an 
Adventure Therapy setting. The seven principles are: 
1. Involvement - the individual needs to become positively 
involved with others, including the therapist. 
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2. Having the client acquire awareness of their current 
behaviour - subsequent to becoming positively involved, the 
individual is guided into becoming consciously aware of his 
or her problematic behaviour. The therapist is constantly 
asking the client "what are you doing?". 
3. The client is then encouraged to evaluate his or her 
behaviour by critically examining whether or not their 
behaviour is serving his or her best interests, whether the 
behaviour is 'good' for those to whom the client is close and 
the wider community. 
4. Planning responsible behaviour - in collaboration with the 
therapist other feasible behavioural options are formulated. 
5. The client is asked for a commitment, which is usually 
verbal, that the plan for more responsible behaviour will be 
carried out. This has two primary aims, firstly to intensify 
and accelerate the client's efforts to try new behavioural 
options, and secondly, to encourage the client to recognise 
the importance of keeping commitments to others generally. 
6. The therapist accepts no excuses for failure to fulfil a 
commitment. Glasser's main concern regarding this point 
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was that the client should not be able to find an 'easy way' 
out of commitments which they have made and that 
excuses are not indicative of success. 
7. Punishment is not employed. Hierarchically imposed 
punishment is supposed to erode the positive involvement 
which is necessary for clients to succeed in solving their 
behavioural problems. There is, therefore, no ridicule or 
withdrawal but rather the application of previously agreed 
upon consequences of irresponsible behaviour. 
Reality Therapy approaches were among the first to explicitly 
attempt to integrate the fact that the vast majority of Adventure 
Therapy interventions are undertaken in small, usually 
interdependent, groups. Clients are encouraged to identify with 
their group (a 'reference group' in Reality Therapy parlance). 
Reality Therapy style approaches are particularly amenable to 
Adventure Therapy settings, especially those programs based on 
extended wilderness expeditions. Activities can be formulated and 
examined in terms of the principles described above. Another 
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appealing aspect of Reality Therapy is its largely non-technical 
nature and accessibility (Glasser & Wubbolding, 1996). Reality 
Therapy as a therapeutic modality has achieved support in a 
number of settings, particularly those that deal with 'behavioural' 
problems. However its theoretical underpinnings, which seem to 
suggest that people essentially choose to have psychopathological 
difficulties, are being increasingly called into question (Corsini, 
1996). 
Self Actualisation 
Maslow's notion of a hierarchy of needs, and in particular self 
actualisation, was a particularly strong influence in Adventure 
Therapy during the late seventies and early eighties. The 
wilderness experience can be linked to Maslow's hierarchy in that 
basic needs (such as food, shelter and warmth) become instantly 
recognisable once individuals are removed from their everyday 
environments. Other needs in the hierarchy - safety, 
belongingness and esteem, can be also be identified as being a 
key part of wilderness experiences and may be explicitly linked in 
some programs (Davis-Berman & Berman, 1994). Self 
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actualisation occurs when one is fully functioning, operating at 
one's fullest potential, in a way that is unique to the individual. 
Maslow {1962} believed that few people are fully self actualised 
but that many people have peak experiences, which are 
essentially moments of self-actualisation. Despite Maslow's own 
scepticism about the numbers of people who may be self-
actualised, a number of studies were undertaken to ascertain 
whether those who participated in outdoor programs were more 
self actualised than those who did not. Not surprisingly in light of 
Maslow's scepticism, the relationship between wilderness 
experiences and self actualisation was generally found to be very 
weak {Young & Crandall, 1984}. 
Constructivist Perspectives 
An increasing number of adventure therapists, reflecting the 
current popularity of constructivist and information processing 
perspectives, are suggesting that the processing/transfer elements 
as opposed to the activities themselves are the essential elements 
in therapeutic change {Gass, 1993a; Knapp, 1993; Nadler & 
Luckner, 1992}. For instance, research by Witman {1993} 
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suggested that adolescents participating in Adventure Therapy 
programs value the process over the actual content. Adolescents 
valued the opportunity to take risks or get support from other 
participants more highly than the activities themselves. 
Techniques which focus on the clients individual experience of an 
activity have been described in the Adventure Therapy literature 
as processing (Gass, 1993b). Processing can occur prior to, 
during, or after the experience and is typically used to: 
A.help individuals focus on or increase their awareness of 
relevant issues. 
B. facilitate awareness or promote change while an 
exp~rience is occurring. 
C.reflect, analyse, describe, or discuss an experience after it 
is completed. 
D.reinforce perceptions of change and promote integration in 
participants' lives after the experience is completed (Gass, 
1993a). 
30 
Fundamental to the constructivist perspective is the tenet that 
humans learn by 'making sense' of what is experienced. Efficient 
learning is predicated on individuals' active involvement in the 
learning process and opportunities for interactive communication 
among other learners (Fosnot, 1989). Those coming from a 
constructivist viewpoint suppose that individuals are inherently 
active, self-regulating beings, who act intelligently on their 
perceived worlds, in contrast to responding passively to their 
environments (Iran-Nejad, 1990; Neimeyer, 1993; Resnick, 1987). 
Individuals are thought to be engaged in a constant search for, 
and construction of, personal meaning. Learning, therefore, is not 
simply a matter of taking in new information as it exists externally; 
it is the ongoing construction and reconstruction of new and more 
complex meanings by the individual. It is a process of 
interpretation rather than mechanical accumulation. Such a 
perspective neatly, but not concisely, explains how individ uals may 
have such different experiences within an Adventure Therapy 
context, some in awe of their own sense of expanded capabilities 
while others remember only scrapes and blisters. The challenge 
for the therapist is to facilitate the processing of the experience in 
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a creative, as opposed to corrective, manner. The need for careful 
assessment and exploration of the grounds on which clients are 
'constructing' is therefore crucial. 
The constructivist perspective within psychology has been closely 
associated with post-modern philosophy and criticism. and as 
such, the literature is often rather obtuse and complex - making 
direct therapeutic applications difficult to formulate. The 
emergence of Narrative Therapy, championed by Michael White 
(1989) presents a more practically-oriented framework which has 
direct application to the processing of Adventure Therapy 
experiences (Fosnot, 1989; Stolz, 1997). 
Social scientists such as Bruner( 1985} who described a narrative 
mode of thought, and Sarbin (1986) who proposed stories as a 
root metaphor for the study of human behaviour and conduct, 
support an interpretive therapeutic method that embraces the use 
of narrative. A new experience is framed within a personally 
relevant story which then provides a unit of meaning that stores 
and permits the retrieval of the new experience. Narrative 
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structures become the format into which experienced events can 
be cast in the attempt to make them comprehensible, memorable 
and shareable (Olson, 1990). 
The story-making process is proposed by narrative therapists to 
be at the centre of the constructive process. In constructing 
stories, individuals attempt to convey their intentions by selecting 
incidents and details, arranging time and sequence, and 
employing a variety of codes and conventions that exist within a 
cultural context. Consequently, stories are not merely raw data 
from which to construct interpretations but products of an 
interpretive process that is shaped both by the wishes of the 
author and by the requirements of narrative structure 
(Polkinghorne, 1988). 
With regard to the Adventure Therapy process, Luckner & Nadler 
(1995) suggest that stories are significant in the following ways: 
1. The story that is created from the experience determines 
the meaning given to the experience. 
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2. The stories determine real effects, and the type, and 
degree of transfer of the experience. 
3. The stories select which aspects of the experience will be 
highlighted and then given expression. 
4. The stories encompass the learning, helping individuals to 
store the information in memory and generalise to other 
experiences in the future. 
The goal of narrative therapy is to facilitate the construction of new 
stories within the adventure process while also examining and 
subsequently constructing new, more positive perspectives of old 
stories. By becoming aware of the narrative structures that they 
have been using, clients are able to examine and reflect on the 
themes they are using to organise their lives and to interpret their 
own actions and the actions of others. 
White (1989) suggests four themes around which questions 
should be oriented so as to help clients construct new self stories. 
1. Responsibility and owning the success - the goal is to 
internalise, document and codify the unique outcome: How 
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do you account for this success? When were you first 
aware of your decision to take this risk? 
2. Expand the temporal plane - placing the outcome or 
success in time by giving it a past and a future: What sort of 
training did you do to prepare yourself for this endeavour? 
What in your past would have predicted that you could 
achieve the success that you have today? 
3. Increasing descriptions - opening up space for as many 
alternative stories as possible by including other's 
viewpoints: What do you think this success tells me about 
you? Who in your past would be least surprised that you 
accomplished such a feat? 
4. Meaning and difference - the goal is to help participants 
make distinctions in how they will make sense of the 
learning and apply it. What does it say about you now that 
you have done this? What difference will it make to you, 
knowing that you wrote a new chapter about yourself? 
The four themes suggested by White all have direct relevance to 
Adventure Therapy in that there is a rich pool of raw material, in 
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the form of new and challenging experiences in an unfamilar 
environment. The constructivist perspective presents a new and 
exciting approach to Adventure Therapy and has been taken up 
with vigour, particularly in Europe and the United Kingdom 
(Amesberger, 1997). 
Summary of theoretical approaches: 
Clearly, there are a considerable number of theoretical 
approaches to Adventure Therapy. While it is beyond the scope of 
this work to evaluate the merits of the various theories with regard 
to Adventure Therapy, some general themes can be identified. 
The theories which seem to be most enthusiastically embraced 
are those which do not necessarily depend on 'talking' or 'working 
through' issues. The 'wilderness ethic' and 'letting the mountains 
(and activities) speak for themselves' is still a pervasive notion 
based on the romantic accounts of wilderness. There would seem 
to be a considerable amount of appropriation of aspects of 
particular theories without due regard to the integrated nature of 
some of the theories. With regard to the current work, there is a 
notable absence of references to the affective component of the 
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theories within the Adventure Therapy literature. These concerns 
are consistent with a field of interest that is diverse and evolving. 
Some indication of that diversity is presented below in a brief 
outline of program types. 
Program Types and Populations 
Davis-Berman & Berman (1994) in a list which they describe as 
less than comprehensive, describe over 300 different Adventure 
Therapy programs in the United States. Unfortunately, there are 
no current figures on the number of programs in New Zealand. 
Briefly described below are the broad categories of programs 
which are defined essentially in terms of the populations to which 
they are addressed. A representative program for each category is 
described. Most examples are based in the United States but New 
Zealand examples are used where possible. 
Delinquency and prison programs 
Some of the very first Adventure Therapy programs were aimed at 
reforming delinquent adolescents and there has been a 
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considerable amount of research on programs for delinquents (see 
Roberts, 1989, Wichman, 1983, and Mulvey, Arthur, & Reppucci, 
1993, for reviews). Adventure Therapy programs seem to be 
intuitively applicable to delinquents as the intensity of the 
programs facilitates cooperation, trust, and a redirection of 
'machismo' in more positive directions. Concerns about the 
negative consequences of confining juveniles in institutional 
settings also prompted the exploration of alternatives to 
incarceration. Another factor which prompted the interest in 
Adventure Therapy was the perceived inappropriateness of more 
traditional 'counselling' for teenagers who resist the stigma 
associated with 'therapy' and who may not respond to 'talking' 
cures with therapists to whom they cannot relate (Brown, 1986). 
By way of a New Zealand example, Eggleston (1996) reports on a 
wilderness program, Te Whakapakari Youth Program, based on 
Great Barrier Island, New Zealand. Originating as a Maori Affairs 
initiative in 1977, Te Whakapakari brings together youth of many 
different cultures (although the majority are Maori) to live together 
in a wilderness situation, under a Maori kaupapa, for one month. 
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Participants typically range in age from thirteen to eighteen years, 
generally have gang affiliations, problems concerning sexual, 
physical, and mental abuse, and most have problems relating to 
drug abuse and dependence. Each day is spent gathering food, 
maintaining accommodation, learning technical outdoor skills, and 
developing cultural knowledge. The goals of the program are: 
1. To provide an alternative to institutionalisation. 
2. To develop a positive and supportive whanau during each 
camp. 
3. To develop self-esteem. 
4. To replace negative peer pressure with support and 
assertiveness training. 
5. To offer participants the opportunity of developing 
constructive, trusting relationships with adults and peers. 
6. To introduce anger management techniques 
7. To develop participants respect for the rights of others. 
8. To provide a retreat. 
9. To develop Maoritanga. 
1 O.To discontinue drug use. 
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As can be seen from the goals, there are elements of a number of 
the theoretical perspectives in the Te Whakapakari program. The 
program has much in common with programs for delinquents in 
other countries, while the cultural component separates it out from 
the majority of programs. 
Programs within prisons are typically instituted in order to reduce 
re-offending. The offender rehabilitation literature indicates that 
those prisoners who participate on Adventure Therapy programs 
have a lower rate of recidivism that those who do not participate in 
such programs. In New Zealand, McLaren (1992) reported 
average recidivism rates of 10-30 percent post outdoor-program 
compared to 30-90percent of matched no-program controls. 
In general, programs for offenders and particularly for delinquent 
offenders, are a last resort for those who have not responded to 
other interventions to reduce offending. The programs tend to be 
particularly demanding, with a high degree of physical challenge, 
and typically involve extended wilderness experiences (Davis-
Berman & Berman, 1994). 
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Mental health programs 
Adventure Therapy style interventions for those with psychiatric 
disabilities are not a new phenomena. The 'tent therapy' 
movement in the United States began around the turn of the 
century, firstly with patients suffering from tuberculosis and then 
with nontubucular psychiatric patients. It is interesting to note that 
the original reason for instituting the program was a chronic lack of 
space in Manhatten State Hospital. Due to the apparent 
successes of the Manhattan programS, other tent therapy 
programs sprung up. In a series of letters, brief reports, and notes 
to the American Journal of Insanity, various physiCians reported on 
positive results for their patients. A patient of Bloomindale State 
Hospital reported that "[the program] part of the summer of 1915 
was the beginning of my improvement, and we all felt that it was 
the lift we otherwise would not have had" (American Journal of 
Insanity, 73,1916, p.334, cited in Davis-Berman & Berman, 1994). 
These programs were predicated on the supposed therapeutic 
5 'Program' in the context is perhaps a misnomer. Apart from the location and increased 
freedom to move around there were no particualar activities undertaken. 
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influence of 'fresh air' and although most were on hospital grounds 
there seems to have been an element of escape for patients from 
an otherwise oppressive environment. Despite the apparent 
efficacy of 'tent therapy' in a time when there was little to offer 
patients suffering from psychiatric difficulties, these programs 
disappeared abruptly around 1920. 
It was in the 1960s that 'camping6, re-emerged as a possible 
adjunct to treatment for psychiatric patients. In 1966, Maxwell, 
Weisman, Mann, & Barker published a report on a therapeutic 
camping program in the American Journal of Psychiatry entitled 
"Camping: An approach to releasing human potential in chronic 
mental patients". 
This article was significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was 
published in the premier American professional psychiatric journal, 
indicating that it was being presented for serious consideration by 
the psychiatric community as a treatment approach. Secondly, 
there was a sharp focus on the detrimental effects that long-term 
6 The majority of these camps were semi-permanent, often with buildings for cooking, washing 
etc but with tents and stretchers for patients. 
42 
hospitalisation could have on patients, specifically the 
disempowerment engendered by highly-structured, authoritarian, 
and isolating hospital environments. These 'camping' programs 
were typically aimed at chronic (hospitalised for at least two years) 
schizophrenic patients for whom there was little in the way of 
treatment in the 1960s. Thirdly, there was an emphasis on the 
importance of the communal aspects of the program. As far as 
was possible, all signs of hospital authority were removed, with 
staff eating the same food which they cooked with the patients, 
sleeping in camp with the patients, and generally maintaining the 
same schedules as the patients. Lastly, there was no formal 
therapy undertaken. Patients were able to choose to engage in a 
range of activities including fishing, hiking, swimming, as well as 
contributing to the day-to-day running of the camp. The only 
'therapy' involved camp meetings to discuss what people had 
done during the day and what they wished to do next. The authors 
reported that of the 90 long-term patients involved in the program, 
41 were able to be discharged from the hospital, a remarkable 
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result in the days when the 'treatment' for schizophrenia7 
consisted largely of palliative care. 
These camping programs were clearly the forerunners of the 
Adventure Therapy programs available today. Pawlowski & Hafner 
(1993) list the main aims of the majority of Adventure Therapy 
programs for psychiatric patients and maintain that they are 
generally designed to allow patients to: 
1. Test their cognitive, affective, and behavioural capacities in 
a normal environment that is free of habitual associations. 
2. Develop their interpersonal and problem solving skills in the 
context of goal-oriented group activities. 
3. Experience a sense of achievement, mastery and 
enhanced competence and self-esteem 
4. Acquire a sense of trust in others. 
5. Develop strong positive associations with the natural 
environment. 
7 It is interesting to note that when outcomes are evaluated by disorder, schizophrenic patients 
seem to benifit from Adventure Therapy programs more than do patients with other disorders. 
The most commonly noted disorder-related improvements are reductions in paranoia and 
psychoticism (Shearer, 1985). 
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From the aims described above it is apparent that Adventure 
Therapy, rather than being aimed at treating the specific 
symptoms of a diagnosed disorder, is generally concerned with 
addressing the diffuse disabilities that may result from a 
psychiatric disorder. There is however often a degree of overlap. 
The possible exception to this approach of treating the more 
diffuse aspects of psychiatric disorders are programs which are 
explicitly aimed at treating clients with alcohol and substance 
abuse problems (Gillis & Simpson, 1993).8 
It is also worth pointing out at this stage that some programs, such 
as those aimed at drug and alcohol problems, do conduct 
particular types of psychotherapy (Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
for instance) aimed at treating specific disorders, but in a 
wilderness environment. Such programs are, however, the 
exception, while many programs include what is loosely described 
as 'group psychotherapy', most do not include disorder-specific 
psychotherapies. This topic will be taken up in later chapters with 
specific regard to the place of emotion within particular 
8 There is however ongoing debate regarding the classification of addictive behaviours (see 
Wakefield, 1992 for a review of the concept of mental disorder). 
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psychotherapies and the use of such therapeutic paradigms in 
wilderness or adventurous settings. 
Health care programs 
Although not especially common, programs targeted for those with 
physical disabilities or chronic health problems, are becoming 
increasingly popular (Davis-Berman & Berman, 1994). In New 
Zealand, organisations such as Outward Bound, Kiwiable, and 
Parafed, are examples of organisations that provide outdoor 
programs for this population. Clients facing disease or disability 
are placed in environments where new ways of responding and 
coping are required. 
Kessell, Resnick, & Blum (1985) describe a program for 
chronically ill and disabled youth called Adventure Etc which is run 
in conjunction with the Minnesota Outward Bound school. In 
addition to wilderness/adventure activities such as rockclimbing 
and canoeing, an urban adventure component is an interesting 
addition designed to reframe the participants everyday 
environment in a new and less threatening light. Urban adventures 
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included bus orienteering and a 'minimarthon'. Significant changes 
in body-image, increases in internal locus of control, less family 
conflict, and increases in self-initiated recreational activities were 
reported. The authors point out that for many chronically ill or 
disabled adolescents the achievement of age-appropriate 
developmental tasks is often hampered by a variety of factors 
such as the reinforcement of a catastrophized self-concept by 
well-intentioned parents, teachers, and health professionals. 
Undertaking wilderness/adventure programs is suggested as a 
way of addressing such difficulties. 
School, executive, and 'enrichment' programs: 
While they do not easily fall under the 'therapy' umbrella there are 
three other types of programs that merit brief mention - school 
programs, 'enrichment' programs, and 
executive programs. With regard to school programs, it is difficult 
to ignore the Project Adventure organisation that has been at the 
forefront of what is commonly called 'experiential education'. 
Project Adventure is based around action-oriented experiences on 
what are called 'challenge ropes courses' (Rohnke, 1989). The 
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ropes courses offer participants tasks of increasing difficulty plus 
specific exercises that require group participation to achieve a 
common goal. Other outdoor and wilderness experiences are also 
often incorporated into Project Adventure courses. 'Processing' is 
a key term for Project Adventure and broadly refers to participants 
reflecting and sharing their experiences with other group 
members. Although this is a key component of virtually all 
Adventure Therapy programs Project Adventure have 
operationalised the process and have developed a large number 
of specific techniques to facilitate this process (Project Adventure, 
1991 ). 
'Enrichment programs' covers a broad spectrum of programs but it 
would seem that Outward Bound provides the template around 
which most other programs are measured. Outward Bound 
provides a variety of courses, primarily designed for high 
functioning individuals, all of which use outdoor challenge, 
physical rigor, and risk-taking as metaphors for real-life 
experiences. Martin (1997) summerises the Outward Bound 
approach: 
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Difficult goals are set, action and experience takes place, 
feedback is given and petiormance is reviewed, then new 
plans are made for improved petiormance. Peer feedback 
provides honest observations to heighten personal 
awareness. The dynamics of the group based experience are 
fundamental in the development of self perception and 
influence each individuals personal development (1997:148). 
It has been suggested (Marsh, Richards, & Barnes, 1986) that 
Outward Bound has a 'stocktake' effect on many of its 
participants, causing them to examine aspects of their 
occupations, relationships, lifestyle, and aspirations. While most 
participants on standard Outward Bound courses report changes 
such as improvements in self-confidence and motivation, it is 
interesting to note that participants may also report feelings of 
dislocation and alienation upon returning to their everyday worlds 
(Mitchell & Mitchell, 1988). Enrichment programs, such as those 
provided by Outward Bound, are distinguished essentially by their 
clientele who do not generally have a specific therapeutic goal in 
mind. 
Business Programs 
During the 1980s there was a proliferation of outdoor programs 
specifically targeted (or marketed) at the business world. These 
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programs have become popular adjuncts to the team building and 
leadership training retreats that have become part of corporate 
culture. In New Zealand, The Sir Edmund Hilary Outdoor Pursuits 
Centre runs programs which use outdoor activities to facilitate 
team building and managerial leadership development. For many 
outdoors centers, business programs have become an important 
source of funds. 
Summary 
Adventure Therapy then, is an area to which a number of 
theoretical perspectives have been applied and which takes a 
number of different forms, which are in turn applied to a diverse 
range of populations. It is not a new approach, having begun 
almost a hundred years ago, but it is diverse and dynamic. Various 
practioners have speculated about the efficacious elements of 
Adventure Therapy programs. While producing plausible 
explanations that attempt to incorporate sound theoretical 
principles, there is a nagging lack of 'fit' with regard to what 
actually happens while hanging from a rope, running down a rapid, 
or climbing up a mountain. It would seem that the glaring 
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ommission in the literature is a lack of concern with a fundamental 
element of the human experience - emotion. 
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EMOTION 
Having introduced Adventure Therapy, an introduction to emotion 
is also required. Such a task is daunting in that there is a 
voluminous literature from many different perspectives, both 
theoretical and empirical, produced by scholars of eminence. The 
aim of this section is not to summarise all the major theories of 
emotion, but rather to identify key themes within the literature. 
With this in mind, Safran & Greenberg (1991) provide a basic 
framework of thirteen features of emotion that draw on a number 
of perspectives, including physiological, cognitive, behavioural, 
and phenomenological conceptions. 
A potential danger in adopting what is essentially a 'pick and mix' 
approach is that the coherence of individual perspectives is 
necessarily sacrificed - with a concurrent reduction in explanatory 
power. The delineation of one feature immediately raises any 
number of "yes, but ... " questions and concerns. However, the goal 
of this particular work is to make a start on conceptualising the 
role of emotion in Adventure Therapy. Broad brushstrokes are 
required to lay down base colours before the specific details can 
be added through research specific to the field. It is indicative of 
the current vibrancy in the field of emotion that Safran & 
Greenberg's 1991 features have required some updating and 
expansion due to the amount of work that has emerged in the last 
five years. Besides the thirteen features, both cultural and gender 
differences are also briefly considered. The features presented 
below are put fOlWard as signposts rather than hitching posts. 
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Emotions are adaptive 
At the core of much of the theorising and research presented 
below is the notion that emotion has been wired into the human 
organism, and that it persists because it contributes to survival. If 
emotions were not adaptive they would have been eliminated from 
the repertoire of humans and other animals as part of the 
evolutionary process. 
Interestingly, Darwin, in his 1872 work The Expression of 
Emotions in Man and Anima/s, maintained that emotional 
expression has not evolved and that it is not dependent on natural 
selection but is rather indicative of biological 'old habits' and the 
particular way in which the nervous system is wired. This is 
consistent with Darwin's broader goal of placing humans on a 
continuum with other species. It is important to note, however, that 
Darwin did not suggest that emotion was not adaptive and that 
one of the key functions of emotion is to increase the chances of 
survival through appropriate reactions to emergency events. 
As would be expected for seminal but exploratory work, there is 
ongoing debate as to Darwin's conception of emotion. While some 
commentators on Darwin, such as Fridlund (1992), maintain that 
Darwin posited that emotion did not have any communicative 
function, Izard (1993) contends that Darwin, in his comments 
regarding the smiles or frowns of a mother to a child, clearly 
recognised a communicative aspect of emotion that has adaptive 
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significance. The other adaptive function Izard identified in 
Darwin's work concerns the regulation of emotional experiences. 
Suppressing the experience of an emotion weakens the 
experience of that emotion, while the full expression of an emotion 
amplifies the emotional experience (ibid,632). For instance, 
emotional regulation assists in sustaining and intergrating an 
organisms position within a hierarchy which supports access to the 
resources needed for personal survival.1 
While the functionality of emotion is expanded upon below, the key 
point to be made here is that emotions have persisted because 
they are adaptive in that they help organisms deal with key 
survival issues. Plutchik (1993) writes: 
Emotions may be conceptualised as basic adaptive patterns 
that can be identified at all phylogenetic levels ... Emotions 
are the ultraconservative evolutionary behavioural adaptations 
that have been successful (similar to amino acids, DNA, and 
genes) in increasing the chances of survival of organisms 
(1993:55). 
Emotions motivate goal-directed behaviour important to 
survival 
A key function of the emotions is to safeguard and satisfy the 
goals of the organism. Frijda (1986) posits that underlying most 
emotions are a number of what he calls concerns.2 Frijda 
1 Plutchik (1993), following on from earlier work (Plutchik & Landau, 1973), makes an 
interesting connection between depression and perceived downward mobility within a 
particular social hierachy. 
2 Frijda. with his reference to concerns is following the lead taken by Klinger (1975) who 
prefered the term to motive or goal because of the connotations of activity, actual striving, or 
awareness of a future state to be reached, which, within Frijda's conception of emotion, is 
inappropriate with regard to the circumstances under which emotion arises. 
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(1986:336) describes concerns as "dormant demons", maintaining 
that they are dispositions that remain silent as long as conditions 
conform to acceptable standards. For instance, general concern 
for bodily welfare remains dormant until circumstances, falling 
piano's and so on, provoke the concern. Concerns may also 
become salient when they signal that there is a satisfaction 
condition that could potentially be obtained, as in the case of acute 
desire or lust. 
At their most fundamental level, these concerns are hard-wired 
and are oriented towards basic survival needs such as hunger, 
procreation and self protection. Other concerns are derivatives of 
these more fundamental aspects and develop as a result of 
learning. For example, the goal of maintaining interpersonal 
relatedness is a hard-wired concern but the standards that 
develop as to how one should act in terms of social mores and 
conventions are learned. The particular learned manner or mores 
is not hard-wired but the need (goal) for what the standard derives 
from (maintaining interrelatedness) is a fundamental concern with 
a biological basis. In terms of Frijda's conception, emotions 
function to safeguard and satisfy the goals of the overall system, 
with the result being a greater likelihood for survival. 
Emotions provide action disposition information 
There is an intrinsic connection between emotion and action. In 
keeping with their adaptive functions, emotions supply information 
regarding the readiness of the human organism to act in a certain 
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way. That emotions are a source of action disposition information 
is a feature of a number of perspectives on emotion (Bull, 1951; 
Frijda,1988; Lang, 1983; Leventhal, 1984). 
At its most basic level, reference to the often mentioned 
prototypical safety-danger situation, or 'fight or flight' reaction, 
clearly indicates that emotions provide readiness information. 
Anger, therefore, provides information about the preparedness of 
the organism to aggressively protect itself while fear provides 
information about readiness to flee. It is important to note that 
action readiness may exist without being noticeable in behaviour, 
that there may only be minor signs such as small changes in vocal 
inflections, or the absence of an expected response (Frijda, 
Mesquita, Sonnemans, & Goozen, 1991). As Frijda and his 
colleagues point out, states of action readiness form an important 
aspect of subjective emotional feeling. They cite examples 
collected by Oavitz (1969) including "I could have killed him", "I felt 
like I wanted to disappear from view", "I wanted to do something 
but I didn't know what,,3, and "I felt like crying". 
Lang (1988) differentiated two types of action readiness: strategic 
and tactical. Strategic action readiness refers to serving the broad 
goals of furthering or countering interaction with the current 
situation. Changes in action readiness that serve specific forms of 
furthering or countering interaction, such as flight or opposition, 
3 This particular example is interesting in that states of action readiness generally closely 
corrospond to felt emotions and vice versa. Frijda, Kuipers, & Terschure (1989) noted that 
subjects systematically check states of action readiness as elements of their different 
emotions. 
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are tactical. While, as Frijda and colleagues (1991) point out, the 
difference is one of degree rather than kind, the distinction makes 
understanding non-specific action readiness changes that underlie 
unspecific emotion labels such as 'excitement' or 'upset' more 
readily understandable. 
Emotions involve discrete expressive-motor patterns 
As pointed out above, emotions provide information about the 
readiness of the system to act in particular ways. The next step 
along from this are the discrete expressive-motor patterns linked 
with particular emotions.4 These expressive motor configurations 
involve physiological, vocal and postural changes and the most 
studied of any of the expressive motor patterns, facial expression.5 
A major contribution to the relationship between expressive-motor 
patterns and emotion has been made by Leventhal (for example, 
1974, 1984). According to Leventhal, human beings come 
equipped with basic templates for specific core emotional 
experiences. These coded neural templates do not depend on 
past learning and provide the basic structure for both core 
emotional experiences and associated expressive-motor 
behaviours. 
4 It should be noted that the notion of each emotion having its own action tendancy and 
physiological activity is not undisputed. For instance, Ortony, Clore, & Collins (1988) suggest, 
as part of their critique of basic emotions theory, that such a notion is largely untenable. 
5 Although written 25 years ago, Izard's 1973 work The Face of Emotion still provides a 
comprehensive overview of emotion and facial expression. 
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In contrast to other theorists, such as Izard (1991) and Tomkins 
(1962) who have argued that emotional experience is necessarily 
dependent on feedback from expressive-motor behaviour, 
Leventhal prefers instead to refer to expressive-motor behaviour 
as being the first aspect of an emotional synthesis hierarchy. 
Leventhal does, however, refer to an integral link between 
particular emotions and specific expressive-motor behaviour. The 
links between these motor configurations (with facial expression6 
being the most commonly described) are present at birth, where 
they provide cognitively undeveloped infants with their earliest 
meaning for situational experiences, and persist throughout life as 
the basic referent for emotional experience. Leventhal maintains 
that despite the rapid development of cognitive processing 
resources these basic referents remain largely unchanged. 
Emotion is motivational 
Emotion not only provides readiness information about the 
readiness to act in a certain way but also tends to push towards 
certain types of action. Lazarus (1991) presents an interesting 
perspective on what he calls the motivational principle. Lazarus 
points out that the notion that positive emotions derive from goal 
attainment, conditions that facilitate goal attainment, or steady 
progress towards goal attainment, and conversely, that negative 
6 Leventhal maintains that facial expression is the most important expressive-motor 
mechanism associated with emotion and that there are three generalisations to be made 
regarding facial expression: (1) Each emotion is associated with a distinctive facial expression, 
(2) It is consistent across the life span for all humanity, (3) The linkages between facial 
expression and emotion are innate and not learned. The adaptive function of the linkage 
between facial expression and emotion for Leventhal is primarily communicative in that it 
provides for rapid, non-verbal communication (1986). 
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emotions derive from goals thwarted, threatened, or delayed has 
been discussed for at least a millennium? 
Lazarus uses the term motivation in two particular but interrelated 
senses: firstly refering to a personality trait and secondly, refering 
to a reaction to a set of environmental conditions. By personality 
trait, Lazarus is referring to the way in which adults have relatively 
stable value and goal hierarchies. When motives are viewed as 
traits, Lazarus maintains, they are dispositions for goal attainment 
that will be enlivened when engaged by the appropriate 
environmental circumstances. That this is a core concept for the 
, 
understanding of emotion is indicated by Lazarus; 
There would be no emotion if people did not arrive on the 
scene of an encounter with a desire, want, wish, need, or goal 
commitment that could be advanced or thwarted. The 
stronger or more important the goal, the more intense is the 
emotion, other things being equal. (1991 : 94 ) 
The second sense in which Lazarus uses the term motivation is 
perhaps more familiar and refers to the actual mobilisation of 
mental and behavioural effort in a particular encounter to achieve 
a goal or to prevent its thwarting. Motivation here becomes 
reactive to the demands, constraints, and resources present in the 
environment. Because of the environmental component, Lazarus 
refers to this type of motivation as transactional. When a negative 
7 See Gardner, Metcalf, & Beebe-Center (1970) for a historical review of motivation as the 
basis for emotion. 
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emotion is generated by harm or a threat, the person is motivated 
to do something about this negative condition. This, Lazarus 
states, is the meaning of emotion as a drive (Lazarus, 1968). 
Emotions organise systemic priorities through their salience 
When presented with multiple and possibly conflicting goals, 
emotions influence decision making in a way that is consistent with 
the system's priorities. That emotions have a compelling quality 
that can essentially override other systems of evaluation is called 
'control precedence' by Frijda (1988). This control precedence can 
involve the interruption of other activities, preoccupation, and 
persistence in the face of obstacles or distracting events (ibid, 
1986). The control precedence of an emotion such as anger may 
mean that long-term goals (perhaps setting a non-violent example) 
are overridden in favour of attacking in the face of a potential 
threat. Conversely, passionate feelings of attraction for a 
potentially unsuitable person may override the studied evaluation 
of the pros and cons of forming a relationship (Hatfield & Rapson, 
1993). 
Frijda (1986) maintains that control precedence is probably the 
key distinguishing mark of emotion. He maintains that there are 
two features of control precedence that are part of the 'nature' of 
human and animal organisms. The first feature is that control 
precedence for a given action, if not actually taking control of 
action, impatiently waits to do so. Control precedence implies that 
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rather than just putting an action at the top of a priority list, effort is 
required to keep it from taking control. 
The second feature of control precedence is that it is 'forced' upon 
the organism by two relevant signals: pleasure and pain. Once 
again, there is a persistent and insistent quality to these signals 
and they continue to be noticed as long as an eliciting event 
continues or a desire is evoked and unsatisfied. In keeping with 
his rather determinist stance, Frijda maintains that an emotional 
impulse and its attendant control precedence overwhelms and 
controls the individual because he or she does not truly want to 
control. To control would mean that pain would then be sustained 
or pleasure forgone (1986:472). 
Emotional responses are mediated by anticipated 
interpersonal consequences 
Following Frijda (1988) and his generalised emotional law of the 
'care for consequence', Safran & Greenberg (1992) refer 
specifically to the interpersonal consequences of emotion. While, 
as was pOinted out above, emotions have a compelling quality that 
can override long term goals and 'rational' evaluation, for each 
emotion there is also an impulse that is cognisant of the 
consequences of the emotion, with interpersonal consequences 
being perhaps the most carefully considered. Lazarus (1991) 
suggests that each emotion has its own core relational theme. He 
writes: 
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A core relational theme is simply the central (hence core) 
relational harm or benefit in adaptational encounters that 
underlies each specific kind of emotion ... Each individual 
emotion or emotion family is defined by a specific core 
relational theme. When its implications for well being are 
appraised by the person, each thematic relationship produces 
an action impulse consistent with the core relational theme 
and the emotion that flows from it (1991 : 121 ). 
The interpersonal consequences of this impulse of evaluation or 
appraisal has been further elaborated upon, with an explicitly 
clinical focus, by Muran & Safran (1993). These authors maintain 
that, considering the work of people such as Bowlby (1973) on 
attachment, it is apparent that humans are perceptually attuned to 
detect clues regarding the disintegration of interpersonal 
relationships and are programmed to respond with anxiety. 
Anxiety can then become a cue that alerts people to avoid 
associated experiences and stimulus situations. Conversely, 
experiences and behaviours that are valued by attachment figures 
become associated with a sense of interpersonal felt security_ As 
a result of such learning, individuals develop what were described 
by Sullivan (1953) as "security operations" which can include 
diverting attention from anxiety-provoking information, controlling 
the conversation to avoid anxiety-provoking topics, and presenting 
oneself in a fashion that momentarily raises one's self-esteem. 
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What is notable about Muran & Safran's extension of an 
interpersonal care for consequence is their recognition of the 
potential maladaptiveness of this feature of emotion. While the 
emotionally signalled and biologically determined goal of 
maintaining interpersonal relatedness is always operating, the 
strategies which the individual employs to maintain relatedness 
may not be appropriate to the present context and may in fact be 
detrimental to the goal of maintaining relatedness. Furthermore, it 
is essential to recognise that the individual's goal is not 
necessarily one of maintaining relatedness to a specific person in 
a specific interaction but rather one of acting so as to enhance a 
sense of potential relatedness in an abstract, generalised sense. 
This is in keeping with Sullivan's (1953) assertion that the 
audience to which an individual plays is largely an internal one. To 
extend the theatrical metaphor with regard to emotion, the 
applause or opprobrium of the audience is communicated by way 
of emotion. 
Emotion is a primary communication system 
As Lazarus (1991) points out, social communication is an 
important adaptational function of emotion that is clearly not 
restricted to humans. He points out that herd animals must be able 
to tell when a predator, who may live with the herd, is hunting, and 
that mating, without signs of receptivity, can be a hazardous 
undertaking. Frijda (1986) describes relational activity as activity 
that establishes or modifies a relationship by modifying the 
relationship rather than the environment - emotion is a primary 
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relational activity, that for humans in particular, who are 
characterised by high levels of interdependence, is a primary 
means of communication. 
Emotion is a form of meaning 
Emotion as a form of meaning within the literature has generally 
referred to emotional processing as a quick and economical 
information source. The information provided is condensed and 
largely unarticulated (Frijda, 1986; Leventhal, 1979). 
Lazarus (1991) elaborates on meaning with regard to emotion, 
pointing out that there is more than one way of knowing. Referring 
firstly to the phenomenological philosophy of Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, he then describes the way in which his own fingers 
seem to 'know' where the keys are on a keyboard despite his 
inability to describe from memory where the keys are. That there 
can be dissociations between verbal knowledge and task 
performance8 of this kind leads logically into a discussion of the 
possibility of two different systems of appraisal: one conscious, 
deliberate and under volitional control, the other automatic, 
unconscious, and uncontrollable. A discussion of the relative 
merits of theories regarding unconscious versus conscious 
knowledge is clearly beyond the scope of this work. However, the 
key point that Lazarus refers to, that there is more than one way of 
knowing and that emotion is clearly a way of knowing, is an 
8 Lazarus refers here to the work of Brewin (1989) on change processes within 
psychotherapy. In his writing (for example, 1996, 1988), Brewin has often focused on the role 
of unconscious representations and refers to the use of emotion as a key means of identifying 
and modifying these representations. 
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important point which has direct relevance to this discussion and 
will be taken further. 
Schematic emotional memory mediates emotional responding 
From birth, individuals begin developing memory codings for 
events and the emotional responses they evoke. These memory 
structures, which are elaborated and refined over time, consist of 
specific expressive motor responses, relevant eliciting stimuli, 
associated images, and associated autonomic arousal. Muran & 
Safran (1993) call these memory structures emotional schemas. 
Lazarus (1991), in line with his relational focus, points out that 
while the traditional conception of memorial provocation of 
emotional schemata treats memory as an internal event, it is also 
important to consider the external factors that prompt the memory. 
9 He asserts that the memory of an emotional event is 
reconstructed differently each time it is activated.1o He raises two 
points to explain this reconstruction. Firstly, as is discussed below, 
Lazarus explains that as we grow older new schemata are always 
being formed or elaborated upon. Therefore, the reconstruction of 
the past tends to change. Secondly, the adaptational context 
within which an emotional memory is activated must be 
considered. Memories are not random psychological events, the 
current situation, or some feature of the current situation, triggers 
9 See Christianson (1992) for a research and theoretical overview on emotion and memory. 
10 Discussions of this sort tend to be based on extrapolation and theorising regarding adults 
memories. Strongman (1996) points out that, while there has been research on early 
autobiographical memory, mood, and memory in adult subjects, there is a general lack of 
research from a life-span perspective. 
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the appropriate memory. Lazarus suggests a number of possible 
features that could be responsible for the memory, including the 
emotional response pattern, the personal meanings and 
psychological situation that has generated the emotion which are 
similar to an earlier encounter, a fragment or element of the 
situation (perhaps another persons dress, or tone of voice), or the 
configuration and interpretive situation of all these elements. 11 
According to Lazarus, it is the core relational theme discussed 
above, which provides a plot or structure to what may initially be a 
jumble of images or stimuli, that makes remembering emotional 
experiences easier. The general point Lazarus seems to be 
making here is that, in contrast to much of the research literature 
on emotion and memory, it is often useful to think of the 
relationship between emotion and memory in molar, rather than 
molecular terms. 
Activation of emotion schemata produces emotional 
experience 
Leventhal (1984) hypothesised that the activation of one 
component of an emotional schema increases the potential for the 
activation of the entire schema with the result being the subjective 
experience of the emotion associated with that schematic , 
structure. Lang (1985) maintains that the probability that a 
11 That particualar elements can have markedly different effects on memory is illustrated by 
Parrott & Sabini (1990). Using standard mood induction procedures, such as verbal and 
musical induction methods, they found a pattern of mood congruent memory which was 
consistent with earlier research (Blaney, 1986). However, when they used other methods 
(referring to the weather, succeeding or failing on an examihantion) they found a pattern of 
mood incongruent memory. 
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particular emotional schema (or 'prototype' in Lang's terminology) 
will be activated increases as the number of coded schematic 
features that are matched increases. He also proposes that some 
schematic features may be more central or critical in this process 
than others. Lang makes an analogy between computer programs 
and emotional schemata where, once activated, the schemata 
provide the organism with information that motivates action. 
Emotion schemata are continually elaborated by new 
experience 
As described above, new situations may activate the emotional 
schemata that most closely approximate the perceived features of 
the new situation. The event is then processed in terms of the 
activated schema but at the same time the specific features of the 
new situation are adding to the schemata so as to arrive at a 
holistic 'meaning' for this novel event. This 'new' information is 
then encoded, thereby further expanding and elaborating the 
emotional schemata. 
That emotional schemata, along with other developmentally linked 
aspects of humanity, should change over the life- span as new 
information and processing apparatus become available, is 
generally accepted. However, there is considerable discussion as 
to how such development should be most profitably 
conceptualised and studied.12 For the purposes of the current 
12 See for instance the discussions of Malatesta-Magai, Izard, and Camras (1991), and for an 
overview of the area Strongman (1996). 
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work however, the most important point with regard to changes 
and elaborations of emotional schemata is that there is potential 
for the development of maladaptive emotional schemata and also 
for the restructuring of existing schemata. 
Cognitive-affective processing provides a rapid but flexible 
response system 
In describing the emotion-action link, it is tempting to think of the 
expressive-motor component of emotion in terms of a reflex. 
Reflexes are unconditioned actions that are initiated by closely 
delineated external or internal stimuli and they have specific 
functions (Buck, 1991). While there are some similarities, 
Leventhal & Scherer (1987) point out that emotions, unlike 
reflexes are subject to further processing before a final decision is 
made. 
While the debate between cognition and emotion is taken up 
below, the point here is to suggest that there is a degree of 
flexibility involved in emotional responses. For instance, Lazarus 
(1993) speaks of changing the relational meaning of an emotional 
response so as to regulate and transform emotion. He provides 
the example of a partner responding sharply to an innocent 
inquiry. The partner who had made the inquiry may wish to avoid 
feeling and displaying the resulting anger with its potentially 
negative consequences and may instead seek to essentially 
excuse the sharp response. The grumpy partner may then be 
reconceptualised as ill, tired, or stressed - calling for an empathic 
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and nurturing response rather than anger. Lazarus mentions in 
passing that this may be a healthy, or at least reasonably 
adaptive, form of repression or denial, defenses which are almost 
universally described as pathological. 
Culture and Gender 
As mentioned at the outset, the 'features' approach taken above, 
while being expedient in terms of the current work, is also 
problematic in that the features appear relatively straightforward. 
Such an approach essentially 'irons ouf some of the key debates 
and difficulties that are crucial to maintaining the dynamism and 
intellectual integrity of the discussion. Presented below are some 
useful correctives to the apparently reasonable features presented 
above. Emotion and culture, and emotion and gender are 
discussed. The purpose of presenting these issues is not to 
necessarily invalidate the features of emotion presented above but 
rather to suggest that the space within which this discussion is 
presented is contestable and that there are multiple locations for 
orientation within it. 
Emotion and culture 
Rather than dredge apparent exceptions, or discontinuites, out 
from within the ethnographic literature, presented briefly below is 
an anthropological critique of the current psychobiological models 
of emotion. 
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As anthropology's colonial roots were challenged by both those 
who had been constituted as 'other', and by anthropologists 
increasingly unsatisfied with positivistic science, the reflexive 
approach, with its roots in literary criticism, focused attention on 
the taken-for-granted and power-infused nature of many theories 
and models. With specific regard to emotion, White (1993), 
following Geertz (1973), points out that the dominant 
psychobiological models of emotion are supported by their 'fit' with 
Western commonsense models, which are dualistic in nature. 
White lists a number of such dualisms: 
mind - body 
cognition - affect 
thinking - feeling 
reason - emotion 
rational - irrational· 
conscious - unconscious 
intentional - unintentional 
controlled - uncontrolled 
While to read through the list is indeed to realise how compelling 
the dualisms are (Strongman, 1996), what is also immediately 
apparent to the Western reader is how well these oppositions 'fit' 
with their world-view. With specific regard to the study of emotion, 
it would seem that there is a 'metadualism', that is, that emotion is 
commonly conceived as being 'inside' the individual as opposed to 
being 'outside' in the social world. Lutz and White (1986) outline a 
number of essentially dialectical 'tensions', which shape the way in 
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which emotion is studied. The key notion within their argument is 
that it is necessary to reflect on the ways in which the questions 
about emotion are formulated rather than focusing exclusively on 
the answers. 
For instance, a core, but generally tacit, feature of the predominant 
psychobiological models of emotion is the assumption that english 
terms such as 'sad', 'angry' and 'disgusted' are culturally 
transparent and universally applicable. While it is debateable that 
such words have a meaning that does not require some 
interactional 'panel-beating' before the meaning is agreed upon 
between members of one society speaking the same language, to 
uncritically accept the translation of emotional terms from one 
language to another is to court misunderstanding. As Lutz (1988) 
and Heider (1991) point out, research has not so far provided any 
substantial evidence for a universal linguistic pattern for emotion.13 
While there is no strong support for a universal linguistic 'fit' with 
regard to emotion terminology (even between cultures for whom 
English is a shared primary language) this appears to have been 
the assumption of a number of medical sociologists attempting to 
work across cultures. For example, Kleinman (1985) describes the 
work of Leff (1973) as an example of a 'category fallacy'. Lefftook 
the Present State Examination, and in keeping with standard 
sociological methodology, administered it to a large number of 
13 clf Mesquita & Frijda, (1992) for a discussion of elTiotion taxonomies utilising a cognitive 
model of emotion. 
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English speaking Black Americans. His analysis found less 
differentiation between individuals' responses, leading to the 
conclusion that his respondents were less psychologically 
sophisticated. As Lutz (1985, 1988) points out, conventional 
methods of standardising questionnaires by translation and back 
translation yields some degree of semantic equivalence but does 
not explore the range and context of affective expression that is 
particular to that group. While criticising work of nearly 25 years 
ago may seem somewhat facile, similar approaches are still 
employed and presented as a means of testing theoretical 
predictions across cultures. 14 
By reflecting (or 'reflexing') on the world in which the questions 
regarding emotion come to be asked, the constraints and 
frameworks utilised become an explicit rather than implicit part of 
the both the reading and researching of emotion. For example, 
White (1993) describes what he calls 'dual process models' of 
emotion. These are models which are characterised by their 
reference to a number of core emotions that are then modified in 
some way as they are expressed and translated within the social 
world. A prime example is Ekman's (1992) model which posits six 
core pan-cultural affects, recognisable through facial expression, 
which can be modified according to cultural 'display rules'. Such 
models can usually be identified by words which refer to emotions 
being 'filtered', 'screened', 'masked', 'amplified', or 'muted'. While, 
as White points out, such models are attractive in that they 
14 see for instance, Scherer (1997). 
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account for cultural variation while preserving the notion of 
emotional universals amongst humans, they: 
"systematically privilege the biological in the 
definition of emotion. The parameters of emotion 
theory, the interpretation of specific emotions, and 
the foci for comparative research are all determined 
importantly by the primacy of core affects." 
(1993:32) 
The anthropologically based critique presented above suggests 
that when engaged in any type of research it is behoven upon the 
researcher to consider how the questions they research are 
formulated. 
Emotion and gender 
It is interesting to note that it is sociologists and anthropologists 
who have taken the lead in investigating the relationships between 
emotion and gender (Shields, 1991). In accordance with the 
critique presented above, it would seem that by using traditional 
positivist science, the questions regarding the differences between 
genders regarding emotion were answered in large part by the 
methodology rather than by the participants experience.15 
15 See, for instance, Stoppard (1989) for a discussion of the ways in which the apparently 
marked differences in rates of depression between men and women are essentially 
constructed by the way in which depression is assessed within a cognitive behavioural 
framework. See also Brown (1992) for a feminist critique of personality disorders which has a 
particularly interesting discussion regarding the way in which 'distress' is concieved of within 
the DSM framework. 
73 
Considering White's (1993) commentabove regarding the 
systematic privileging of the biological in the study of emotion, it is 
interesting to note a tendency towards a sex-difference 16 
explanation framework within much of the research on emotion. As 
Shields (1991) points out, the sex difference model typically 
assesses quantitative differences between male and female 
subjects in a closely defined setting. When a statistically 
significant difference is identified, there is a marked tendency to 
attribute the difference to a biologically based (that is, sex-based), 
stable, fixed, and enduring trait. Brody & Hall (1993), summarising 
the thoughts of many other authors, observe that efforts to ascribe 
generalised qualities to males and females are generally 
theoretically simplistic and empirically unsound. In an earlier article 
Brody (1985) noted that gender per se was rarely the focus of 
research but was a part of the methodology. Statistical analysis is 
generally undertaken to rule out the importance of gender as a 
causal influence on the experiment's outcome rather than to 
examine a gender difference (Manstead, 1992). 
An alternative research strategy is to examine gender and its 
relationship to emotion as part of a social context. One strand of 
research along these lines that has proved fruitful is the 
examination of stereotypes. This line of inquiry is particularly 
important as gender stereotypes themselves may be crucial in 
bringing about behaviour which is itself stereotypical (Deaux & 
16 "Sex" is used here to refer to the physical fact of primary and secondary sex characteristics, 
whereas "gender" refers to cultural and psychological constructs and is understood primarily 
by personal identification and culturally defined standards of sex-appropriate behaviour 
(Sheilds, 1991). 
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Major, 1987). Brody & Hall (1993), in a review of the literature, 
suggest that the main stereotypes relating to gender are: greater 
female expressivity, greater expression of sadness and fear by 
females, and greater expression of anger by males. When they 
reviewed the research literature they found that these emotional 
stereotypes were frequently borne out across various types of 
data. 17 Gender differences in peer and family socialisation 
patterns matched gender differences in later life with regard to 
emotional expression, experience, and recognition. Differences in 
the intensity and frequency of specific emotions across the same 
domains were also noted. They also noted that females are 
generally superior to males at both expressing (verbally and 
facially) and recognising emotion. Brody & Hall noted that the 
differences that they identified were consistent with differing 
gender roles for males and females in Western society. 
What emerges, once again, from the above discussion is that 
emotion cannot be considered as only being an internal and 
personal phenomena. Furthermore, much of the research that has 
been carried out has been 'men's work', both literally and 
methodologically. An example of a step in another direction is the 
one taken by Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault, and Benton (1992). 
In their research, these authors make no particular distinction 
between researcher and researched, both are actively involved in 
the production of the research through what Strongman (1996) 
17 It should be noted that ethnographic or cross-cultural literature (of which there is an 
increasing amount) was not included in the review and the conclusions are not, therefore, 
universally applicable. 
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describes as a sort of 'collective recursion'. Emerging from this 
research is knowledge that is enlightening despite its apparent 
blinding obviousness. An example that has particular relevance to 
the Adventure Therapy field is the differences in location of 
emotional experiences for men and women. It would seem that, for 
women, home is generally linked with the positive emotions 
whereas outside (and presumably wilderness in particular) is 
linked with being cold and hostile. Men, on the other hand, 
generally associate being outside with positive emotional 
challenges. 
Research on emotion and gender that is both theoretically 
informed and methodologically innovative is important for more 
than the insights it provides regarding the gendered aspects of 
emotion. Such research is also useful for the model and corrective 
it provides for research in other areas of emotion. 
Summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to introduce the features of 
emotion that serve as the building blocks for the following 
chapters. The discussions on culture and gender were included to 
show not only that the features are not as 'tight' as they may 
appear but also to quh~tly suggest that the research methods that 
may be most fruitful for examining the role of emotion within 
Adventure Therapy may not be those from within traditional 
positivist frameworks. 
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EMOTION AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 
A central task of most psychotherapeutic interventions is the 
elimination, moderation, or reformulation of aversive emotional 
experience. The primary presenting problem for the majority of 
clients regardless of their specific disorder is that, in one way or 
another, they 'feel' bad and their aim within therapy is generally to 
'feel' better. 
Emotion, at least since Freud, has generally been viewed as 
central to the therapeutic process. The aim of this section is 
primarily to survey the various stances taken towards emotion and 
its role in psychotherapy by the major psychotherapeutic schools. 
By focusing on psychotherapeutic schools, some accounts have 
not been included on the basis that they have not, as yet, 
produced particular therapies but have instead formulated 
accounts of how particular difficulties have developed (for 
example, Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum's (1989) 
behavioural/cognitive account of posttraumatic stress disorder). 
They have also in some cases been able to advance new reasons 
as to why particular therapies (especially those that are 
behaviourally based) might work. The obvious example here is the 
information processing perspective which, as will be seen below, 
is becoming increasingly important and seems to be on the cusp 
of a new approach to psychotherapy. 
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In general, despite often referring to emotion, very few of the major 
therapeutic schools present clearly articulated accounts of the role 
of emotion in the change process. It would seem that 
psychotherapeutic change has generally been conceptualised in 
terms of cognition and behaviour alone. It is notable that, until 
recently I very few of the therapeutic schools have refered to the 
general theory and research on emotion. A recent notable 
exception to this trend has been within the cognitive-behavioral 
paradigm where the traditional emphasis on the primacy of 
cognition has been questioned. The following chapter will present 
a number of therapeutic implications based on the features 
described in the previous chapter and the psychotherapeutic 
literature presented below. Considered are psychoanalytic, 
behavioural/cognitive-behavioural, and experiential therapeutic 
pers pectives. 
Psychoanalytic Perspectives 
There is no one psychoanalytic theory of emotion. Various 
emphases and developments over time have lead to a rather 
amorphous conceptualisation of emotion within a broadly 
psychoanalytic framework. There are; however, a number of 
themes that emerge from the psychoanalytic tradition. The most 
notable of these is the central role attributed to the unconscious in 
the production of emotional experience. 
Any discussion of the psychoanalytic approach naturally begins 
with Freud, whose model of emotion was grounded in his 
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conceptualisation of psychic energy. Before clearly articulating his 
drive model, emotion for Freud was almost synonymous with 
psychic energy. Particular emotions were determined 
simultaneously by the nature of the event that elicited them and by 
the cognitive characteristics or personality of the individual. Breuer 
and Freud (1895), upon discovering the apparent value of 
emotional discharge (or abreaction in the psychoanalytic lexicon), 
posited that it was the strangulation of affect that was the main 
cause of hysteria. 
Maladaptive thoughts, according to Freud, are maintained by the 
suppression of emotion. The normal reaction to a traumatic event 
for Freud was abreaction, whereby individuals are able to 'free' 
themselves from the painful emotion associated with the memory 
of the event. It is when this abreactive process is suppressed that 
the emotion remains bound to the memory of the event, leading to 
the persistence of pathological ideas which Freud supposed led to 
neurotic symptoms. Abreaction may occur immediately after the 
, traumatic event, spontaneously some time after it, or it may be 
brought about in therapy to produce a cathartic effect. While 
catharsis has become associated in the popular imagination with 
dramatic and massive discharges of emotion, Freud maintained 
that a cataclysmic reaction was not necessary and that a series of 
small steps may be involved. These small steps may consist of 
reviving the problematic emotion in therapy and talking (Freud 
viewed language as a reasonable substitute for action) through the 
memories that prompted it. 
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The 'wish' model of psychic function, articulated in The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900) signalled a transition from Freud's 
abreaction model to what was to become the foundation of 
psychoanalysis, the 'drive' model. The wish model held that 
'constancy', or the need to maintain a constant level of psychic 
energy, was the primary motivational principle. When there was an 
excess of psychic energy it was discharged in the form of emotion 
with the object of the discharged emotion being remembered and 
associated with feelings of satisfaction. Consequently, when the 
need to discharge psychic energy arises again the individual 
'wishes' or attempts to re-instate previous experiences of 
satisfaction. An interaction between instinctual and environmental 
forces was responsible for emotional development, with psychic 
energy providing the impetus for emotion and real-life experience 
determining the particular character of the emotion. 
While the wish model described in The Interpretation of Dreams 
was based in an ideational framework, Freud's drive model placed 
the emphasis squarely on the role of instinct in determining 
emotion. Initially, Freud maintained that the sexual and self-
preservation instincts were the genesis of all emotions. He later 
added the death instinct. For Freud, the focus on instinct signalled 
a shift in his theorising from social to biological determinants. In 
contrast to his abreactive approach, his theorising based on the 
drive model was largely unconcerned with the quality of a 
particular emotional reaction except for its indication of the 
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presence of an underlying instinctual impulse. Furthermore, the 
actual object of the instinctual impulse was also de-emphasised. 
What was important was the individual's ability to maintain a 
constant level of psychic energy through the discharge of 
instinctual energy. 
It is at this point in Freud's theorising that it becomes increasingly 
difficult to discern exactly what emotion is. Not surprisingly for a 
clinician, Freud gave particular attention to anxiety. Earlier on, 
Freud maintained that anxiety was the product of pent-up psychic 
energy which had essentially 'rotted' within the individual. Later, 
Freud (1926) conceptualised anxiety as a signal that a dangerous 
instinctual impulse was about to intrude into consciousness, 
necessitating the need for the initiation of defenses. Anxiety here 
becomes part of a process rather than a distinct type of psychic 
energy. What is clear however, is that anxiety has little or nothing 
to do with external stimuli but is rather the product of intra-psychic 
conflict. The primary point is that the key to the emotions 
(whatever they are) and their production is to be found in the 
unconscious. In light of this, the clear treatment focus for Freud 
was the need to bring the unconscious instinctual impulses into 
consciousness. The psychodynamic treatment models that have 
emerged subsequent to Freud have generally emphasised the 
discharge, repression, conversion and sublimation of psychic 
energy (Safran & Greenberg, 1991). 
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An emotional change process emerging from the psychodynamic 
tradition that would appear to have particular relevance to the 
Adventure Therapy field, somewhat by virtue of 
misunderstandings as to what it entails, is catharsis. Catharsis has 
a long and somewhat chequered history, beginning with Freud's 
(1926) rejection of it as a primary change mechanism. 
While the father of psychoanalysis became sceptical about the 
value of catharsis, there has nonetheless been an enduring 
interest in catharsis, particularly in 'nonmainstream' 
psychotherapy. Reich (1942, 1949) emphasised that the value of 
cathartic experiences lay in freeing people to express their feelings 
and not as ends in themselves. His primary interest was not in the 
catharsis itself, but rather in the defenses that prevent it. Reich 
became particularly interested in the bodily 'armour' that prevented 
emotional expression. Therapy in the form of deep breathing, 
massage and exercises was aimed at increasing arousal levels 
and thereby facilitating emotional expression. Neo-Reichian 
approaches, such as Lowen's (1975) bio-energetic model, have 
also emphasised the role of bodily expression of emotion with 
Lowen maintaining that individuals must "open up and vent these 
feelings, for their release makes available the energy necessary to 
the process of change"(1975:121). Approaches such as primal 
therapy (Janov, 1970) and re-birthing also have catharsis as a 
central mechanism of change. 
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In what is perhaps indicative of a general suspicion of the body 
that emerged as part of the ordering of Western social science 
(Foucault, 1970), it is apparent that there has been little attention 
paid to the role of the body in psychotherapy. With specific regard 
to the role of emotion in psychotherapy this seems incongruous, 
particularly in light of the considerable research on facial 
expression (for example, Izard, 1991) and the emerging literature 
on the relationship between emotion and health (Robinson & 
Pennebaker, 1991). 
Emerging as an offshoot of Reich's character-analytic-
vegotherapy, Alexander Lowen's (1975; 1996) Bioenergetic 
Analysis is a method of psychotherapy that integrates work with 
the body into the analytic process. The genesis of neurosis, 
according to Lowen, is in childhood deprivation and trauma, which 
results in the repression of emotions and impulses.1 Children are 
said to learn early on that holding one's breath can suppress 
painful or frightening feelings and that by restricting the depth of 
one's breathing, the intensity of feelings can be mitigated .. 
Muscular tension in particular parts of the body are said to be 
indicative of particular types of neurosis - a tight throat may 
indicate holding back a desire to cry or scream, tight musculature 
in the pelvis suggesting repressed sexual urges, tense shoulders 
represent the inhibition of impulses to strike out, and so on. Lowen 
maintains that "every chronically tense muscle in the body reflects 
1 This is not an orginal thought of Lowen's (although Lowen sometimes seems to obscure this) 
and is in fact one of Freud's earliest ideas, one developed before his conflict theory of 
neurosis. 
83 
an inner conflict between an impulse or feeling and the expression 
of that impulse or feeling" (1996:410). The bodily release of 
intense emotional expression is explicitly connected with the 
process of change in psychotherapy.2 
Similarly based in a psychoanalytic theory of repression is Janov's 
(1970) Primal Therapy.3 Primal therapy is based on the notion that 
the painful experiences of childhood do not disappear once the 
experience is over but remain as a part of an individual's 
physiology. In therapy, the aim is to achieve, through feeling, an 
understanding of the process by which memories of early painful 
events are established and subsequently repressed. In practice, 
the sign that such an understanding has been achieved is a gut-
tearing, infantile and agonised primal scream. The intensity of the 
scream is said to be because the pain of childhood trauma has 
survived, unchanged and unaffected by time and life events. 
Both Lowen's bioenergetic therapy and Janov's primal therapy 
are interesting in that they propose that, to one degree or another, 
feelings are controlled, expressed and even stored, somatically. 
Unfortunately however neither of these approaches offer a clear 
and comprehensive model to account for the hypothesised 
relationship between the body and emotional experience. 
21n a cautionary note which has an obvious connection to Adventure Therapy, Lowen (1996) 
points out that increasing a person's energy leads directly to more movement, and therefore 
more feeling, feelings that may be painful or frightening. 
31t is worth noting that Arlow (1996) suggests that primal therapy is essentially a caricature of 
emotional catharis as conceptualised by Freud in his early studies on hysteria and that there is 
a considerable amount of scepticism about primal therapy as a treatment modality. 
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While cathartic approaches have been of continuing interest to the 
general public, perhaps because of their generally dramatic style 
and folk psychology notion of 'letting it all out', they have been 
viewed with some scepticism by the mainstream psychotherapy 
community. This scepticism on the part of the psychotherapeutic 
community, with its distrust of 'drama' and 'irrational' emotion and 
folk notions, may be for exactly the same reasons that they appear 
to have a enduring interest for the general public. Another reason 
may be the lack of clear empirical validation for such approaches. 
Nichols and Zax (1977) surveyed the literature on catharsis in 
therapy. They found that while some studies (for example, 
Haggard & Murray, 1942; Ruesch & Prestwood, 1949) were 
generally positive about the effect of catharsis others (for example, 
Keet, 1948) did not support catharsis. while others (i.e Grossman, 
1952; Weiner, 1955) were equivocal about its usefulness. The 
relative age of these studies is reflective of both the trends in 
psychotherapy and perhaps the reluctance of the less mainstream 
approaches to do research that is recognised by the generally 
conservative world of academic psychology. What is difficult to 
represent are the substantial number of anecdotal and case 
reports which give testimony to the potency of catharsis as a 
therapeutic technique. 
A fundamental problem when attempting to investigate the utility of 
cathartic approaches is the lack of theoretical cohesiveness and 
the tendency to aggregate concepts such as 'experiencing' under 
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the general rubric of catharsis.4 It becomes apparent that while a 
considerable amount of emotional experience within (and 
presumably without) the therapeutic realm can be construed as 
'catharsis' what becomes central is the interpretation of that 
experience. What is happening when catharsis occurs? Is it the 
unconscious instincts which have been locked up being released, 
or is it perhaps an individual learning to connect cognitions and felt 
experiences in a particularly powerful way, as will discussed 
below? 
The psychodynamic paradigm remains influential, particularly in 
applied clinical settings (Strongman, 1996). The treatment focus 
that is the corollary of the psychoanalytic perspective - that 
emotions need to be brought to awareness so as to be examined 
and transformed - remains as a key element of many 
psychotherapeutic interventions and is testimony to the power of 
Freud's thinking. 
Experiential Therapy approaches 
Conceptualising emotions as neither expressions of instinctual 
impulses (as was the case for the psychoanalysts), nor as learned 
responses (as will be seen to be the case for the behaviourists), 
the humanistic and experiential approaches offered an alternative 
4 Greenburg and Safran (1991), in a synthesis of perspectives on catharsis, suggest that it 
consists of four component subprocesses: (1) experiencing compassion for the self, (2) 
completeing interrupted emotion/action sequences, (3) releasing inhibiting muscular tension, 
and, (4) schematic restructuring. In light of the these processes, it is notable that catharsis is 
almost invariably considered from the point of view of experiencing negative rather than 
positive emotions. There does not seem to be a literature from the psychodynamic perspective 
considering the possibility of catharsis of positive emotions. 
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perspective. In a way that is strikingly similar to the information 
processing approaches discussed below, these theorists and 
thinkers propose that affect is essentially an adaptive control 
system, providing feedback to the organism about its responses to 
the environment. Discussed briefly under this general experiential 
rubric is Rogers' client-centered Therapy.5 
Client-centered Therapy 
As is the case for many psychotherapeutic perspectives, particular 
words or phrases come to have particular significance. For client-
centered therapists, the concept of 'experiencing' is such a word. 
Basically, 'experiencing' refers to all that is going on within the 
organism at any particular moment, that is available to awareness 
(Rogers, 1959). Experience refers to the private world of the 
individual, where some aspects of experience may be easier to 
bring into awareness than others. A hypothesised key mechanism 
of change within the client-centred paradigm is the need for the 
client to 'experience fully in awareness' so that there can be a 
more complete and accurate symbolisation of experience. By 
symbolisation, Rogers was referring to the process by which an 
individual becomes aware or conscious of an experience. As 
Raskin & Rogers (1996) point out, there is a tendency to deny 
5 The obvious omission here is Gesalt Therapy (Perls, Hefferline, & Goodman, 1951). In 
general, the Gesalt approach to emotion is consistent with the Client-centered 
conceptualisation of emotion providing adaptively useful information to the organism. Perls et 
al (ibid:409) write; "Far from being obstacles to thought, they [the emotions] are unique 
deliveries of the state of the organism/environment field and have no substitute; they are the 
way we become aware of the appropriateness of our concerns: the way the world is for us". 
Dysfunction was suppossed' to occur as a result of emotions being interrupted before they can 
enter awareness or complete their 'organising' action. There is, however, little in the way of a 
clearly articulated Gesalt view of the role of emotion in the therapeutic process. 
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symbolisation to experiences at variance with the concept of self, 
for instance, people who think of themselves as truthful will tend to 
resist the symbolisation of an act of lying. 
'Feelings' are proposed as a key part of experiencing and consist 
of a union of emotion and cognition as they are experienced 
inseparably in the moment (Rogers, 1959). Most client-centred 
therapists stress 'feelings' as opposed to focusing on what Gendlin 
(1979) described as 'sheer emotion'. Feelings, then, are a 
cognitive-affective functional unit, an integration of emotion and 
meaning. While client-centred therapists may occasionally reflect 
'sheer emotions' sLlch as being 'sad' or 'afraid' the general intent is 
to facilitate a more differentiated sense of sadness, such as 
'feeling over the hill', or of fear as feeling 'small and exposed'. 
Such an approach suggests that, in keeping with the notion of 
experiencing, the information function of emotion can usually be 
best accessed through idiosyncratic meanings (Rice & Greenberg, 
1991 ). 
The client-centered perspective implies some processing 
mechanisms that integrate different sorts of information. 
Awareness of feelings provides the individual with meanings that 
are able to appreciate experience better than would reason or 
words alone. Rogers (1959) claimed that individuals are wiser than 
their intellect alone, suggesting that if individuals are open to 
experiencing their world in as richer way as possible through 
feelings, they are more likely to act adaptively. One of the ways in 
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which this may happen is through a recognition of the intentionality 
of emotion. In a way that has a flavour of the 'core relational 
meanings' suggested by Lazarus (1991), Gendlin (1962) points 
out that people are usually 'angry at' or 'afraid of' someone or 
something.6 There is, then, a meaning for the emotion in a context, 
one that is greater than the experience of the emotion itself. 
Behavioural and Cognitive-Behavioural Approaches 
Behavioural approaches7 
In marked contrast to the psychoanalytic perspective, with its 
emphasis on repressed affect and its role in psychopathology, and 
to the integrative perspective of the experiential approach, 
behavioural therapy has focused almost exclusively on the 
modification or elimination of undesirable affective states. There is 
a clear change in emphasis in the behaviourally oriented theories 
from attempts to explain what emotion per se is, to an emphasis 
on learned emotional behaviour that is readily observable and 
testable (Strongman, 1996). 
There are two competing strands of thought that have dominated 
behavioural theories of emotion. Firstly, there are those who 
consider the individual as a blank slate who learns emotional 
responses in relation to contingencies in the environment. The 
6 See Pascual-Leone (1991) for a discussion of the connection between the classical 
~henomenlogists such as Husserl and Scheler. and the notion of intentionality. 
The approaches considered here are primarily those that have led directly to therapeutic 
techniques, in most cases the therapist and theorist are one and the same. For a discussion 
and critique of the more theoretical approaches to emotion see Strongman (1996). For an 
overview of intellectual trends within the behavioural paradigm see Hayes & Hayes (1992). 
who discuss the ongoing difficulties that behaviourist approaches have with cognition. 
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most obvious and radical proponent of this view was Skinner 
(1971), who proposed that humans had a potentially infinite 
capacity to learn emotional responses. The second perspective 
views emotional responses as having their genesis in particular 
predispositions or propensities, a view exemplified by Rachman 
(1978). As will be discussed, both perspectives have emphasised 
the use of exposure and deconditioning techniques to modify 
emotional responses. 
'Drive' theorists, so-called because of their emphasis on the 
motivating aspects of emotion, focus on the role of emotion in 
conditioning and learning and are therefore part of the second 
strand of behavioural thought. Fear and anxiety are the key 
emotions for the drive theorists because they are considered 
essential to avoidance learning. 
Mowrer (1960), for instance, saw emotions as drives and 
maintained that four, in particular, were crucial: fear, hope, relief 
and disappointment, each of which have particular eliciting 
conditions in the environment. For Mowrer, emotion came to be 
seen as a central state that was elicited by both learned and 
unlearned stimuli. Throughout his career, Mowrer maintained an 
interest in the therapeutic applications of learning theory ranging 
from his still highly influential work on the treatment of enuresis to 
areas such as the effect of guilt upon the individual. Izard (1991) 
describes Mowrer's ideas on the origin of guilt as particularly 
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interesting and provocative.8 For Mowrer, guilt (which can occur 
when the individual is alone and in the absence of the source of 
punishment) develops as a function of the learning process. 
Repeated punishment for things considered bad, and rewards for 
things considered good, leads children to develop a sense of 
proper and improper behaviour. Mowrer asserts that guilt is a type 
of fear. This fear arises after performing a previously punished act. 
Furthermore, Mowrer maintained that individuals, through 
constitutional or hereditary differences, are variously susceptible 
to guilt and that the development of guilt is facilitated when the 
learner feels dependent upon another person who is the source of 
punishment or discipline. 
Dollard & Miller (1950), in what is essentially a learning analysis of 
the psychoanalytic concept of repression, proposed that fear, 
rather than unacceptable wishes or wants, is the major cause of 
neurosis. According to Dollard & Miller problems exist not because 
of unconscious motives but because people are afraid. They 
maintained that approach behaviours - either to seek comfort, or to 
express anger - evoke anxiety because of the cues associated 
with these behaviours. As anxiety reduction is intrinsically 
rewarding, any behaviour or activity that reduces the anxiety 
associated with these cues is reinforced. In an extension of their 
hypothesis that would have greatly distu~bed the classically 
oriented behaviourists, Dollard & Miller also extended their 
8 See Lewis (1993) for a discussion of the 'self-conscious' emotions; embarassment, pride, 
shame and guilt. 
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approach to the avoidance of particular internal phenomena, such 
as particular thoughts. Dollard & Miller's analysis was a means of 
explaining apparently self-defeating and irrational behaviour, as 
such behaviour could be explained as responses that were 
learned so as to reduce fear. The other particularly attractive 
aspect of their analysis was that it suggested a key, if not rather 
obvious, treatment goal - the reduction of fear. 
In 1958 a South African psychologist, Joseph Wo/pe, presented in 
his book Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition the results of his 
application of learning principles to adult neurotic disorders. His 
work was based on Hull's stimulus response learning theory, 
Pavlov's conditioning principles, and his own experimental 
research on fear reduction with cats. It was Wolpe's assertion that 
within a few months or even weeks, 90 percent of his patients 
were either "markedly improved" or "cured" that attracted most 
attention. For Wolpe, anxiety was the causal agent in all neurotic 
conditions. Anxiety was defined as a persistent response of the 
autonomic nervous system acquired through classical conditioning 
where: 
any neutral stimulus, simple or complex, that happens to 
make an impact on an individual at about the time that the 
fear reaction is evoked, acquires the ability to evoke fear. 
Subsequently, ... there will be a generalisation of fear 
reactions to stimuli resembling the conditioned stimulus 
(Wolpe & Rachman, 1960: 145) 
Based on his experimental work with cats, Wolpe maintained that 
anxiety is best eliminated by a process he called reciprocal 
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inhibition. The basic premise of this is that a competing response 
would inhibit and eventually extinguish anxiety.9 Perhaps the best 
known and most widely applied of Wolpe's techniques is 
systematic desensitisation (Wolpe, 1969), which works towards 
decreasing an individual's sensitivity to the objects or situations 
which precipitate fear. Very briefly, the technique combines 
relaxation procedures with a graded and repeated presentation of 
the feared stimuli.1o The client is taught how to systematically relax 
the muscles of the neck, face 11, and body. Once the individual can 
relax, a list of feared situations is composed and then graded from 
the most to the least-feared stimuli. While relaxed, the client 
imagines the least feared of the stimuli. This is repeated until the 
client can imagine the stimuli while remaining relaxed. This is then 
repeated for stimuli further up the list of fears. The other 
competing response most commonly employed is assertion, which 
is taught in a number of different ways.12 
Subsequent to his work with Wolpe, Rachman (1978) concluded 
that simple conditioning theories of fear were unable to 
comprehensively account for the genesis and maintenance of fear. 
Rachman suggested that only major fears, generally with some 
9 It is worth noting that Wolpe's formulation and therapeutic techniques were very similar to 
those put forward by Salter (1949). 
10 For a detailed discussion (including'the pitfalls of this approach) and description of 
procedures see Andrews et.al (1994). 
11 Strongman (1996) notes that behaviourally oriented theorists and therapists have almost 
completely ignored the substanialliterature on facial expression. Izard (1971), one of the 
authorities on facial expression, presents a fear-reduction technique that seems similar to 
Wolpe's notion of reciprocal inhibition but which is based on the premise that one emotion can 
be elimiated by invoking another emotion. Izard maintains that if an individual who feels 
frightened can engage in the expressive behaviour and thought imagery associated with 
another emotion (perhaps anger) the fear will subside. 
12 See Lange & Jakubowski (1976) for an overview and introduction to assertiveness training. 
93 
biological significance, were likely to be acquired via a conditioning 
process. That classical conditioning and stimulus-response 
models were not the only means of acquiring fears was 
demonstrated through the work of people such as Bandura (1971) 
who showed that fears could be acquired through indirect 
processes such as vicarious learning and the provision of 
information. 
Before considering the Cognitive-behavioral framework it is worth 
briefly outlining the other major treatment techniques that have 
emerged from the behavioural tradition. These are implosive 
therapy, flooding and modelling, which in addition to systematic 
desensitisation ( described above) represent the most commonly 
employed behavioural treatment modalities. 
Implosive therapy (Stampfl, 1967) involves repeated imaginal 
exposure to fears which are, according to Stampfl, precipitated by 
pairing of neutral stimuli with psychodynamically conceptualised 
childhood conflict and trauma. Flooding (Sherry & Levine, 1980) is 
technically similar to implosive therapy except that it involves the 
actual presentation of the feared stimuli or situation. Both flooding 
and implosive therapies are supposed to work by preventing 
avoidance behaviour resulting in the extinguishing or habituating 
of the anxiety response. Both flooding and implosive therapy 
expose the client to considerable amounts of fear and anxiety and 
the ethical considerations involved in such a process are 
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increasingly being questioned (Wislon, 1995}.13 In modelling 
(Denny, Sullivan, & Thiry, 1977) the therapist demonstrates 
approach and contact with the feared object and subsequently 
encourages the client to do likewise. The modelled exposure tasks 
are presented in a graduated manner. These therapeutic 
approaches, not surprisingly, have proven most effective when 
there is a clear feared object rather than more diffuse anxieties. 
Behavioural theories are almost beguiling in their simplicity and 
their approaches to treatment are essentially quite similar. Safran 
& Greenberg sum up the behavioural approach: 
Reduction of fear and anxiety has been the major focus, and 
this focus has governed the way in which emotion is 
addressed. The overall implication of the various behavioural 
approaches regarding the role of emotion in change is that 
certain maladaptive behaviours or habits have been learned 
as a way of reducing the anxiety elicited by a particular set of 
cues. Exposure to the feared stimulus without harmful 
consequences leads to extinction of the fear (1987:40). 
Goldfried & Castonguay (1993) suggest that behaviour therapy 
has a number of what they call "limiting strengths" which include: 
(1) attention to fine grained analysis of individuals reactions to 
specific situations, (2) a dedication to the development and study 
of specific effective techniques, (3) a skill training orientation to 
therapy, (4) a focus on the client's current life situation, (5) the 
encouragement of psychotherapy outcome research and (6) the 
provision of various forms of intervention to reduce specific 
13 There is a clear connection here to the Adventure Therapy paradigm where, as was pointed 
out in Chapter 1, there may often be a considerable amount of fear invoked in the course of 
particular activities. 
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symptomatology. These authors maintain that each of these 
apparent strengths also highlight the limitations of behaviour 
therapy. This is in keeping with Strongman's (1996) assertion that 
behavioural theories do not go far enough, particularly with regard 
to the everyday subjective experience of emotion. The limitations 
of behavioural therapy that have come to light have generally done 
so as therapists have attempted to apply the conceptual and 
empirical strengths of behaviourism to clinical practise. 
Cognitive-behavioural Therapies (CBT)14 
Gluhoski (1994) proposes that it is a common misconception 
about CBT that therapists coming from this perspective are 
interested only in distorted or irrational cognition and that they 
view emotion as only minimally important. As a corrective to this, 
he points out that Beck, the founder of Cognitive Therapy, has 
from early on, emphasised the necessity of arousing affect in 
therapy. Beck argued that efficacy is largely due to the client's 
ability to "experience and express feelings during the therapy 
session" (Beck et al. 1979:40). Safran & Greenberg (1987) 
suggest that, historically, the central unifying theme in cognitive-
behavioural therapies has been the conceptualisation of emotion 
as a post-cognitive phenomenon. It is the discussion of this point, 
within the psychotherapeutic framework of mood disorders 15, that 
14 Some terminological confusion can arise when considering cognitive behaviour therapies 
and attempting to distinguish between a general approach (CBT) and a specific therapeutic 
school from within that general approach (such as Beck's Cognitive Therapy, or Ellis's 
Rational Emotive Therapy). The view taken here, in keeping with Dobson (1988) is that CBT is 
an approach, not a therapeutic school. 
15 For an overview of the emotion-cognition debate within the theoretical literature see 
Strongman (1996). 
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forms the basis of this discussion of cognitive behavioural 
therapies. 16 
Cognitive-behavioural approaches to the treatment of emotional 
disorders largely assume that emotional responses are mediated 
through the interpretations or meanings that are attributed to 
experience. This idea appears at first to be relatively 
straightfolWard and has been a powerful heuristic for the 
development of effective treatment strategies. However, as 
Teasdale (1997) points out, what has become clear is that this 
basic idea has required considerable elaboration and qualification. 
For some (for example, Leventhal & Scherer,1987; Parrott & 
Sabini 1989) the whole idea of the primacy of either cognition or 
emotion is one that would be best abandoned in favour of an 
analysis based on what could be called a multicomponent 
processing system that privileges neither cognition nor emotion. 
There are a number of factors which have prompted a 
reconsideration of the cognitive-behavioural insistence on the 
primacy of cognition. While certain types of cognition may be the 
antecedents to emotional states, there is also a need to recognise 
that these same cognitions may be powerfully influenced by 
affective state to the extent that they may in fact be considered as 
a consequence of emotional state. The work of researchers such 
as Blaney (1986) and Morris (1989) with depressed individuals 
16 For a more general discussion of the contribution cognitive science has to make with regard 
to an understanding of emotional disorders see Watts (1992). 
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demonstrates that the cognitive interpretation and evaluation of 
experience can be substantially influenced by a depressed 
mood.17 In a related vein, the patterns of negative thinking that are 
characteristic of depression almost invariably disappear when a 
course of medication, with no attempt to modify cognitions, is 
successful in lifting the mood of the individual (Schatzberg,1995). 
Teasdale (1997), following Bower (1981,1983), suggests a 
possible way around such difficulties by positing a reciprocal 
relationship between cognition and emotion. Certain types of 
interpretation are antecedents to emotional states but, by the 
same token, these emotional states themselves increase the 
likelihood of those very same cognitions. There are, however, a 
number of important qualifications to be made here, and although 
there is a considerable amount of empirical support for such a 
view, Singer & Salovey (1988) propose that this support is not 
straig htforwa rd. 
Qualifications of such a view include: (1) Apparently similar mood 
states can have quite different effects on cognitive processing, as 
is suggested by the work of Parrott & Sabini (1990) on mood 
incongruent memory. (2) Apparently related cognitions can have 
quite different effects on emotion. It would seem that there is a 
need for accounts that allow for multiple levels of cognitive 
representation of each topic, each with particular relationships to 
17 See Fridja (1993) for a discussion on the distinctions between moods, emotion episodes, 
and emotions. 
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emotion (Leventhal, 1984; Johnson & Multhaup, 1992). (3)The 
distinction between mood states and cognition may not be clear-
cut as is supposed by people such as Beck who propose that 
cognition is "any ideation with verbal or pictorial content" (Beck et 
al 1979: 12) or that "cognitions are stream-of-consciousness or 
automatic thoughts that tend to be in an individual's awareness" 
(Beck, Epstein, & Harrison, 1983:2).18 At the other end of the 
spectrum from such views is the perspective of people such as 
Laird (1989) who posited that "mood affects memory because 
feelings are cognitions". 
The view taken here is that there are indeed multiple levels of 
representation and that any analysis needs to go beyond a simple 
primary/secondary or even cognition/emotion point of view in 
favour of a more systemic approach. Furthermore, it is suggested, 
in keeping with the anthropological critique outlined in the previous 
chapter, that such distinctions may be artefacts of the typically 
binary way in which the questions have been framed. One does, 
however, need to leap into the circle at some point, inevitably 
giving the impression of privileging either cognition or emotion. 
At this point, the introduction of a heuristic metaphor, which will be 
expanded upon in a later chapter, seems appropriate. Based on 
the modularity metaphor of the cognitive neuroscientist Fodor 
(1983), it is a metaphor first articulated by Ornstein (1992) and 
18 While such an unelaborated and unsophisticated view of cognition probably still holds true 
for the mainstream of Cognitive therapist's it is only fair to point out that in his most recent 
writing (for example, 1996) Beck has moved towards a network view very similar to that which 
is proposed here. 
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applied by Teasdale (1997) to the conceptualisation of mood 
disorders, and one which seems to have particular relevance to 
Adventure Therapy. It refers to the notion of the 'mind-in-place'. 
Ornstein illustrates the mind-in-place metaphor by recounting a 
story told to him by a psychiatrist friend: 
The psychiatrist had been called by the police to speak with 
Alfred, a patient of his who was standing on the edge of a cliff, 
threatening to jump. The psychiatrist ran through with Alfred 
the implications of jumping: what about the effects on his 
mother, his children? What about the potential breakthrough 
he was just about to make at the robotics company where he 
worked? What about the increasingly real potential of 
reconciliation with his wife? Alfred had considered all these 
things already and was resolute in his intention to jump_ The 
psychiatrist walked from the cliff edge, desolate that nothing 
could break Alfred's resolve. 
Unaware of the unfolding drama a police officer pulled up at 
the site, pulled out his loudhailer, and bellowed to the group of 
people who had gathered: "Who's the idiot who left that 
Pontiac double-parked out there in the middle of the road? I 
almost hit it, move it now, whoever you are". Alfred heard the 
message, stepped back from the cliff, got in his car and 
parked it properly before quietly getting in the police officer's 
car and waiting to be taken to hospital. 
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As is apparent from the story, the central idea of the mind-in-place 
metaphor is that we do not have one mind, but many, and that at 
anyone time a particular 'mind' will be dominant, and that this is 
the 'mind-in-place'. For Alfred, his suicidal intent had been 
formulated in one mind, one which was replaced by the mind 
which had another priority, being a law-abiding citizen who obeys 
the instructions of the police. The basic idea behind the mind-in-
place metaphor is that, at anyone time, circumstances wi" call up 
a particular mind, and this mind then takes center stage, in much 
the same way as one might access a particular computer program 
to complete a particular task. As circumstances change, the 
current mind-in-place becomes irrelevant, and another 
automatically comes to the fore. 
As will be apparent from the discussion presented in Chapter 1, 
there are some important links here to the constructivist 
perspective. Although based in part on new research about the 
nature of emotion, the articulation of a theory of the role of 
emotion in psychotherapy has not been a major focus of 
attention. In general, emotions are viewed as informative, in that 
they reflect the nature of clients' attempts to construct meaning 
out their of experiences (McGinn & Young, 1996). 
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THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to firstly present some of the 
general therapeutic implications of the features discussed in 
Chapter 2. This is followed by a discussion of the various affective 
change mechanisms and general therapeutic intervention 
processes that are suggested by the various psychotherapeutic 
schools discussed in Chapter 3. While the general structure for 
this discussion is shaped by the work of Safran & Greenberg 
(1987; 1989; 1991) and Greenberg (1993) it is also informed by 
the theoretical critiques of psychotherapy by Lazarus (1991; 
1991 a) and Izard (1991; 1991 a). 
Therapeutic implications of the features of emotions- why is 
emotion important to psychotherapy? 
1. The awareness and complete processing of emotion, enhances 
adaptive functioning. 
In that emotion is adaptive, and provides important orienting 
information to the organism about its situation, to either suppress, 
ignore or avoid emotional experience suggests that functioning will 
be less than optimal. If an individual is unable to learn to 
accurately process one particular type of emotional experience, it 
would seem to follow that due to the reduction in orienting 
information and therefore meaning, a maladaptive response is 
likely to result. For instance, in response to the desire to maintain 
relatedness within an attachment, relationship an individual with 
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an anxious attachment style may fail to develop an appropriate 
response to the action readiness information that anger provides 
(Collins, 1994). Alternatively, emotional response information may 
become outmoded as circumstances change, resulting in 
inappropriate responses. Those with a history of abuse, for 
instance, may react with anger when feeling that others (with 
nonabusive intent) attempt to become close (Bricker, Young, & 
Flanagan, 1993). Furthermore, as Kuhl & Helle (1986) 
demonstrated concerning depression, the failure to implement an 
action results in a reduction of processing power as working 
memory remains 'preoccupied' with a persevering emotional 
state. 1 
2. Emotion provides both a means of activating and information 
about schematic structures. 
Following on from the mind-in-place metaphor which was 
introduced in the previous chapter, emotion indicates the presence 
of a new mirid-in-place or affective schematic structure. In keeping 
with Lang's (1984) proposal that activation of anyone component 
of a schematic structure increases the likelihood of the activation 
of the whole structure, if a sufficient number of parts are elicited or 
primed by a therapeutic process, access to a problematic schema 
is facilitated. This recognises that evocation of emotion is often a 
non-linear process that may not be best achieved by cognitive 
means. The research work on the different effects of various mood 
1 See Mathews (1997) for an analysis and critique of information processing biases in 
emotional disorders. 
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induction techniques (such as music, the weather or facial 
expression) also suggests the potential complexity of schematic 
structures. 
As is suggested by Frijda (1986), emotion has a compelling quality 
that makes it difficult to challenge rationally until further processing 
makes it possible to make sense of the experience. The implicit 
meaning for the individual of particular situations, or types of . 
situations, may then be revealed. For instance, a person may 
experience overwhelming fear in a situation that seems unusual 
but it is difficult to immediately convince the individual that they 
don't need to experience fear and it may be equally difficult for the 
individual to 'talk' him or herself out of being fearful while in the 
midst of the response until the emotion has been 'run-off'. It then 
remains to assess the nature of appraisal pattern or mind-in-place 
that evoked the response. 
3. Awareness of elicitors provides personal clarity and control. 
Following on from the above example, if an emotional reaction or 
action-tendency occurs without any conscious awareness of the 
reasons for such a reaction an individual may find themselves 
puzzled and possibly disturbed by their reaction. Mathews (1997) 
writes that a commonly heard comment with regard to anxiety 
disorders is "I know nothing terrible is going to happen, but I can't 
stop worrying about it". The personal experience of the rapid and 
generally tacit processing that the information-processing 
perspective rests on is often neglected. Greenberg (1993) points 
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out that when there is automatic queuing of an idiosyncratic 
emotion scheme, which is more self-relevant than situation-
relevant, then the response may not seem to fit the situation. Thus 
people may automatically appraise neutral situations or 
statements as rejections or as threats to their competence or 
knowledge; they may feel insecure, anxious, or devalued and 
unappreciated. Such a situation could also conceivably lead to 
people feeling angry and frustrated, both with others and 
themselves. 
4. Interaction can be enhanced through an appreciation of the 
communicative aspect of emotion. 
The expression of an emotion is a clear and poignant signal about 
one's internal state which is never neutral and will rarely go 
unnoticed (Izard, 1991 ).2 For a time during the to late sixties and 
early seventies (perhaps due to less stringent ethical guidelines to 
guide research than exist now) there was a considerable amount 
of research on emotion communication as it related to aggression. 
Milgram's (1964;1965) controversial studies showed that the 
aggressive responses made by the unfortunate subjects in 
response to the request of an 'authority' were influenced markedly 
by the victim's presence and proximity, conditions conducive to 
emotional communication. Similarly, a large number of studies 
showed that eye contact influences behaviour in agonistic 
2 See Pittam & Scherer (1993) for a discussion of verbal expression and the communication of 
emotion. 
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encounters.3 After a period of relative inactivity, there is currently a 
resurgence in interest in anger and hostility.4 
Huesmann (1988) suggested that aggressive behaviour in humans 
is controlled largely by what he called cognitive scripts. Scripts 
relating to aggression in particular are supposed to be particularly 
resistant to change because aggression is typically immediately 
reinforced for the aggressor and is therefore likely to be 
maintained in one's arsenal of strategies for immediate solutions 
of conflict situations. They are also 'run off' very quickly, due 
presumably to their core adaptive function. In situations where an 
individual is not fully processing affective information about his or 
her own action tendency, others may nevertheless respond to the 
emotional communication they are receiving,5 thus eliciting 
unexpected or undesirable responses in others without 
understanding what is being responded to. If the action tendency 
is towards 'fight' rather than 'flight', the unexpected or undesirable 
consequences may be dramatic as others quickly seek to respond 
adaptively themselves. 
5. The therapeutic relationship is an important medium for both the 
assessment and modification of emotion. 
The therapeutic relationship, variously formulated, is a key aspect 
of most schools of psychotherapy (Frank, 1979). Traditionally the 
3 See Pliner, Krames, & Alloway (1975) for an edited overview of studies on nonverbal 
communication of aggression. 
4 See Lemerise & Dodge (1993) for an overview. 
5These 'communications', as Kiesler (1986) points out, may be extremely subtle, to the point 
where people read and react to emotional displays without being completely aware what it is 
they are responding to. 
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experiential and psychoanalytic approaches have highlighted the 
therapeutic relationship. A common misconception regarding 
cognitive and behavioural therapies is that the therapeutic 
relationship is undervalued or even irrelevant (Gluhoski, 1994). 
One of the key notions across a range of schools of thought is that 
the relationship with the therapist may be similar to how he or she 
interacts with others (Goldfried & Castonguay, 1993).6 While 
specific aspects of the therapeutic relationship will be taken up 
below, (an often neglected area) the emotions of the therapist, 
merits attention here. In regard to emotion, the focus, quite 
appropriately, is on the client. However an important part of that 
focus, in view of the communicative aspect of emotion, is the 
emotions of the psychotherapist. 
Izard (1991) provides a valuable discussion of the emotions of the 
psychotherapist and the implications of the therapist's choice of 
emotion theory. Izard points out that the therapist functions both 
as a scientifically trained professional with informed basic beliefs 
about the nature of emotion and as an emotionally responsive 
person. Therefore, the therapist's own emotions, emotional 
responsiveness and beliefs about emotion have to be considered 
along with an intellectual commitment to a formal theory of 
emotion.7 
6 clf the psychoanalytic concept of countertransference, see Truant & Lohrenz (1993). 
7 Some commentators (for example, Watts, 1992) would suggest that Izard is being rather 
flattering to therapists in suggesting that the majority have a clear grasp of, and commitment 
to, a particular theory or conceptualisation of emotion. 
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Izard suggests that therapist emotion responses consist of three 
parts: the emotions' experienced, the emotions expressed verbally 
and nonverbally, and emotion-related behaviour. There is no 
particular reason to suspect that therapists should not, like 
everyone else, have different thresholds for emotion activation 
generally and various thresholds for particular emotions. While the 
majority of research on individual differences comes from early 
emotional development, Izard proposes that these are biologically 
based differences that persist and characterise personality 
throughout the life-span.8 Given that these differences exist, the 
same client may therefore elicit a different emotion or level of 
emotion in various therapists. Therapist empathy is a crucial part 
of a therapeutic relationship and is an obvious place where 
differences in emotional responsiveness may become particularly 
apparent (Book, 1988; Hoffman, 1981). 
Furthermore, like all other humans, therapists may experience 
emotions but may suppress their experience of them. In some 
therapeutic schools this is encouraged. Classical analysts are 
supposed to be a tabula rosa, a blank slate upon which the client's 
concerns are written. In contrast therapists following the client-
centred tradition are encouraged to respond in a caring and 
validating way to the emotions of the client. While it is possible to 
debate the degree to which it is possible to hide or suppress 
emotion the important point here is that, as has been discussed, 
6 Such as the work on behavioral inhibition by Kagan and colleagues (1987) and the 
considerable amount of work on attachment behaviour (see Holmes, 1993 for an overview), 
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emotions have considerable influence on a variety of cognitive 
processes, a phenomenon to which therapists are presumably not 
immune. This has clear implications for shaping the encounter and 
suggests that assessment strategies in particular, should involve 
multiple sources of information as is suggested by Lazarus (1991). 
6. Emotions are central to the change process in psychotherapy. 
That emotion is a central but often neglected and misunderstood 
aspect of therapeutic change is the fundamental premise of the 
current work. As has been seen from the review of the 
psychotherapeutic literature above, emotion has traditionally been 
used as a key source of information for both the therapist and 
client about the client's world. The other major function of emotion, 
either through its absence, presence or regulation, is as a marker 
for change. The notion that emotion is a key mechanism of 
change, while often being an unelaborated element (particularly of 
the behaviourally oriented therapies), is also a feature of most 
therapeutic paradigms. It would be a mistake, however, to suggest 
that emotion is the only mechanism of change. What seems to be 
emerging is a consensus that to depend on the modification of 
only one aspect of the client's world is to predict changes that will 
be largely superficial, if indeed they occur at all. This has become 
increasingly apparent with regard to what might be called the 
'cookbook' approach9 to cognitive therapy which has tended to 
focus on the techniques and procedures by which particular 
cognitions are thought to be modified. 
9 elf Kiesler (1994) for a discussion of the merits of standardized intervention procedures. 
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Meichenbaum & Cameron (1983), following Wachtel (1977), 
recognised that changes in cognition without the simultaneous 
involvement of motivation, emotion and action are likely to be 
minor, short-lived and shallow. Cognitive therapists are often 
charged with being concerned only with distorted thinking and 
being largely unconcerned with emotion, viewing it as essentially 
epiphenomenal (Gluhoski, 1994). This seems unfair in that Beck, 
in his earliest work (1979), emphasised the necessity of arousing 
affect in therapy and the central role that the client's ability to 
"experience and express his feelings during the therapy 
session"(ibid:40) has in the efficacy of cognitive therapy. Debates 
about the primacy of cognition or emotion aside, the presence of 
emotion signals the presence of an important thought and 
emotions are a potent signal of cognitive shifts. In a review of the 
Beckian cognitive paradigm Weishaar (1993) points out that 
thoughts which are associated with a strong emotional reaction 
are the best representatives of core beliefs and assumptions. 
Lazarus (1991) maintains that successful therapy depends on 
what he calls the interpenetration of cognitive, motivational and 
emotional activities - all focused on actions which are directed at 
the environment in which the person lives. Therapy should not 
depend only on one construct, be it cognitive, motivational, 
emotion, action or the environmental conditions faced by the 
patient. For instance, even the behaviourally oriented Foa & Kozak 
(1986) maintain that people must learn from exposure to feared 
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stimuli that their expectations are wrong, that they must stop 
avoiding the sources of their fear and act in ways that make this 
confrontation possible. Lazarus suggests that there has been an 
increased spirit of cooperation and appreciation between 
therapeutic schools. There is an apparent increased appreciation 
not only of the contributions of other therapeutic approaches but, 
in keeping with a theme of the current work, that research from 
academic psychology can provide valuable input into the 
conceptualisation and treatment of various disorders and 
difficulties. 
Change processes 
In light of this rapprochement between therapeutic schools, 
presented below a brief description of some purported change 
processes that are thought to underlie therapeutic change. The 
aim of presenting these representative change processes is to 
present a broad spectrum of the ways in which emotion may 
contribute to change, as have been presented by various 
psychotherapeutic approaches. The emphasis here is to start 
making links from these processes to emotion theory and research 
rather than relying exclusively the therapeutic theorising. 
Catharsis 
The controversial and chequered history of catharsis has already 
been alluded to above but the enduring general interest in 
cathartic techniques and testimonials from therapists suggest that 
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it may well be a change process that is worthy of careful scrutiny. 
Catharsis is also an important change process to examine 
because it can tend to become a catch-all phrase for any affective 
change process that involves emotional expression. 
Frijda (1986), in the context of a discussion of response 
suppression as a means of abolishing or weakening an action 
tendency, points out that it is important to consider what is being 
spoken of when catharsis is proposed as a mechanism of change. 
Frijda maintains that while response suppression engenders 
tenseness and discomfort, 'letting go' of control is felt as relief and 
release, a purging of pent-up or blocked emotion. This is the 
essence of catharsis as proposed by Breuer and Freud (1895). 
After briefly considering the very weak experimental evidence for a 
cathartic effect, Frijda suggests that a careful distinction must be 
made between the short-term effects of releasing control and the 
long-term therapeutic effects that a re proposed by proponents of 
cathartic experiences. The short term effect of releasing control, 
according to Frijda, is concerned mainly with getting rid of 
excitement and preoccupation. However effects of releasing 
control can vary according to the emotion concerned and to the 
conditions that exist when the emotion is expressed. 
Releasing control of anger, for instance, can lead to an escalation, 
or to reinforcement of the desire to hurt. Frijda (ibid: 444) refers to 
a self-reinforcement cycle that can develop when a constellation of 
maintaining stimuli, provocation and the occurrence of rewards is 
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met. Alternatively, anger expressed during a quarrel may 'clear the 
air'; the other person may understand, modify some behaviour or 
bolster the angry individual's self esteem. Alternatively, releasing 
control of grief can mean confrontation with memories or images 
which may have previously been deflected due to a desire to 
maintain self-esteem (perhaps not wanting to appear weak or 
vulnerable) and a completion of the response cycle which will 
allow the acceptance of a loss. Frijda suggests that it is these 
types of processes which may contribute to long-term cathartic 
effect. Catharsis, within Frijda's framework, is not a matter of 
'letting off steam' from a boiler overheated by suppressed 
instinctual impulses but rather a way of perceiving situations in 
their actuality or in terms of what a situation actually means for the 
individual and an acceptance of one's own response. He writes: 
It [catharsis] is ... much more like extinction than tension 
release. It may be supposed to occur, and to occur only, 
when such confrontation and acceptance have been warded 
off in the past and can be effected now: when, in other words, 
letting go of control can produce, or is accompanied by, 
cognitive change (1986:445). 
In marked contrast to their earlier (1987) reluctance to discuss 
catharsis,1O Safran & Greenberg (1991), after reviewing a number 
of perspectives on catharsis suggest that it may consist of a 
10 Their reluctance was based on a desire to move away from the catch~all phrase 'catharsis' 
moving instead towards a more differentiated discussion of affective change processes. They 
also pointed out, following Yalom (1970), that there had been a tendancy within the literature 
to 'write off emotional factors in therapy by refering to catharsis, thereby perpetuating the lack 
of critical attention to emotion processes in therapy. 
113 
number on component subprocesses. They are: (1) experiencing 
compassion for the self, where the very process of 'letting go' 
entails a softening in stance towards previously warded off 
aspects of the self. (2) Completing interrupted emotion/action 
sequences - in much the same way as suggested by Frijda above. 
(3) Releasing inhibiting muscular tension in keeping with Reich's 
notion that the suppression of emotional experience may also 
involve the suppression of associated expressive-motor 
behaviours through muscular contraction. This is also consistent 
with theories- of emotion that acknowledge that emotion involves 
an expressive motor component (Le Izard, 1991). The suppression 
of emotion then becomes not an exclusively psychological act, but 
also a physical one where motor behaviours associated with a 
particular emotion are suppressed through muscular contraction. 
(4) Schematic restructuring - intense emotional experience that is 
related speci'fically to 'unfinished business' may allow access to 
affective schematic memories that can then be re-examined, 
leading to schematic restructuring. 
It is apparent that the majority of factors relating to catharsis 
presented above relate to the completion of interrupted 
sequences, be they cognitive, emotional or motoric (if such 
distinctions continue to have merit in terms of being distinct 
processes). This would suggest that there is the need for some 
focus to the cathartic experience rather than vague and 
undifferentiated experience that is perhaps more in keeping with 
the primal therapy suggest by Janov (1970). An enduring difficulty 
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regarding assessing the contribution of cathartic experience as an 
affective change process is that there is a dearth of theoretically 
informed research that clearly differentiates catharsis from other 
change processes. 
Experiencing 
Coming from the person-centred tradition, experiencing refers to 
receiving the impact of sensory and physiological events occurring 
in the moment (Rogers, 1959). Emotion then, is not something to 
be expelled or discharged as it is in catharsis but rather it is to be 
felt or experienced. The goal of experiencing is not to get rid of the 
feelings 11 but rather to increase awareness of feelings as orienting 
information that provides the person with important information 
about their current situation. While there are parallels with 
catharsis, particularly in terms of what an observer might see,12 
the emphasis in experiencing is quite different. 
'Experiencing' has become an increasingly complex construct 
within the experiential school.13 As Rogers' theory became 
differentiated from the actual practice of client-centred therapy it 
became increasingly difficult to identify Rogers' practical position 
on emotion as a means of change (Wexler & Rice, 1974). Gendlin 
11 It is important to keep in mind here that 'feelings' in the client~centered tradition are defined 
as a complex cognitive~affective unit composed of emotionally toned experience and its 
cognisized meaning. 
12 Gendlin (1991 :266), an eminent practioner and therorist from the person centered tradition 
writes, "I have dents in my file cabinet and bashed-in plaster in my wall. I am pleased with 
both". 
13 See for instance the debate between McGuire (1991) and Gendlin (1991) about the merits 
of particular goals in experiencing. 
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developed a less analytically oriented and more 
phenomenologically oriented approach which emphasised the 
manner in which individuals attend to, and represent, immediate 
experience. In a passage which goes some way to explaining the 
distinction between emotion and experiencing Gendlin (1962) 
writes: 
Let us compare "experiencing" with the common term 
ilemotion". We said that "experiencing" is a felt datum, and this 
word ilfelt" may suggest that it must be an emotion. Often, 
some emotion is the most important aspect of some present 
"this" or experiencing. However, just as often, a client will 
refer to "this feeling" and when he (sic) comes to 
conceptualise it later14 it will turn out to be a complex of many 
meanings (such as "I know what is really at the bottom of it, 
it's that I feel so inferior in action and people will despise me 
because ... " and so on at length). It is a directly felt datum 
that implicitly means a great deal (1962:243-244 emphasis 
in original). 
Experiencing then, is a complex process that is rich in personal 
meaning. The emphasis on a number of different meaning sources 
and structures that interact in particular ways has many parallels 
with the information processing perspective. It is interesting that 
while the experiential school no longer has the therapeutic 
ascendancy, there has been something of a rapprochement 
between cognitive and experiential therapies as cognitive 
therapists and theorists seek to broaden their horizons (Kuehlwein 
& Rosen, 1993). With regard to experiencing as an affective 
change process, the emphasis here is on the need to be cognisant 
14 c/fthe notion of primary, secondary and instrumental emotions (Pascual-Leone, 1991). 
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of as many possible sources of meaning as possible with emotion 
as a guiding light towards key areas of concern. 
Corrective emotional experience 
Franz Alexander (1891-1964), who wrote extensively on the 
association between specific personality traits and certain 
psychosomatic aliments, fell out of favour with classical analysts 
for advocating the use of the corrective emotional experience 15 as 
part of analytic technique (Alexander & French, 1946). In terms of 
Alexander's analytic thought the relationship between the therapist 
and client gives the therapist an opportunity to display behaviour 
different from the destructive or unproductive behaviour of the 
client's parents. For instance, if the client had excessively 
authoritarian parents, a friendly, flexible, nonjudgemental, non-
authoritarian - but with boundaries clearly delineated - attitude 
means that the client has the opportunity to experience, adjust to 
and be led by a new parent figure. 
Butler & Strupp (1991) discuss Sullivan's (1953) "theorem of 
reciprocal emotion" which suggests that, in contrast to Freud's 
unidirectional model, all human transactions (psychotherapy 
included) obey certain reciprocal or circular 'laws'. This model 
predicts that the therapist's response to a client's style will be an 
important component of the resulting interaction. For instance, 
constricted or inflexible responses on the part of the client will 'pull' 
for a complementary response on the part of the therapist. 
15 clf Beck's (1996) 'corrective information', 
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'Complementary' refers here to a narrowing of the range of 
responses from the presumably infinite range of possible 
responses. For instance, while a therapist may wish to treat a 
client as another reasonable and competent individual, a 
depressed or helpless stance on the part of a client may 'pull' the 
therapist towards wanting to nurture, jolly along or to solve a 
current dilemma, thereby potentially treating the client as 
dependent and incompetent. Kiesler (1982) suggested that the 
primary locus for this complementary communication is found in 
the non-verbal, emotional component of interactions between the 
therapist and client. 
In keeping with information processing perspectives that suggest 
that when the features of an interaction or environment match a 
critical configuration of an individual's schema, and theories that 
focus on emotion as a primary means of communication, it would 
seem to follow that if a therapist is able to resist this 'pull' and 
'disengages' from the cycle, there is an opportunity for the 
restructuring of the problematic schematic structure or network. By 
'getting outside the circle', the therapist can provide information at 
an experiential level that is at odds with the schematic structure 
which is typically run off in such circumstances, providing a 
context within which the schema may be examined and possibly 
restructured. 16 
16 Classical analysts may suggest that there is no need to resort to notions such as the 
corrective emotional experience, prefering instead to refer to the concepts of 
countertransference on the part of the therapist and transference on the part of the client. The 
implication of the corrective emotional experience here, however, is that, in contrast to the 
largely conceptual and reflective process of transference interpretation, it is a forward-moving 
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In what is perhaps an unconventional interpretation of what the 
corrective emotional experience involves, it would seem possible 
to suggest that individuals are able to provide their own corrective 
emotional experience. If, as theorists such as Lazarus (1991) 
suggest, emotion provides a form of ongoing appraisal of 
circumstances, an argument could be made that therapies that 
involve flooding or sustained exposure to, work by providing 
schema discrepant information that requires either the creation of 
new schematic structures or the revision of old ones. 
Foa & Kozak (1991) suggest that exposure and response 
prevention changes fear structures and they speculate that this 
type of treatment may also address pathological cognitive 
processes that may underlie erroneous aspects of the structure. 
By linking such notions with the corrective emotional experience it 
is possible to envisage the creation of circumstances where an 
individual is unable to complete their own 'circle'. For instance, 
once an individual has begun abseiling down a cliff, emotion laden 
notions of incompetence are presumably constantly challenged as 
the person proceeds down the rope. If, on top of this experience, a 
corrective emotional experience of a more conventional kind is 
added, where the instructor is effusive about the client's 
achievement (whereas in the past the person may have not been 
process that becomes part of the client's ongoing holistic appraisal of the situation, thereby 
possibly modifying schema by incorporating information from ongoing experience. 
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praised or encouraged for their efforts) it is conceivable that there 
is potential for significant change. 
While such elaborations may be taking theoretical ecumenicalism 
rather too far, a growing number of theorists and therapists have 
come to consider that the impact of an affectively focused 
intervention is due largely to the effects of a corrective emotional 
experience rather than the acquisition of intellectual insight. 
Attunement 
The role of affect in empathic communication is an area that while 
receiving considerable attention during the 1960s and 1970s has 
received only sporadic attention in recent years (Duan & Hill, 
1996). The earlier studies were clearly focused on investigating 
Rogers' hypothesis that therapists' unconditional positive regard, 
genuineness and empathy were 'necessary and sufficient' for 
. therapeutic change to occur. Truax and his colleagues (Traux & 
Mitchell, 1971), were at the forefront of this research and, despite 
a number of challenges to their findings (based mainly around the 
suggestion that what was being researched was a specific 
response technique - empathic reflection - a primarily Rogerian 
therapy technique, rather than empathy per se), seemed to show 
strong relationships between these conditions and positive 
change. After this surge of interest, empathy seems to have 
become a taken-for-granted aspect of most therapeutic 
techniques, where it is conceived of as little more than some sort 
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of kindly and supportive orientation towards the client 
(Synder,1992). 
However, the recent influence of postmodern thought, particularly 
evidenced by the constructivist approach to therapy, where a 
multiplicity of realities is assumed, suggests that empathy should 
be a central concern for therapists rather than a background factor 
(Anderson,1990). Empathy then becomes a fundamental way of 
meeting and knowing another person from a different reality. 
Empathy, according to this approach, is seen as something that 
exists between the therapist and client, not within one or the other, 
and therapy is oriented towards restoring the connection with 
others rather than re-creating an autonomous, separate and 
essentially Western 'self'. For instance, coming from a Gestalt 
perspective, Wheeler (1991) and Yontef (1994) emphasise 
working at what they call the contact boundary between the 
therapist and client. While keeping in mind the anthropological 
critique, it seems that a potential meeting place is that of emotional 
\ 
experience. 
In their overview of a recent volume examining the construct of 
empathy, Bohart & Greenberg (1997) suggest there are three 
basic categories of therapeutic empathy: (1) 'Empathic rapport' 
refers to a general kindliness, global understanding, and tolerant 
acceptance of the client's feelings and frame of reference and is 
most akin to the 'common sense' view of empathy. (2) An 
'experience-near understanding of the client's world' involves 
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trying to grasp the whole of the client's perceived situation. This is 
most characteristic of the psychodynamic approach where there is 
a recursive cycle of exploration of the client's experience, both 
conscious and unconscious, and using this to achieve a 
differentiated understanding of how the client is experiencing his 
or her world. (3) Emphasised mainly by the client-centred 
approach is 'communicative attunement'. The aim here is to share, 
connect, 'be in the moment with' the client's attempts to 
understand him or herself, access his or her experience, to shape 
and conceptualise, and to communicate this to another person. 
The therapist endeavours to put him or herself in the client's shoes 
at that moment. It is this third type of empathy which involves the 
greatest degree of affective attunement. 
Developmental researchers (for example, Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987) have emphasised the importance of emotion 17 in empathy 
and the work of Stern (1985) in particular suggests that affective 
attunement may be central to empathic communication. 
Furthermore, research in this area suggests that deficiencies in 
affective attunement are associated with distortions in dyadic 
interaction and increased conflict in interpersonal interactions 
(Seifer & Dickstien, 1993) indicating that affective attunement may 
have therapeutic benefits apart from those associated only with 
those attributed to a good therapeutic relationship. 
17 clf Shott's (1979) notion of empathic role taking emotions. 
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Attunement, as described by the developmental researchers, 
involves intermodal resonance between parent and infant. For 
example, if a baby is playing enthusiastically with a toy by banging 
the pieces together, the infant's parent may express attunement 
by clapping his or her hands in time with the infant, or making 
verbal exclamations in a tonal quality that matches the intensity of 
the child's actions. Research where mothers are instructed to 
misattune their responses to their infant's affective state showed 
that the normal interactional sequence was disrupted and it 
remained disrupted until the mother began to re-attune (Stern, 
Hofer, Haft, & Dore, 1985). Interpersonal communication, as 
created by attunement, promotes the recognition of shared feeling 
states for the infant. But as Stern (1985) points out, the converse 
is also true - feeling states that are never attuned18 will not 
become part of the infant's developing repertoire. Moving into the 
therapeutic realm, Safran & Greenberg (1991) suggest that 
affective attunement by the therapist may playa vital role in 
helping the client to contact, articulate and intergrade into his or 
her sense of self-adaptive feeling states which are currently 
unarticulated. 
A note on prevention 
With the notable exception of Goleman's (1995) focus on the need 
to enhance the 'emotional intelligence' which has resulted in 
programs to teach such things as empathy skills, there would 
18 The work of Stern and colleagues (1985) indicated that some mothers consistently 
misattune to their child's affective experience. This was particularly true for mothers who were 
ill and a particulalry intriguing finding was that the cultural norm of communicating in 
'motherese' was noticelably less apparent in ill mothers. 
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seem to have been little written about the ways in which primary 
prevention of pathological emotional problems may be achieved. 
Lazarus (1991) maintains that thus far the principles involved in 
primary prevention are so general, and the number of variables so 
great, that it has tended to rely on what he describes as "pious 
slogans" rather than clear courses of action (ibid,464). Lazarus 
points out that we still know little about things such as under what 
conditions a trauma impairs later adaptation, or what kinds of, and 
at what stage of development does stress facilitate or impair 
child's later development. 
Secondary prevention concerns efforts to keep an already existing 
dysfunction from getting worse. It would seem that whether one 
describes assisting people to cope with difficulties as secondary 
prevention or therapy is rather academic. Lazarus does, however, 
suggest that more careful attention needs to be paid to the 
distinction between what might have traditionally been called 
neurosis and temporary reactions to severe difficulties of living. He 
suggests that the tendency to emphasise characterlogical 
neuroses now seems incomplete and involves essentially blaming 
the victim of destructive life conditions for not functioning well. 
Summary: 
A general framework is presented by Greenberg (1993) who 
suggests that in light of both emotion theory and practice of 
psychotherapy there are three major types of intervention 
processes: acknowledging, evoking, and reconstruction of emotion 
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schemes. In terms of the changes processes described above, 
acknowledging is analogous to experiencing, attunement and 
empathy, evoking has most in common with cathartic approaches, 
and the corrective emotional experience involves reconstruction. 
These are not, of course, the only possible change processes and 
Greenberg's framework of acknowledging, evoking, and 
reconstruction provides a means of conceptualising other specific 
change process.19 
Acknowledging essentially involves directing clients towards 
attending to their emotional experience. This is based on the 
premise that emotion cannot fully serve its adaptive function if it is 
not being attended to with accuracy and immediacy. Interventions 
based on acknowledging emotion essentially fall into two 
categories. The first is training client's to be aware of different 
aspects of their experience, including bodily sensations, 
expressive actions, cognitive-affective complexes (such as feeling 
'over the hill') and the like. The second category involves affective 
attunement and empathically responding to clients' feelings with a 
view to facilitating the clients' attention to inner experience and 
acknowledgment of emotion. 
Evoking and intensifying emotion leads to various possible change 
processes. Firstly, as has been discussed, emotional experience 
leads to the accessing of core schema. Safran & Greenberg 
19 For an overview of other change processes (such as reowning) see Safran & Greenberg 
(1987). 
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(1987), drawing on Abelson's (1963) original use of a hot/cold 
distinction, refer to 'hot cognitions' which involve affectively laden 
thoughts which have a salience that overrides 'cold' hypothesising 
or analysis. Secondly, the experience of emotion is linked to an 
action tendency and is therefore motivational. While this action 
tendency may be the focus of therapeutic intervention, as can be 
the case in violent behaviour, in other contexts (perhaps when fear 
has reduced the capacity for assertive action) the evocation and 
intensification of anger may be therapeutic. Thirdly, the expression 
of emotion can lead to further processing and completion of a 
sequence which may not have been 'run-off'. This seems to be 
particularly relevant in terms of grief and trauma where there has 
been incomplete processing of the appropriate emotional reaction 
along with an interruption in action tendencies. The evocation of 
and surrender to emotion allows the emotion to 'run its course'. 
Emotional restructuring involves techniques which firstly make 
available the relevant activating information, and then provide 
novel information from as many sources as possible. It is still a 
point of conjecture and debate whether old schema are being 
modified or elaborated or whether new, more adaptive schema are 
being created. Covering the gamut of therapeutic approaches, 
Greenberg suggests that restructuring can occur when 
contradictions are resolved, when new organismic information 
about needs and concerns becomes available, when adult 
processing capacity is applied to childhood experience, when 
greater attenlional capacity is made available enabling the 
126 
synthesising of more information, and when dysfunctional beliefs 
in schema are changed. 
The particular change processes which have been described 
above were chosen on the basis of their therapeutic 'heritage' and 
for their apparent relevance to Adventure Therapy. Whether or not 
these particular processes prove to be the most applicable will 
only be confirmed by substantive research. Greenberg's general 
framework of acknowledging, evoking and restructuring, provides 
a means within which other change processes may by 
conceptualised and as such 'makes space' within which other 
interventions can potentially be included. 
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COPING AND RISK 
The previous chapters have focused on general features and 
processes that, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, have a 
connection to Adventure Therapy but which do not focus directly 
on the activities which are part of the Adventure Therapy 
approach. Considered below are two aspects which have 
particular relevance to the activities which participants may 
engage in as part of Adventure Therapy programs; coping and risk 
taking. Surprisingly, for processes which are constantly referred to 
as being part of Adventure Therapy programs, there has been little 
apparent research attention paid to these aspects. Perhaps as a 
consequence of this, there has been a tendency in the Adventure 
Therapy area to assume firstly that these are relatively 
straightforward processes, and secondly, with specific regard to 
emotion, that emotion is a hindrance to effective coping and 
'rational' risk-taking. The aim of the discussion below is to suggest 
that this attitude does not adequately take account of the 
psychological literature and that a more sophisticated approach is 
required to make effective therapeutic use of adventurous 
activities. 
Coping 
Coping is an everyday process. Everyday language is full of 
coping phrases such as "I managed to deal with it" and its more 
assertive recent variation, "I dealt to it". Folk conceptions of 
psychopathology often seem predicated with a reference to a lack 
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of coping - "she/he just wasn't coping". With specific regard to 
Adventure Therapy, improvements (generally undefined and 
unmeasured) in what are usually called coping strategies are often 
part of a program's aims. 
Coping is also increasingly an area of interest for psychologists 
from a number of different perspectives. 
While the closely related concept of defenses has been a theme in 
therapeutically oriented psychology, at least since Freud, the 
interest of the psychological community in stress, an interest 
which flowered in the 1960s, logically resulted in a considerable 
amount of discussion about coping. With specific regard to the 
study of emotion, especially amongst cognitively oriented theorists 
and researchers, coping has become an important theme, to the 
point where it has been conceptualised by some as a subset of 
emotion (Lazarus, 1996). The aim of this discussion is firstly to 
briefly outline the major theoretical approaches to coping with a 
r 
focus on the work of Lazarus and his colleagues. What becomes 
apparent is that, despite the voluminous amount of theorising and 
research on coping, it is still a dynamic and developing area. 
Furthermore, with regard to the Adventure Therapy area, the ways 
in which participants cope with the activities involved and the 
process of engaging in the activities is generally seen as a key 
part of the therapeutic process. 
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There would appear to be two main approaches to coping: those 
who are primarily interested in coping styles and those whose 
focus is on the process of coping. The coping style approach has 
its modern roots in the psychoanal~ic interest in defenses. Freud, 
while acknowledging that there were a number of defense 
mechanisms, was chiefly concerned with repression, which he 
viewed as the most important and most commonly applied 
defense. The essential function of the defenses is to protect the 
individual from emotional distress prompted by awareness of 
internal or external stresses. 
It was Freud's daughter Anna, in her book The Ego and the 
Mechanisms of Defense (1946), who first clearly articulated the 
psychoanalytic perspective on defenses. Anna Freud maintained 
that both normal and neurotic individuals had a characteristic and 
discernible repertoire of defenses. Her oft-quoted observation that 
"there is depth in the surface" reflected her contention that 
defenses adumbrated the complexity of the defensive aspects of 
the ego. Each libidinal phase of development, with its specific 
drive components, necessarily evoked particular defenses. The 
anal phase, for instance, is associated with reaction formation (the 
transformation of an unacceptable impulse into its opposite) due to 
the development of shame and disgust in relation to anal impulses 
and pleasures (Inderbitzin, Luke, & James, 1990). Further to this, 
in a notion that became a touchstone for clinical psychology, and 
psychiatry particularly, it was proposed that particular forms of 
defenses were associated with particular forms of 
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psychopathology (or neurotic breakthrough in psychoanalytic 
parlance). Intellectualisation was associated with obsessive-
compulsiveness, paranoia with projection and denial, mania with 
compensation and sublimation and so on. 
The developmental focus of the psychodynamic approach to 
defenses continued and was explicitly articulated in the work of 
Menninger (1954) and Hann (1969). Vaillant (1977) began 
articulating a hierarchical approach to defenses without the same 
emphasis on classical psychosexual formulations. Vaillant 
proposes that there are four types of defense mechanisms. 
Narcissistic defenses (such as denial) are the most primitive and 
are used by children and psychotically disturbed individuals. 
Immature defenses (introjection, for instance) are characteristic of 
adolescents. Neurotic defenses (that is, repression and isolation) 
are seen in obsessive compulsive and hysterical patients and in 
adults under stress. Mature defenses (humour and altruism, for 
example), within Valliants framework at least, are adaptive 
mechanisms of adult life. 
This conception of an adaptive hierarchy of defenses led to the 
development of a number of trait type measures 1 which 
endeavoured to objectify what had, until that time, been a primarily 
impressionistic pursuit based largely on inference. There is a 
clear link here to trait-based personality research which in the 
early 1970s was just beginning to capture the imagination of 
1 See Cohen (1987) for a review of these measures. 
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researchers in the field. The coping style approach, then, is 
clearly linked to the psychodynamic and ego-psychology 
movements which are now often considered rather weary 
theoretically.2 However, as will be discussed below, there is still a 
tendency to attempt to apply trait type or dispositional attributes to 
individual's coping processes. This may be a reflection of the 
methodological preferences of researchers and clinicians who 
attempt to make people, as it were, 'hold still'. 
Rather than attempting to tie down particular styles of coping, a 
group of researchers began to consider coping as a process. At 
the forefront of this work for more than 30 years has been Richard 
Lazarus, who in concert with a number of researchers (particularly 
Folkman) has developed the process approach to coping. This 
process approach rejected the dispositional approach of the 
psychoanalytic and ego-psychology schools. 
Lazarus (1993) outlines five principles of the process approach: 
1.ln marked contrast to the hierarchical approach, Lazarus 
maintains that coping thoughts and actions should be 
measured separately from their outcomes. The 
adaptiveness of a particular way of coping depends not 
only on the person but on at least three other factors: firstly, 
adaptiveness depends on the specifics of the situation. 
Secondly, on the time frame being considered (a way of 
2 Despite the current enthusiasm for cognitive and biological accounts and a concomitant lack 
of interest in psychodynamic explanations, it is worth noting that DSM-IV includes a Defensive 
Functioning Scale as a proposed axis for further study. The framework is explicitly hierarchical 
and has a strong ego-psychology flavour, complete with reference to unconscious processes. 
133 
coping may be immediately adaptive but still have long-term 
negative consequences), and lastly, on the particular type 
of outcome being considered (for instance, an exercise 
program may have positive effects on somatic health, but 
deleterious effects on relationships which are not 
maintained due to the time taken to exercise). 
2. The process of coping employed for any complex stressor 
will vary according to the adaptational significance of the 
stressor and the requirements of the stressor. What this 
means in practice is that it is necessary to identify the 
particular threats within a complex situation (having a life-
threatening illness, for example) which have particular 
salience for the individual at a particular time. 
3. Coping measurement should "describe what a person is 
thinking and doing in the effort to cope with stressful 
encounters" (ibid, 236). Lazarus & Folkman (1988) 
developed the Ways of Coping Questionnaire, which was 
intended to provide a means of examining the process of 
coping within various contexts rather than as a measure of 
coping style as it is conceived psychodynamically. 3 
However, Lazarus maintains that there are consistencies 
(and inconsistencies) in coping process both over time and 
across stressful encounters. 
4. Lazarus (1993:237) defines coping as: 
.. , ongoing cognitive and behavioural efforts to 
manage specific external and/or internal demands 
3 see Coyne & Gottlieb (1996) for a critique of checklist measures of coping, with a particular 
focus on the Ways of Coping Questionnaire. Coyne and Gottlieb suggest that such 
questionaries are an imposed narrative which is too narrowly focused. 
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that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the 
resources of the person. 
The key feature of this definition is that there is no reference 
to the outcomes of the process. The link here is to point 
number 1, that process should be measured independently 
from outcome. Lazarus is not, however, expousing an 
extreme relativist perspective, he is concerned with both the 
adaptive ness (the extent to which coping improves 
adaptational outcomes such as social functioning or 
physical health) and with the success (the extent to which 
the person believes a coping related reappraisal). 
5. In what has become perhaps the best known aspect of the 
process approach, Lazarus maintains that there are two 
major functions of coping; emotion-focused and problem-
focused. Simply put, emotion-focused coping is concerned 
with managing emotions rather than the environment that 
aroused them. Alternately, problem-focused coping is 
directed towards the conditions that arouse stressful 
emotions. 
The five principles outlined above have resulted in a considerable 
amount of research and discussion. It is the fifth principle that is of 
particular interest here, due to its apparent heuristic value. The two 
functions, at least at first, seem to simplify a complex process. 
Whether simplification of complex processes is itself a useful 
endeavour is beyond the scope of this discussion. It would appear, 
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however, that it is the tendency towards reification of heuristics4 
(such as problem-focused and emotion-focused coping processes) 
and a general mistrust of emotion as 'sensible' that has resulted in 
the misapplication of the two functions. 
Lazarus himself (1996) has been at pains to address what he sees 
as misconceptions regarding the problem/emotion-focused 
functions of coping. Lazarus criticises others, and himself, for a 
tendency to treat coping functions as action types. The task of 
measurement almost inevitably leads to the formulation of action 
typologies so as to distinguish one measured thing from another. 
However, Lazarus writes: 
... functions do not refer clearly or consistently to 
actions; any action can have more than one function. 
And if one does not know the full context of coping, 
including what the person is trying to accomplish, the 
classification is often specious. (1996 :292) 
While Lazarus provides a modern example based on the use of 
beta-blockers to reduce the physical symptoms of performance 
anxiety that illustrates the futility of creating a binary opposition 
between problem and emotion focused coping I would like to 
briefly explore another example: 
And now my life ebbs away;· 
days of suffering grip me. 
Night pierces my bones: 
my gnawing pains never rest. 
In his great power God becomes like 
4 See Dumont (1993) for a selective review of the ways in which heuristics influence clinical 
problem formulation. The points Dumont makes with regard to clinical work would also seem 
applicable generally, when researchers attempt to formulate how individuals cope. 
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clothing to me, he binds me like the 
neck of my garment. 
He throws me into the mud 
and I am reduced to dust and ashes. 
Job 30: 16-195 
Here then, is Job, an archetypal 'coper' for two major religions.6 It 
is when an example such as this is considered that the centrality 
of context to the coping process is apparent. It is interesting to 
consider, as a psychologist, the model of coping that is presented 
by Job and, byexterision, other 'religious' ways of coping. Freud. 
himself clearly considered religion as a neurotic form of 
explanation and defense that belonged to the infancy of humanity, 
that would, or should be supplanted by the primacy of intelligence 
(Freud, 1913). Later psychodynamic theorists became more 
interested in formulating the ways in which religious belief 'worked' 
for the individual where such beliefs, however unfounded they may 
appear, could be considered as either highly pathological (when 
religion was a form of distortion - a narcissistic and infantile 
defense) or as rather benign (with religious belief promoting 
altruism and anticipation - mature defenses). 
Turning to the process approach, in terms of problem-focused and 
emotion-focused coping, a religious approach immediately 
highlights the difficulties involved in, and perhaps the futility of, 
5 New International Translation. 
S It is interesting to note that there does not appear to be a body of psychological literature that 
discusses the cultural components of coping, or cross-cultural comparisons of coping. 
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classifying coping processes in terms of oppositions.? For 
example, the atheistic or agnostic researcher may be compelled to 
consider religious coping as emotion-focused, while the individual 
doing the coping (by praying or making sacrifices, for instance) 
may consider such actions to be clearly problem-focused. A 
both/and rather than either/or approach seems clearly more 
appropriate in such a case. 
Lazarus, with his strong aversion to linking outcome with coping 
process, and his contention that only observers can assess the 
'success' of a coping process, does not seem to deal adequately 
with the role of expectancy in the coping process. Lazarus does 
consider appraisal as a key part of his general theory of emotion 
and refers to it with regard to coping (Lazarus, 1991). For 
Lazarus, appraisals are either primary or secondary. Primary 
appraisals involve assessing what is at stake in a given stressful 
encounter while secondary appraisals involve evaluating the 
coping resources and options available (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). Lazarus, however, does not seem particularly interested in 
the individuals expectation of outcomes as the result of specific 
responses. Lazarus sometimes (Lazarus, 1993) seems to suggest 
that individuals set out on the coping process and almost 'play it 
by ear', adapting the process as they go. While, to a degree, this 
does seem to be the case, the social cognitive perspective, and 
particularly the work of Bandura, suggests that individuals may 
7 An interesting background theme to this discussion is the contestability of the attribution of 
pathological and benign - who is best placed to make such attributions and how these 
attributions are legitimated (for one perspective, see Foucault, 1965). 
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also have quite specific efficacy expectations which they use to 
shape the coping process. 
Bandura (1988) refers to two types of response outcome 
expectancies. One is concerned with the outcomes that are likely 
to result from a specific response, The other is concerned with the 
degree to which an individual8 expects to be able to perform a 
particular response, or self-efficacy, Some writers (such as 
Ursin,1988) go so far as to equate positive response outcome 
expectancies directly with coping. Bandura (1997) is critical of 
dichotomous thinking with regard to problem and emotion focused 
coping. He does not, however, seem to raise any criticisms that 
Lazarus himself has not pointed out, particularly with regard to the 
changeability of situations and the confounding of means and 
ends. That said, there would still appear to be room within the 
process approach to coping for a more extensive integration of the 
construct of self-efficacy. 
Lazarus, as described at the outset of this discussion, maintains 
that coping can be usefully considered as a subset of emotion. 
Lazarus criticises research that separates coping from emotion: 
... psychologists think of an emotion as one event or 
process, and coping as another, both separate but 
presumably connected by learning. This stems from the 
long tradition in psychology of separating stimulus and 
response, afferent and efferent, and perception and 
action (1996:297). 
8 Bandura (1997) also clearly believes in corporate self-efficacy, as might be found in sports 
teams, schools, or communities, Such a perspective serves to widen the possibilities with 
regard to coping research beyond the supposed boundaries of the individual. 
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Lazarus suggests that this tendency stems from the style of 
reductionist science which has dominated psychological inquiry. 
Within this paradigm it is necessary to reduce a phenomena to its 
basic elements to understand it. Lazarus seems equivocal about 
the utility of breaking a process into component parts (he did after 
all develop the Ways of Coping Questionnaire, which does just 
that) but maintains that psychologists generally ignore the need to 
resynthesise the elements into a "living system". 
Lazarus' key point here with regard to coping and emotion (if 
indeed it remains appropriate to use the two separate terms) is 
that: 
we must abandon the bad habit of thinking of emotion as 
an event that leads to a coping response, and instead 
recognise that the emotion process includes coping 
( 1996:298). 
Lazarus (ibid) suggests that it is the personal significance or core 
relational theme that is what takes the emotion process to a higher 
level of abstraction, with coping contributing to this process by 
indicating what is possible in a given situation. While the 
apparently hierarchical notion of 'higher levels of abstraction' 
seems to muddy the water of integrated 'living systems', it would 
seem that the core relational themes of emotion provide some 
type of epistemological substrate. 
If there is going to be a 'third generation' (with the psychoanalytic 
and process approaches constituting the first and second 
generations respectively) of coping research, what are the key 
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questions and issues that will shape the research? As pointed out 
by Coyne & Gottlieb (1996), there are a number of difficulties with 
the checklist approach to the measurement of coping. Furthermore 
Stone & Kennedy-More (199~) question the utility of the factor 
analysis in the analysis of such data. 
When to measure coping remains problematical. It is generally 
inappropriate and may in fact be spurious (in that the process is 
amended by the act of measuring it) to attempt to measure coping 
while an individual is involved in the coping process. Most 
checklists are retrospective and are not specific about what it is 
that might constitute a 'coping episode'. It would seem that 
methods which involve recording a coping process (by means of 
videotape for instance) may provide a way of addressing some of 
the temporal issues of coping assessment. 
The consistency of coping and its relationship to personality is an 
area ripe for theoretical development. 9 Lazarus (1993) reports that 
some strategies of coping, analogous to personality, are more 
stable or consistent than others. Lazarus himself (1993) reports 
research which suggests that optimism and pessimism influence 
the way stressful encounters are dealt with. A possible area within 
which to start the analysis could be from a developmental 
perspective. As was described above, those from a 
psychodynamic perspective were explicit about the link between 
9 See Suls, David, & Harvey (1996) for an overview of recent research on coping and 
personality that uses a trait model of personality. See also Pervin (1993) and Krohne, Hock, & 
Kohlmann (1992). Another strand of related research concerns the links between personality, 
emotion, and health, see Robinson & Pennebaker (1991) for a discussion. 
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defenses and developmental stage. While the psychosexual 
developmental model has fallen from favour, it would seem that 
there has not yet been any further attempts to develop a 
substantial and integrated developmental perspective.1o 
The adaptiveness or effectiveness of certain coping strategies 
remains a fascinating area but unfortunately coping and outcomes 
are still often confounded (Stanton et al. 1994). The confounding 
of coping and outcome has led to an explanation that suggests 
that emotion-oriented coping is well correlated with emotional 
distress (presumably an undesirable outcome). With specific 
regard to Adventure Therapy, consider a climber awash with fear 
on a difficult climb recognising that his or her fear needs to be 
coped with as it is standing in the way of addressing the problem 
at hand. The tendency to devalue emotionally-focused coping, 
while being historically understandable, needs reassessment. 
Thus far, the focus has been on how people respond to situations 
they find themselves in. The other side of this particular coin are 
the means by which they find themselves in these situations in the 
first place. In keeping with the Adventure Therapy theme, a key 
issue is the role of risk-taking, which is an explicit part of most 
-Adventure Therapy programs, and more specifically the role of 
emotion in risk-taking. 
10 A possible starting point for such an investigation could be the link between coping and 
attachment. The attachment paradigm (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991) would seem to provide, at 
least intuitively, a means by which particular coping processes might become more or Jess 
likely to be utilised. In a similar vein a dispositional perspective has been advanced by Ayers 
et al (1996). 
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Emotion and risk-taking 
Almost immediately upon attempting to link risk, adventurous 
activities and emotion, the substantial research tradition within 
psychology that has looked at situations that involve possible 
injury or death emerges, a tradition which often explores the 
possibility of a 'sensation seeking' trait. The word 'trait' naturally 
alerts the reader to the fact that sensation seeking, as it has come 
to be commonly conceived of, is considered as an aspect of 
personality. 
To be even more specific, the term has narrowed to be almost 
synonymous with measures of the Sensation Seeking Scale 
(Zuckerman, 1978, 1979). What also emerges is a general 
suspicion of those who might engage in activities which are 
associated with sensation seeking. Zuckerman, Bushsbaum, & 
Murphy (1980) summarised the behavioural correlates of 
sensation seeking (as measured by the Sensation Seeking Scale). 
High sensation seeking correlated with greater sexual activity, 
multidrug use, cigarette smoking, volunteering for unusual 
experiments, participation in physically dangerous activities, and 
elevations on the Hypomania (Ma) and Psychopathic Deviate (Pd) 
scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. What is 
particularly apparent, however, when examining the subscales 11 
11 The subscales are (a) thrill and adventure seeking, which measures the desire to engage in 
physically adventurous activities, (b) experience seeking, which measures a desire for 
experiential variety through a non-conforming lifestyle (as in joining 'counterculture' groups), 
(c) diSinhibition, which measures traditional nonconformity through release and social 
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on the Sensation Seeking Scale, apart from its thorough 
endorsement of a stereotypical middle class lifestyle, is its almost 
complete lack of attention to emotion. This seems incongruous as 
there is a clear emotional connotation to the way in which 
'sensation' as it is construed by the SSS is conceived, the 
implication being that individuals seek, through sensation, a more 
positive affective state. 
Coming from the other direction, the research on emotion and risk 
taking has, quite understandably, been concerned primarily with 
decision making. That emotion can have an influence on decision 
making, and that emotion in some circumstances may be 
essentially making the decision, has already been discussed. 
However, an examination of the influence of emotion on risk taking 
allows an examination not only of the theoretical issues involves 
but also raises points regarding the research possibilities in this 
area, especially within the Adventure Therapy area. 
At the forefront of research on the relationship between emotion, 
particularly positive emotion, on risk related behaviour has been 
Alice Isen and her colleagues (for example, Isen & Patrick, 1983; 
Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988). The majority of 
Isen's work is based on the responses of college students who 
take part in the research in order to obtain one hour's course credit 
which they are able to 'risk' in various situations, situations which 
disinhibition, and (d) boredom susceptibility, which measures an aversion to repetition and 
routine. 
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typically revolve around being able to bet chips which represent 
the course credits. Isen has consistently pointed out that the effect 
of emotion on risk taking is complex, and that it depends on 
factors such as the nature of the risk (physical risk, social risk, 
gambling, and so on), the level of risk involved, and whether the 
potential loss is meaningful or hypothetical. The counterintuitive, 
but consistent, finding with a (few important exceptions), 
throughout Isen's work, is that subjects induced with positive 
feelings are generally more cautious and conservative in their risk 
preferences and risk taking than control subjects. 
Isen & Patrick (1993) tested the notion that positive affect leads to 
risky behaviour only in low-risk situations. They manipulated the 
risk level (that the students could lose their course credits), telling 
different subjects that the bet available to them held a 17 percent 
chance of winning (high risk), a 50 percent chance of winning 
(medium risk) or an 83 percent chance of winning (low risk). Their 
findings revealed that positive affect did not have a uniform effect 
across the three risk conditions. A significantly greater proportion 
of positive affect subjects than neutral affect subjects chose to bet 
in the low-risk condition. Approximately equal proportions of 
positive affect and neutral affect subjects chose to bet in the 
moderate risk condition while a smaller proportion of positive affect 
subjects than neutral affect subjects chose to bet in the high risk 
condition. Positive affect then, in a gambling situation, promotes 
an interest in gambling when the risk of losing is low, has little 
effect when the risk of losing is moderate, and appears to inhibit 
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interest when the risk of losing is high. This risk aversion was also 
noted in situations where the risk situation about which subjects 
were reasoning was a realistic one, that involved a real and 
personally meaningful loss (Arkes et ai, 1988). 
This research has important implications in terms of considering 
'common sense' models. For instance, the priming or accessibility 
model of Fiske & Taylor (1984) suggests that persons who are 
happy are more likely to think about positive possibilities and that 
they will be generally more optimistic in their decision making, and 
the model is consistent with what experimental subjects intuit 
(lsen,et ai, 1984). Isen & Geva (1987) investigated this with 
regard to risk-taking and found that positive mood subjects 
reported more thoughts about losses and losing in high and 
moderate risk situations but had fewer thoughts about losing than 
controls in low risk situations. According to the accessibility model, 
happy people should have more positive cognitions and should 
think more about positive possibilities, and should act accordingly, 
but in this situation they often had more negative thoughts. Isen 
(1993) argues that this relative risk aversion in positive affect 
subjects can be explained in terms of affect maintenance - people 
who are in a positive mood risk losing that state and therefore 
think and behave conservatively. 
Isen's work suggests that, in general, positive affect will 
discourage risk taking when the risky decision is personally 
meaningful and relates to a genuine loss, and when the risk of 
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losing is high. However, positive affect appears to encourage 
preference for risk when the risk is judged to be low or when the 
cost associated with the risk is relatively inconsequential. The 
discussion of the effect of affect on risk taking naturally leads to 
consideration of the quality of the risk taking decisions that 
individuals may make. Work by Isen and colleagues (1991) and 
others (eg Murray et aI., 1990) suggests that the effects of affect 
on cognitive processes involving decisions are task and situation 
dependant. Important tasks, that allow for creative input, and 
which provide personally meaningful feedback appear to benefit 
from positive affect in terms of more efficient information 
processing. In contrast, positive affect seems to lead to a greater 
reliance on heuristics, with a possible reduction in task 
performance, when the task in question is mundane, and of little 
personal consequence. 
With regard to negative affect and decision making, Forgas (1989) 
compared the effects of positive and negative affect on information 
search and decision making strategies for both personally relevant 
and personally irrelevant decisions.12 Forgas found that sad 
subjects took longer to make decisions, re-checked information 
more than positive affect subjects, attended to more information 
that was not task related, and searched for alternatives rather than 
attributes of the situation (which, in relation to the experimental 
task, was less efficient). It is important to note that the work of 
12 It is worth noting that a limitation of Forgas' work is its reliance on bogus feedback to induce 
positive, neutral, and negative moods - raising the question of whether subjects are influenced 
more by their mood or by their success or failure on a previous task as they embark on 
another. 
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Forgas does not suggest that the actual quality of the decision 
making of sad subjects was less than that of subjects in positive 
affective states. 
The studies described above are typically undertaken with 
subjects with no particular (or identified) psychopathology. It is 
also interesting to note that, in contrast to most other studies of 
emotion, the majority of the work with regard to risk taking has 
been done on the influence of positive emotion. However, 
commonly-made clinical observations of individuals who are 
depressed include an apparent slowing of decision making 
processes, a general reluctance to make decisions, marked 
tendencies towards giving greater weight to risks rather than 
benefits, and to be generally risk avoidant (see for example, 
Akiskal & Van Valkenburg,1994; Hartledge et aI., 1993; Sweet et 
al.,1992). There has not however been a substantial amount of 
empirical research on risk with depressed subjects of the type 
undertaken by Isen and her colleagues on positive affect. A study 
that is typical of the type of research that has been undertaken, 
and which highlights some of the shortcomings of such research, 
was conducted by Pietromonaco & Rook (1987). 
Pietromonaco & Rook studied two groups of students, 25 of whom 
were depressed and 44 who were non-depressed. The students 
were given a list of ten decision scenarios and a list of potential 
risks and benefits which might follow from making a particular 
choice. For example, one of the problems went: "You recently 
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purchased a pair of shoes. After wearing the shoes for about a 
month, you notice that some of the stitches around the sole are 
coming loose. In deciding whether to return the shoes to the store, 
you consider the following benefits and risks. Potential benefit: 
You might get your money back or a replacement pair of shoes. 
Potential risk: You may waste a lot of time and not accomplish 
anything" (Pietromonaco & Rook, ibid:401-402). The students 
were then asked to rate the potential benefit and the potential risk, 
relating the importance of their possibility, the likelihood that they 
would occur, and the feeling they would have if the benefit (or risk) 
were to occur. A composite measure was formed to represent the 
student's perception of potential risks and benefits. In general, the 
'depressed' students rated potential risks more highly and 
potential benefits less highly than the 'non-depressed' students. 
The so-called depressed students were also more reluctant than 
the other students to take the action specified in the scenarios (for 
example, taking the shoes back in the example described above). 
This particular study is instructive as it highlights a number of 
shortcomings of such investigations. Firstly, as is typical for such 
studies, the 'diagnosis' of depression was made using a checklist 
of symptoms of depression (The Beck Depression Inventory). This 
checklist was developed as a measure of severity of depression 
and is not a diagnostic instrument. The assumption that a score 
above a certain point is indicative of the presence of depression in 
non-clinical populations, particularly in college samples, is rarely 
warranted (Hammen,1980; Rippere, 1994). Furthermore, 
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depression in this case is treated essentially as an emotion, 
whereas, as a clinical phenomena, it is more accurately described 
as a constellation of features, anyone of which could potentially 
have been responsible for the findings. Secondly, as has already 
been discussed, any analysis of risk requires an analysis of what 
is actually being risked - specifically, is the risk to be taken highly 
or only slightly risky? Is the risk personally relevant? What are the 
features of the potential loss? I n a much more general sense, 
there appears to be only a rudimentary acknowledgment of 
emotion research and theory. In the shoe example above, emotion 
theory (from virtually any perspective) would suggest that the 
authors are making a rather sUbstantial assumption that sadness 
is the key emotion. It would be just as easy to suggest that anger 
is the fundamental ingredient in the students' responses. 
In short, while the experimental evidence of researchers such as 
Isen provides some useful signposts regarding emotion and risk, it 
would seem that there is still a substantial amount of work to be 
done in the clinical area. A possible avenue of research, which, 
while being consistent with most of the results discussed above 
but has more theoretical 'horsepower', regards the distinction 
between automatic and effortful processing.13 For instance, 
Hartledge et al (1993) reviewed the literature and found a clear 
pattern regarding automatic and effortful processing regarding 
13 Hartledge and her colleagues have three key criteria for both automatic and effortful 
processing. Automatic processing takes place without requiring attention or conscious 
awareness, it can occur in parallel with other operations, and occurs without subject intention 
or control. Effortful processing requires attention with a subsequent inhibition of other 
pathways, efficiency of the process improves with practice, and the process can be used to 
cause learning. 
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depression.14 They found that depression interferes with effortful 
processing with the degree of interference being determined by 
the degree of 'effortfulness' of the task, the severity of depression, 
and the valance of the material to be processed. Alternately, 
depression interferes only minimally with automatic processing. 
There are clear parallels between automatic processing and 
emotional processes~ Although the automatic/effortful distinction 
refers to cognitive processes, it would seem that the relation 
between risk-taking (which requires some cognitive appraisal 
before it can sensibly be called 'risk taking') and depression could 
be usefully investigated using such a distinction. 
To return to the Adventure Therapy context, the existing research 
on risk, while being informative, is limited with regard to the 
processes involved in individuals engaging in, and coping with, 
activities which they perceive to be risky. Researchers focusing on 
sensation seeking seem to make an implicit assumption that 
participation in such activities is indicative of some sort of 
pathology, while the risk research generally examines risks (such 
as gambling) which do not mesh easily with the perceived or 
objective risks inherent in Adventure Therapy. 
14 Depression was defined in numerous ways for various studies although, in general, there 
was a greater reliance on clinician diagnosis, with the use of scales to indicate severity. 
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EMOTION AND ADVENTURE THERAPY: A MODEL 
Having assembled the raw materials of an introduction to 
Adventure Therapy, emotion, the role of emotion in psychotherapy 
and the attendant therapeutic implications, it is appropriate to 
begin building a model of the way in which emotion may contribute 
to the process of Adventure Therapy. The aim of constructing the 
model, as was alluded to in the introduction, is to provide a basic, 
theoretically informed framework, that will serve as the basis for 
research. In keeping with the themes of the preceding chapters, 
the model is predicated on four key concepts: (1) the mind in 
place, (2) the adaptive significance of emotion, (3) the 
interpenetration of adventurous activities and (4) the centrality of 
emotion to the therapy process. 
adventurous 
activities 
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Simply put, the model, pictured above, suggests that an individual 
comes to the Adventure Therapy process with a particular mind-in-
place and participates in adventurous activities that have various 
adaptive implications. Participation in these activities precipitates 
an interpenetration of the mind-in-place, the result being an 
opportunity for therapy. The opportunity can then be taken up in 
terms of acknowledging, evoking and restructuring with the end 
result being a shift in mind-in-place. That then, is the model in a 
nutshell. However, on the basis that any model that can only be 
put in a nutshell probably belongs there, described below are the 
components and their interrelationships in more detail. 
In Chapter 3, Alfred, apparently determined to jump to his death 
and girded up against the expected appeals from his psychiatrist 
and other specialists in such behaviour, did not kill himself 
because of the demands of an obnoxious police officer 
inadvertently provoking a shift in Alfred's mind-in-place from 
committed suicider to law-abiding citizen. The shift in Alfred's 
mind-in-place was not effortful but occurred in a largely automatic 
fashion in response to an unexpected pattern of environmental 
input. Clients arrive in Adventure Therapy programs as the result 
of a persistent mind-in-place, typically one which has become 
problematic in some way. It is important to note that while there is 
a temptation to think of the mind-in-place as purely cognitive, as it 
is conceived here, the mind-in-place is a holistic construct that 
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refers to all aspects of an individual's being at a particular time. 
This will necessarily include emotional, cognitive and bodily 
aspects. 
The suggestion that there are substantial shifts between 'minds' is, 
for some, better explained in terms of an automatic adjustment in 
the threshold of accessibility for the use of particular constructs. 
This construct accessibility model, on the basis of its parsimonious 
nature, presents a substantial challenge to the mind-in-place 
approach and deserves consideration. In an often referred to 
study, Srull & Wyer (1979) presented subjects, who thought they 
were participating in a sentence construction task, with words 
related to either hostility or kindness. Following the presentation of 
the words subjects were asked to rate their impressions of a 
person presented to them. Those who had been presented with 
more hostile words as part of the bogus sentence construction 
task rated the hostility of the target person as higher than that of 
those who had been presented with kind words. 
These types of results fitted comfortably within the construct 
accessibility model but Teasdale (1997) reports more recent work, 
conducted along similar experimental lines, such as that by 8argh 
et al. (1994), that is not as easy to explain in terms of construct 
accessibility. Bargh and his colleagues were able to demonstrate 
that the prior presentation of achievement-related words increased 
measures of related goals and motives. Subjects were primed with 
either achievement-related or neutral words and asked, under the 
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guise of a 'language ability' test to make as many words as they 
could out of scrabble letter tiles. The experimenter told the 
subjects that she needed to leave to run another experiment but 
that if she could not get back she would give them the signal to 
stop creating words over an intercom. The subjects were 
surreptitiously observed, and received the instruction to stop 
apparently without any observer present. Of interest were the 
subjects who persisted with the task after being told to stop, with 
persistence being assumed to reflect the subject's level of 
achievement motivation. While 22 percent of the subjects who 
were primed with neutral words persisted with the task, 55percent 
of those primed with achievement-related words persisted. As 
Teasdale points out, such results clearly indicate that the mere 
presentation of achievement words had automatically triggered a 
related motivational state, something that is difficult to explain in 
terms of simple construct accessibility. Such results are much 
more consistent with the mind-in-place notion of changes in 
environmental stimuli resulting in an automatic shift across the 
spectrum of interpretation, behaviour and motivation. 
The construct accessibility model has been used to explain the 
well-researched tendency of depressed individuals to interpret 
experience more negatively (Haaga et al. 1991). However, in a 
recent study (Teasdale et al. 1995), Teasdale and his colleagues 
found a fascinating conterintuitive aspect of depression. Their 
research suggests that mood effects operate not at the level of 
individual negative constructs (as is suggested by the construct 
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accessibility model) but rather at a more generic or higher level of 
representation more consistent with the mind-in-place conception. 
These researchers suggested that although depressed patients 
may regard success or social approval as unlikely, if such events 
were to occur they would be interpreted more positively than in a 
non-depressed state (where personal worth is thought to be 
relatively independent of social approval or one's success or 
failure on a particular task). Furthermore, they suggest that the 
interrelationships between constructs become dysfunctional in 
depression, resulting in closer than usual relationships between 
things such as the view of self and social approval or success on a 
task. 
In a study conducted by Teasdale et al. (1995) subjects were 
given a number of sentence stems and were asked to complete 
them with the first word that came to mind. The sentences were 
constructed so that dysfunctional models (those implying a close 
dependence of personal worth on the positive attention and 
approval of others) would result in positive sentence completions. 
For example, one of the sentences ran: 'For everyone to look to 
me for guidance and advice would make me '. Those 
using a dysfunctional model would complete the sentence 
positively (for example, 'happy') while a those with a more 
functional or realistic model would lead to more negative 
completions (for example, 'exhausted'). This research design 
cleverly separates the construct accessibility view, which would 
predict that depressed patients would make more negative 
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responses, and the mind-in-place model (which concentrates on 
interrelationships and dependencies between constructs) which 
would predict that the depressed patients would give more positive 
completions, a tendency which should decrease with recovery. 
The results of the investigation clearly support the mind-in-place 
view. Depressed patients did indeed give more positive responses 
than non-depressed controls, and at the three month follow-up, 
those depressed patients who had improved gave more negative 
responses. Conversely, those whose mood had deteriorated at 
follow-up showed a marked increase in positive responses. 
Teasdale maintains that the results, which he and others have 
subsequently replicated, support the view that negative depressive 
thinking is better explained in terms of changes in representations 
that reflect the relationships between key aspects of experience, 
rather than by referring to changes in the accessibility of individual 
cognitive constructs. 
In terms of the current model, this is an important point because 
otherwise it would be clearly more expedient to target specific 
thoughts and to challenge them, in a form of cognitive 
'panel beating' rather than taking a more holistic approach as is 
being suggested here. This is of course what a crude version of 
Beck's Cognitive Behaviour Therapy would resemble. While the 
identification of negative thoughts is still a key element of CBT, it 
is interesting to note that a recurrent theme in the recent CBT 
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literature is the need for an integrative approach to 
psychothera py.1 
Such a view of mind-in-place also suggests that any form of 
psychological treatment needs to create in some way either a way 
of wheeling in new more adaptive minds or, more probably, 
reinstituting already existing minds while excluding the less useful 
ones. One approach to this (the one which Teasdale 
recommends) is to concentrate on -creating a 'store' of alternative 
depression-related models which are associated with as a wide a 
variety of eliciting contexts as possible. Such an approach has 
clear merit but relies on being able to identify exactly what the 
possible eliciting contexts are, a task which the mind-in-place 
model suggests would become a Sisyphean struggle due to the 
potentially infinite combinations of eliciting contexts. 
Another approach is to provide a foundation by working within an 
environment that has particular salience due to its adaptive 
implications for the individual. Interestingly, Beck, the founder of 
cognitive therapy, appears to offer tacit support for such a view. 
He writes: 
The modes, consisting of integrated sectors or 
suborganizations of personality, are designed to deal with 
specific demands or problems. The "primal modes" of most 
interest for the study of psychopathology include the 
derivatives of ancient organisations that evolved in prehistoric 
circumstances and are manifested in survival reactions, but 
also, in an exaggerated way, in psychiatric disorders (1996:2). 
1 See the volume "Frontiers of Cognitive Therapy" (1996) and in particular a chapter by Beck 
himself entitled "Beyond Belief', which highlights the need for an integrated view. 
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It is suggested here that an effective means of addressing 
problematic minds-in-place is to initially work within a context that 
makes deep adaptive sense to the individual in terms of survival. 
Furthermore, as has been frequently stated in earlier chapters, 
emotion is at the forefront of the provision of adaptively relevant 
information to the organism. This suggests that adaptive activities 
that have substantial emotionality attached to them will be most 
useful. Of course, in keeping with the theme of the current work, it 
. is suggested that adventurous activities provide a readily 
accessible means of entering such a context. 
What is it, then, about adventurous activities which would result in 
access to fundamental adaptive information? To set the stage, 
consider briefly the context within which the emotions are 
generally thought to have evolved in humans. In evolutionary 
\ 
terms, give or take a dozen millennia, our evolution reached its 
current form 40 000 years ago. The world, for almost all of 
humanity during almost all of our history, was small, tribal and 
stable in terms of environment. We are the way we are because of 
the way the world was for us 40 000 years ago. That world, 
however, has changed, especially for the western industrial 'us'. 
Consider what would now be thought of as an extended 
wilderness journey of ten days. Technological changes in 
equipment and the journeys intent excepting, the similarities rather 
than differences between modern humans and our ancestors are 
apparent. Both groups need to walk, to carry or find food, to 
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cooperate to survive and to adapt to environmental demands in 
terms of weather, terrain, wildlife and so on. 
It is important to clearly point out that what is being envisaged 
here is not a 'back to nature' therapeutic intervention, with its 
attendant philosophical baggage, but rather the formulation 
(through particular activities) of an environment that, in an 
adaptive way, 'makes sense'. As was seen in Chapter 1, it is a 
common enough theme in the Adventure Therapy literature that an 
unfamiliar environment is seen as a key part of the Adventure 
Therapy process. What is being suggested here is an extension of 
this notion, in that the outdoors may indeed be immediately 
unfamiliar to participants, but that in terms of evolutionary history, 
it is quite familiar and is therefore an appropriate context for the 
psychotherapeutic exploration of emotional themes. 
Another important aspect of engaging in adventurous activities is 
the potential such activities have for allowing participants to gain a 
wider perspective of their problems and symptoms. It is tempting 
to think only in terms of the activities providing compelling 
distraction from current difficulties in much the same way as has 
been suggested by Fennell et al. (1987) who pointed out that 
some tasks are incompatible with depression.2 But what is being 
suggested here is that engaging in such activities prompts 
2 Recent developments in cognitive therapy for psychosis suggest that distraction can provide 
some relief from hallucinations (for an overview see Haddock & Slade, 1996). Similarly, 
anecdotal reports from Adventure Therapists suggest that clients, when engaged in highly 
focused activities such as climbing and abseiling, do not experience hallucinations to the same 
degree. 
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participants to be move from 'being' only their negative problems 
and symptoms to a situation in which, while they may still 
experience such difficulties, the difficulties are experienced as part 
of a wider context. 
Rather than examining all the possible activities which Adventure 
Therapy participants may engage in, a consideration of the 
features of rock climbing and abseiling with regard to the role of 
emotion will serve to illustrate the potential utility of such activities. 
Heights appear to be naturally fear-inducing in humans. Using an 
apparatus called the visual cliff,3 Campos and his colleagues 
(1978) were able to provide indirect evidence (based on heart-
rate4) that infants (six to seven months of age) who were placed 
on the deep side of the cliff were capable of detecting a drop and 
responded with fear. Interestingly, although infants as young as 
four months of age have at least basic depth perception, they do 
not respond fearfully to the visual cliff. In what has become an 
ongoing series of experiments, Campos and his colleagues have 
established that the emergence of fear is associated with the 
development of depth perception plus approximately three weeks 
of crawling or self-locomotion. With regard to Adventure Therapy, 
it is notable that climbing and abseiling are a part of the vast 
majority of programs and that major programs such as Project 
Adventure use ropes courses as the basis of their therapeutic 
3 The visual cliff is a glass topped table of which one side has a chequered cover very near the 
glass top and on the other the glass is separated from the cover by approximately 60 
centimetres. 
4 See Fox & Calkins (1993) for an overview of the use of heart-rate and vagal tone as a means 
of investigating infant emotion. 
161 
work. Although there does not appear to be any particular 
research on why climbing and abseiling should be such an integral 
part of most Adventure Therapy programs it would seem that it is 
these activities that are most likely to cause fear, followed by 
positive emotion as the result of having completed the activity. 
It is at this point that the need for research based on people's 
emotional processes during such activities becomes clearly 
evident. While the research on coping and risk described in 
Chapter 5, and the anecdotes of practitioners and reports of 
participants strongly suggests that emotion will be a dynamic and 
influential process as people engage in such activities, there is no 
body of literature to delineate exactly what is occurring. While 
'processing', as described in Chapter 1, especially with regard to 
how individuals 'felt', has become commonplace as part of the 
Adventure Therapy process, there does not appear to have been, 
as yet, any systematic research. 
What is clear, however, is that for most, participants, climbing and 
abseiling over substantial drops will be a frightening experience to 
greater or lesser degrees. Experience with clients and anecdotal 
reports suggest that participants experience considerable 
anticipatory anxiety, which is often related to peer or self 
evaluations as to how they will cope, followed by fears about not 
being able to escape from the situation, and fears about injury or 
death when actually engaged in the activity. With the exception of 
fears about animals, this is entirely consistent with the factor 
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analytic work of Arrindell et a/. (1991) on self-reported fear of large 
samples of adults. This work identified four primary factors, all of 
which have clear adaptive significance: (1) fears about 
interpersonal events or situations, (2) fears related to death, blood, 
injuries and the like, (3) fears about animals and (4) agoraphobic 
type fears. However, what is also remarkable about observing 
clients who have completed the activity is the speed with which the 
fears dissipate and with which exhilaration sets in.5 The often 
reported experience of people who have had a na rrow escape 
from danger, where some time later they have the actual 
experience of fearfulness, does not seem to occur often in 
Adventure Therapy situations, a phenomenon that if substantiated, 
would provide an interesting avenue of research.6 
The main point to be made here is that rock climbing and abseiling 
typically provide participants with an experience that, with emotion 
at the forefront, is almost completely absorbing, pervading all 
aspects of an individual's current being. ThJs is what is being 
referred to by the concept of interpenetration where, following 
Lazarus (1991), cognitive, motivational and emotional activities, all 
focused on actions within an environment, are engaged. Lazarus 
maintains that this is the essence of therapeutic change and what 
is being suggested here is that interpenetration within an adaptive 
environment is a precursor to therapeutic change, providing a 
5 See Ruch (1993) for an overview of exhilaration. 
6 Izard (1991) provides a brief discussion of 'delayed' or 'postponed' fear and points out that 
although it is a widely recognised phenomenon, there are, as yet, no sUbstantial explanations 
as to the processes involved. A possible explanation is that as one function of fear is to 
organise and motivate escape, if there is no escape possible the fear may only add to the 
danger. 
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context within which a shift in mind-in-place can occur. This 
interpenetration suggests an unavoidable adaptive integration that 
can serve as a reference point in proceed ing therapeutic 
interventions. 
Any reference to the need for integration suggests that a key 
aspect of psychopathology is a lack of integration or what Lazarus 
(1991 :461) refers to as disconnections. He suggests that there are 
four types of disconnection: 
1. Within the mind - what has traditionally been referred to as 
intrapsychic conflict. 
2. Between the mind and environment - for instance where a 
threat is appraised inappropriately, resulting in anxiety, guilt 
or shame, and when real threats are unapprised or when 
the coping process employed is inappropriate. 
3. Between mind and action - consisting of two subvarieties, 
actions failing to conform to intentions, and intentions not 
expressed in action. 
4. Between environment and action - which refers to a lack of 
fit between appraisal or coping and the environment. 
By examining these disconnections, it is apparent that each of the 
therapeutic schools described in Chapter 3 emphasise particular 
disconnections. For instance, a disconnection within the mind 
clearly fits most easily within the psychoanalytic school, 
particularly the later thought of Freud. While some may argue that 
it is little more than terminological obfuscation and that we may as 
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well talk about the unconscious, the notion of automatic versus 
effortful processing which was raised in Chapter 5 suggests that, 
particularly with regard to anxiety, there is a disconnection 
between these two modes of processing. What is also apparent, 
however, is that the emphasis on one particular disconnection 
results in therapy that does not connect with other aspects of the 
holistically conceptualised mind. Or, to apply the mind-in-place 
conceptualisation, an intervention that does not activate all the 
aspects of a more adaptive mind-in-place is unlikely to bring that 
mind-in-place to the fore. 
Interpenetration, then, prompts the implementation of a new mind-
in-place and, if of sufficient salience to the individual, the 
experiences which prompt the interpenetration will provide a kind 
of 'home base' for an individual's own therapy. At this point, it is 
worth attempting to make some sort of distinction between 
'therapeutic' and 'therapy'. It would seem that most Adventure 
Therapists actually work within a therapeutic realm, where the 
activities provide a reorienting and healthy (in the broadest sense 
of the word) experience for participants. Within this realm it makes 
sense that adventurous activities should be generally 'useful', as is 
evidenced by the diverse populations.described in Chapter 1. It is 
also important to remember that for many people the activities 
which comprise these programs are recreational pursuits, 
engaged in presumably because people perceive benefit from 
doing so. 
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Therapy however, as it is being conceived of here, is a matter of 
intentionally (both on the part of the client and therapist) 
addressing specific concerns, and using specific techniques, 
within the holistic framework presented above. The transition into 
therapy also presupposes that the therapist is cognisant of the 
general principles of psychotherapy and the specific difficulties 
with which clients may present. This distinction has been a 
contentious issue within the Adventure Therapy world, with the 
inaugural world conference in 1997 devoting considerable time 
and debate to the issue. 
The model which is being presented here suggests that the first 
two aspects (adventurous activities and interpenetration) are 
therapeutic but that once the interpenetration of the activities is 
utilised to address specific concerns, participants are engaged in 
therapy. The model therefore has two stages, with the way in 
which interpenetration is utilised constituting the boundary 
between the two stages. What may often occur, however, is that 
individuals essentially self-prescribe the first stages of the model 
so as to 'get over' particular difficulties, a process which facilators 
of these activities may wittingly or unwittingly participate in. 
Perhaps the commonest form of this self-prescription is a desire to 
overcome a fear of heights by going climbing or abseiling. The 
obvious danger with this form of 'treatment' is the potential for 
sensitisation (Andrews et al., 1994) thereby actually lowering the 
likelihood of seeking appropriate treatment. Mitten (1994) also 
points out that there is a danger when depressed individuals who 
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have previously enjoyed an activity such as rock-climbing in a 
supervised setting try to lift their mood by climbing themselves. 
The nature of depression, with its attendant cognitive deficits 
(such as attentional and processing speed deficits, see for 
example, Lezak, 1995) may result in poor judgement, which in an 
unsupervised situation, places the individual in real danger as 
opposed to the perceived danger of Adventure Therapy. 
Proceeding into the therapy realm, the model suggests that the 
interpenetration of adventurous activities, with their high affective 
component, provides a valuable opportunity for therapy. The 
interpenetration provides, for both the therapist and client, a 'back 
stage pass' to the way in which the client is processing important 
adaptive information. For example, interest for the current work 
was piqued by anecdotes from Adventure Therapy practitioners 
and personal, observation of clients who, despite being in what 
were fear provoking situations, became angry and abusive to both 
instructors and other participants to the exclusion of both support 
and assistance. This is the sort of information that would be 
unlikely to be elicited with such clarity in a standard assessment 
situation. 
Assessment is a key part of any therapy and it would seem that, in 
contrast to the plethora of single trait measures (for example of 
anxiety or anger), assessment in the context of Adventure Therapy 
programs provides a valuable insight into the client's way of 
adapting to the world. Before proceeding to any particular 
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'treatment', an assessment needs to be made in terms of the way 
in which the client is processing information. Greenberg (1993) 
suggests that there are four key areas which should be considered 
when making a 'process diagnosis', all of which could be 
undertaken in the course of an Adventure Therapy program: 
1. Biologically adaptive primary affective responses - referring 
to the experiences of emotion that provide information 
about an appropriate response to the environment. 
2. Secondary reactive emotional responses - in a way that 
reflects Lazarus's (1991) distinction between primary and 
secondary appraisal as described in Chapter 5, these 
responses are secondary to the primary generating 
processes. They are perhaps most easily conceived of as 
defensive responses. 
3. Instrumental emotional responses - the emotional 
responses that individuals have learned as a way to 
influence others, such as crying to elicit sympathy or using 
anger to dominate. 
4. Learned maladaptive primary responses - although, as has 
been discussed at length above, emotions are generally 
adaptive, in the case of sustained negative contingencies in 
childhood it may be possible for individuals to learn 
maladaptive primary responses. The example presented 
above, of an individual becoming angry in response to fear, 
which has the effect of excluding assistance or care, could 
be conceived of in terms of a learned maladpative primary 
response. 
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The focus of the model is on the emotional processes involved in 
Adventure Therapy, and their contribution to therapy, and as such, 
attention now turns to particular applications. These applications 
are based on the therapeutic implications presented in Chapter 4 
and are organised under the general framework of emotional 
change processes which relate to acknowledging, evoking and 
restructuring. 
It is important to remain mindful that no attempt is being made 
here to encompass the spectrum of possible types of therapy 
techniques and it is not being suggested that emotional 
intervention processes are the be all and end all of therapy. 
However, in light of the theory and research which has been 
presented in previous chapters, to ignore emotional interventions 
in therapy is to risk closing the shutters on a basic aspect of 
human experience, thereby fundamentally compromising the 
potential effectiveness of therapy. 
Acknowledging emotion, as was described in Chapter 4, is largely 
a matter of assisting clients to attend to their emotions. In terms of 
the therapeutic implications discussed in Chapter 4, the two 
factors which seem most applicable are the need for the complete 
processing of emotion to enhance adaptive functioning and the 
personal clarity and control that results from cognisance of 
elicitors of emotion. In terms of the primary change process 
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involved t the processes involved fall under the general rubric of 
experiencing. 
In general, techniques designed to train clients in attending to 
emotion are based on the cognitive construction of a relevant 
situation? The difficulty regarding such training, which was alluded 
to in Chapter 3 with regard to the work of Bandura, is captured in a 
distinction that is now over a hundred years old. William James 
(1890) referred to know/edge by acquaintance and know/edge by 
description. Knowledge by description is knowledge about 
something whereas knowledge by acquaintance involves direct 
experience. Bandura (1997), in an empirically based analysis, 
points out that verbal persuasion or 'talking' is not as effective as 
actual experience in learning. 
Adventure Therapy activities t as a result of their ability to provoke 
emotion that is part of a broader adaptive context, clearly provide 
a valuable context for the exploration of experiencing emotion. 
Clients can be directed towards attending to bodily sensations, 
action tendencies and all the other aspects of emotional 
processing. In terms of Adventure Therapy, it would seem that the 
activities provide a context for learning to attend to emotion that is 
personally non-threatening in terms of the particular difficulties that 
a client may bring to therapy. For example, for clients suffering 
from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, a feature of which is 
emotional numbing (DSM-IV), to attempt to learn (or re-Iearn) to 
7 See, for example, Gendlin's (1981) description of how clients may be trained in 'focusing'. 
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attend to emotion only in the context of their traumatic experience 
is likely to be counterproductive (van Der Kolk, 1996). However, as 
Levine (1994) explains, women who have experienced sexual 
assault benefit from being able to experience 'warded off' 
emotions within an Adventure Therapy context before proceeding 
to examining their traumatic experience within a conventional 
counselling context. 
Also mentioned above with regard to acknowledging was that 
awareness of elicitors provides personal clarity and control. As has 
been suggested with regard to climbing, humans havve an 
apparently hard-wired fear of heights. There is. in other words, a 
clear elicitor. A feature of anxiety disorders, and Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder in particular, is fear that, for sufferers is 
unattributable to any particular cause (Rapee,1990). In terms of 
using adventurous activities with such clients, there would seem to 
be potential for using such activities as the basis for beginning to 
orientate clients to the various aspects of being frightened. By 
being able to reflect on a clear eliciting stimuli, clients may begin to 
identify other eliciting stimuli, thereby gaining some sense of 
mastery and control (Bandura, 1997) .. 
As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, the evoking of 
emotion with a view to promoting a cathartic effect has been 
almost synonymous with emotional change processes. In terms of 
the model presented, the use of adventurous activities in order to 
promote a cathartic experience for an individual is not consistent 
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with the adaptive framework within which the activities have been 
conceptualised. Furthermore, suggestions that all that is required 
to provoke a cathartic effect is a highly emotional experience 
which will then produce a therapeutic result, seems to presuppose 
that one emotional 'episode' is much like another. However, in 
terms of the mind-in-place conceptualisation, the emotion that is 
evoked by activities such as climbing may provide valuable 
insights for both the client and therapist into the nature of the 
current mind-in-place. This is based on the information processing 
perspective and more particularly on the work of Leventhal (1984) 
who proposed that the activation of one component of a schema is 
likely to result in the 'reeling off of the entire schema, as was 
described in Chapter 2. 
In terms of emotionally focused interventions, Greenberg & Safran 
(1987) suggest that emotion leads to accessing what they 
describe as 'hot cognitions'. While their distinction between 'hot' 
cognitions, which are affectively laden, and 'cold' rational, affect 
free thoughts seems, to mix metaphors, rather black and white. It 
has an intuitive appeal in terms of an effective means of accessing 
key therapy issues. Once clients have a clear experience of a 
particular emotional process, accessing problematic or traumatic 
aspects of a client's world may be as simple as asking "are there 
other times when you have felt like this?". This type of approach is 
consistent with Frijda's (1986) analysis of catharsis presented in 
Chapter 4 where, rather than 'letting off steam', the emotional 
experience is activated, the context is personalised, and the 
172 
completion of a previously interrupted sequence is facilitated. 
Once again, in general terms, the features inherent in the activity 
provide a general context from which to proceed on to therapy 
which is more closely focused on the client's particular difficulties. 
The third general category of emotionally focused intervention is 
restructuring. Virtually all the techniques and procedures that have 
been discussed could potentially fall under this category. The 
emphasis here will be on restructuring as it relates to interpersonal 
aspects of Adventure Therapy. Considered briefly are both the 
adaptive aspects of interpersonal interaction in the course of 
adventurous activities, and the unique aspects of the therapeutic 
relationship in Adventure Therapy. 
As was pointed out in Chapter 4, a therapeutic implication of the 
research on emotion is that awareness of the communicative 
aspect of emotion enhances interaction. In terms of 
psychotherapy, Kiesler (1982, 1986), in a similar way to Sullivan 
(1953), suggested that 'problems in living' are the result of 
inappropriate, disordered, or inadequate interpersonal 
communication. Defined in interpersonal terms, a client's 
experience of emotion is seen as a significant part of interpersonal 
transactions. Kiesler maintained that these transactions, rather 
than being linear in terms of a single cause, are circular, where the 
effect of the transaction shapes the meaning of the interaction. 
The problems that are typically the focus of therapy are 
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communicated as a part of this process with emotion constituting 
an important 'channel' of that communication. 
Consistent with the theme that is emerging within the model, the 
conventional therapy setting, typically an office, limits 
communication to a particular style. This restricted medium for 
communication will tend to present emotional difficulties as 
emerging from 'within' the client rather than as a part of how the 
person is in the world. The work of anthropologically oriented 
theorists such as Lutz and White has already been mentioned and 
suggests that emotion is not only 'within' as is suggested by the 
dominant psychobiological models but is also 'without', existing 
within a social world where the currency of human transaction is 
commu nication. 
Out of the office, and in an adaptive environment, there is potential 
for the observation of a much broader field of communication. As 
has been already pointed out, the control precedence of emotion 
that occurs within the context of some adventurous activities 
provides a 'backstage pass' to an individual's particular reactions 
to a broad range of environmental features. For instance, 
Adventure Therapy is almost invariably carried out in small groups, 
within which activities are often formulated so as to engender 
group co-operation and trust. Most people for instance, are familiar 
with 'trust falls', where an individual falls backwards and is caught 
by the other members of the group. Commonly, individuals will 
seek reassurance from the group that they will indeed be caught, 
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communicating their apprehension not only verbally, but also 
emotionally with visible signs of apprehension. The fear of the 
individual alerts other members of the group to pay attention and 
typically the group will reassure the individual that they will indeed 
catch them. Climbing, where an individual needs to rely on a 
belayer to hold the rope in the event of a fall, elicits similar 
commu nication. 
By broadening the scope within which the communicative aspects 
of emotion can be elicited, both therapist and client can gain 
insights into the communicative function of emotion for the client, 
and more particularly, any anomalies in this communication that 
may be problematic. As was discussed in Chapter 4, therapists 
may often feel 'pulled' to make a complementary response to a 
client's emotion in a therapy session, which in turn elicits a 
repetition of the client's actions. What is often overlooked, 
however, is that there is an implicit assumption that the way the 
client responds in the context of a therapy session is the way they 
respond in other situations. Such a view does not seem to take 
into account the particular dynamics (such as power imbalances) 
that may be part of such an encounter. Having said that, the 
therapeutic relationship is, as has been suggested in Chapter 4, a 
key therapeutic ingredient. 
The therapeutic relationship is usually one where it is tacitly 
agreed that, in contrast to most intimate relationships, only one 
person (the client) will share their most intimate experiences and 
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concerns with their attendant emotions, with another person (the 
therapist) who does not reciprocate with the sharing of the intimate 
details of his or her own life (Butler & Strupp, 1991). Furthermore, 
there is an understanding that the client will describe the 
problematic aspects of life, rather than having the therapist 
present in the client's everyday environment. In contrast, the 
typical Adventure Therapy environment involves both client and 
therapist spending considerable amounts of time in each other's 
company, while simultaneously involved in what can be everyday 
activities. This is particularly true of wilderness oriented programs, 
where therapists and clients are often together for extended 
periods and where the everyday aspects of life, including cooking, 
travelling and sleeping are shared. 
At this point, it is worth noting some of the special considerations 
that arise in this environment with regard to the therapeutic 
relationship, and the ethical considerations that subsequently need 
to be taken into account.8 As is apparent from the preceding 
discussion, a key part of Adventure Therapy is taking clients both 
out of their everyday environment, and also into situations that are 
well outside the client's 'comfort zone'. In a standard therapy 
situation clients may often become dependant to one degree or 
another on the therapist as a result of the support they find. In an 
Adventure Therapy context, the same client may not only be 
dependant on the general support of the therapist but also for very 
8 Mitten (1994) provides one of the most thought-provoking discussions of ethics in Adventure 
Therapy particularly with regard to the patriarchal history of the field and in particular, the 
concerns of women in light of this history. 
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basic needs such as food, shelter and protection, as well as the 
technical skills required to participate safely in some activities. 
When one also considers that clients are most likely coming to 
Adventure Therapy as the result of problematic aspects in their 
lives which may have resulted in increased feelings of vulnerability 
there is obviously a need to be constantly watchful as to 
professional boundaries and ethical practise.9 
With such concerns clearly in mind, in terms of the current model 
such considerations are also indicative of the potential for 
restructuring, particularly in terms of what could broadly be called 
a 'corrective emotional experience'. Greenberg (1993) suggests 
that there are two key elements required if successful emotional 
restructuring is to occur. Firstly, as has been discussed above, 
relevant activating information must be provided to the individual. 
The intrinsically adaptive nature of the Adventure Therapy ecology 
provides considerable activating information. Secondly, and most 
importantly with regard to the corrective emotional experience, 
novel information must be provided that is incompatible with 
existing structures, or mind-in-place. In light of the research 
presented in Chapter 4, it would seem that the initial medium 
through which these interpersonal elements are communicated is 
affective attunement. 
At this point it is apparent that there is a tension between resisting 
perpetuating a possibly maladaptive 'pull' from the client while still 
9 For an overview and interesting analysis of professional boundaries, see Peterson (1992). 
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being able to demonstrate the attunement that is so crucial to 
establishing the therapeutic alliance. While there is no 
straightforward solution to this tension, it is possible that in a 
'standard' therapy setting the problematic 'pull' is accentuated 
because of the sharp focus that is being drawn on the very 
aspects of the individual's experience that are likely to elicit it. 
When the environment, both in terms of physical surroundings and 
activities, is less focused on the individual's particular difficulties or 
diagnosis in favour of his or her 'being', it is possible that there is 
less potential for becoming enmeshed in dynamics which are likely 
to be well entrenched. Instead there is the potential to 
demonstrate an attunement to a more diverse range of emotions, 
thereby widening the scope for the provision of novel information. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the lack of scope 
within a conventional therapy context to attune in an immediate 
way to a client's happiness. In general, as was apparent in 
Chapter 3, psychotherapy practice is focused on the experience of 
negative emotions. However, the activities which are an integral 
part of Adventure Therapy are designed to make successful 
completion likely. This means there is far more opportunity for the 
therapist and other group members to participate in a particular 
clients exhilaration or happiness at the achievement of a goal 
(Averill & More,1993; Ruch,1993). 
The other aspect which is apparently unresearched is the effect of 
group members attuning to a particular clients emotion in an 
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Adventure Therapy setting and the subsequent impact such 
attunement may have in terms of providing a corrective emotional 
experience. There is, of course, a considerable body of research 
and theory which demonstrates the impact of others on the 
experience of emotion and the expression of emotion in groups.10 
It is important to keep in mind that, as was pointed out above, the 
so-called 'emotional disorders' are not only a matter of what 
comes from within an individual but also of that individual's 
emotional being in the world and the reactions of others to that 
being. Being able to experience the attunement of others to 
experiences which are not 'disordered' clearly has the potential to 
deliver significant novel information that can lead to the 
restructuring of emotional reactions. 
Restructuring, evoking and acknowledging, as they are being 
presented here, are probably best envisaged as a type of 
ecological constructivism. By being a part of an adaptive physical 
and interpersonal environment, a participant is presented with 
novel information about needs and concerns that facilitates both 
the egress of a problematic mind-in-place and the ingress of a 
more adaptive mind-in-place. 
Summary 
The model presented above, of the role of emotion in Adventure 
Therapy, is a two stage process which suggests that the 
experience of participating in adventurous activities is therapeutic 
10 See Strongman (1996) for an overview. 
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in and of itself, and that participation can, in the second stage, 
provide a valuable substrate for therapy. The second stage of the 
model was presented in very general terms, but in practice would 
be tailored to an individual client, based on a thorough 
assessment of what particular issues are presenting as 
problematic. The model does not purport in any way to cover the 
gamet of what therapy may involve, but does suggest that any 
intervention that does not involve an emotional component will be 
therapeutically underpowered. 
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The preceding discussion suggests that Adventure Therapy 
provides an adaptive context for addressing a broad range of 
'problems of living'. The focus has been on exploring the way in 
which emotion may contribute to the therapeutic process. Based 
on the research and theory presented, there is good reason to 
suspect that, as is the case for other approaches to therapy, 
emotion is a key therapeutic element in Adventure Therapy. The 
model which has been presented is an attempt to describe a way 
in which emotion may be conceptualised as operating within the 
Adventure Therapy context. 
While the model is grounded in research and theory from both the 
academic and therapy literature it is speculative and requires 
substantive research. As was apparent from the research on 
coping and risk, substantive research often reveals 
counterintuitive features which result in the revision of existing 
models. However, the coping and risk research also revealed that, 
while there are some interesting suggestions as to the processes 
at work, there is a clear need to investigate Adventure Therapy in 
a naturalistic context. The Adventure Therapy research that does 
exist, perhaps driven by the need to demonstrate efficacy, has 
tended to focus on general outcomes such as broadly defined 
improvements in self-esteem. What is required, however, is 
process research that illuminates what occurs in course of 
Adventure Therapy. 
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Rennie & Toukmanian (1992), following Bruner (1986), describe 
two approaches to research, paradigmatic and narrative, that are 
used within the psychotherapy domain. The paradigmatic 
approach is logico-scientific where demonstrative reasoning gives 
rise to hypotheses about the causes of relations between 
phenomena, and verification of hypotheses is taken as evidence 
of general laws. The paradigmatic approach, consistent with the 
realist philosophical attitude which underpins it, suggests that 
there is a world external to the observer that can be understood 
objectively. In general, the paradigmatic approach has prevailed in 
psychotherapy research and similarly, Adventure Therapy 
research has tended to reflect this with an emphasis on pre and 
post measures across various dimensions. 
The narrative approach in contrast to the deductive, 
demonstrative, and quantitative approach of the paradigmatic 
orientation is inductive, hermeneutical, and qualitative. The 
narrative approach supposes that individual reasons and 
experiences are not only particular, but that they are also the 
product of both individual and social interpretation. Without 
entering the debate about the compatibility of such approaches 1 it 
would seem that methodological fundamentalism regarding either 
perspective is likely to limit rather than expand what can be known 
about the role of emotion in Adventure Therapy. For instance the 
1 See Polkinghorne (1988) and Miles & Huberman (1984) for representative discussions of the 
utility and compatibility of the two approaches. 
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experimental work of Teasdale (1997) brought to light higher order 
interrelationships indicative of a mind-in-place which could 
subsequently be elaborated by the 'collective recursion' that 
Crawford et al (1992) used to investigate gender and emotion. 
In terms of emotion in Adventure Therapy there is clearly a need 
to engage in research which taps the experience of participants in 
such programs. For before any suggestions can be made about 
the most efficacious emotionally focused interventions, there is a 
clear need to hear what occurs for participants. One of the 
questions that looms largest is whether or not those who have 
emotional disorders have the same experience of adventurous 
activities as those who do not, especially with regard to emotional 
regulation processes. The emotional experiences of particular 
groups is also an important avenue of research. Of particular 
concern is the urgent need to explore the experiences of women 
within Adventure Therapy contexts. While an excellent start has 
been made by Cole, Erdman & Rothblum (1994) on outlining the 
experiences of women within what has traditionally been a men 
only space (both in terms of environment and ideology), the work 
of Crawford et al (1992) suggests that the emotional experience of 
women within such programs may be quite different to that of male 
participants. 
The model which has been presented provides a conceptual 
framework within which substantive investigation of the role of 
emotion within Adventure Therapy might proceed using a variety 
183 
of methodological approaches. It is expected, and hoped, that 
such research would contribute to the revision and elaboration of 
the model. 
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